3-416msg2.txt

该程序实现的是一个垃圾邮件过滤系统

Subject: rule , innateness , psychological reality

guido vanden wyngaerd ( vol-3 - 395 ) claim that the wh-island constraint be innate . if it be innate , there be really nothing to explain . to vindicate his claim , wyngaerd purport to show that cognitive principle such as analogy make false prediction about how the structure of yes-no question be acquire : if it be acquire by analogy , one would expect a more or less random distribution over ( 1a ) and ( 1b ) : ( 1 ) a is [ the man who be tall ] _ _ in the room ? b * is [ the man who _ _ tall ] be in the room ? as the reason for this distributional expectation wyngaerd give this : > give that the main source of evidence on yes-no question at the child 's > disposal will overwhelmingly consist of simple sentence of the form " is > the man _ _ in the room " , the child could make the generalisation either > in way : in term of linear precedence ( " front the first finite verb " , > yield ( 1b ) ) or in term of hierarchical structure ( " front the finite verb > which follow the subject " , yield ( 1a ) ) . the fact that child do not > make mistake in this respect ( ie do not form ( 1b ) ) clearly show that > the rule be not one learn by experience , the relevant experience not > be rich enough to determine the nature of the rule and not be > able to explain the absence of mistake . the above passage prove nothing . it would be interest , indeed , to hear psycholinguist ' opinion about this kind of conjectural psycholinguistic . meanwhile , let me continue conjecture , for the sake of argument . that " the relevant experience [ be not ] rich enough to determine the nature of the rule " echo the well-known ' poverty of stimulus ' argument , which have never be prove . in the case at hand , it be easy to conjecture what sort of datum / experience be relevant for a child to infer that yes-no question be form in term of hierarchical structure . consider where-question : where be [ x ] ? [ x ] be in z . is [ x ] in z ? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - where be [ x who be y ] ? [ x who be y ] be in z . is [ x who be y ] in z ? in principle , analogy work here quite well : the where-question display the hierarchy which can be analogically extend to other case . but i be not concern with whether or not analogy work in this particular case . what i be concern with be , object to wholesale innatism . notice that this do not make me a _ tabulum _ rasa _ proselyte . certainly child possess innate cognitive principle and ability , but from this it do not follow that human being be necessarily endow with a grammar as a mental organ ; nor do it follow that the cognitive principle be linguistic or grammatical in nature . it should be clear from my earlier posting that i do not hold that " child only produce what they hear " . so , i concur with wyngaerd 's view that > children do not hear > form like " buy " , " eat " , or " goe " , yet they all go through a stage > where they produce these form . this can only be because they make > generalization ( rule , if you like ) , which go beyond what they hear . i expect wyngaerd to concur with me that form like " buy " , " eat " , or " goe " be due to analogy . > as far as the rest of nyman 's remark be concern , i still fail to > see how and why they motivate a distinction between grule and lrule : in his _ knowledge _ of _ grammar _ ( 1986 ) , chomsky speak of rule as follw : " it may be appropriate to describe the way a sheep dog collect the flock , or the way a spider spin a web , or the way a cockroach walk in term of rule follow , with reference to underlie " competence " consist of rule of some sort . . . " ( 239 ) . if you think this be analogical to linguistic behavior , you win need recognize the conceptual distinction between social norms-of - language ( l - rule as object of common knowledge ) and theoretical generalization as formulate by a linguist ( g - rule ) . g ( rammatical ) rule need not be psychologically real , but if they be suppose to be psychologically valid , this means that g - rule be suppose to describe what the internalize rule must consist in ; no one know how " brain rule " be represent ( mentalese ? ) . marttus nyman department of linguistic , university of helsinkus , finland