📄 rfc2684.txt
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| BAsize | Header +-------------------------------+ ------- | MAC destination address | +-------------------------------+ | | | (remainder of MAC frame) | | | +-------------------------------+ | | | Common PDU Trailer | | | +-------------------------------+ Payload Format for BPDUs +-------------------------------+ | | | BPDU as defined by | | 802.1(d) or 802.1(g) | | | +-------------------------------+Grossman & Heinanen Standards Track [Page 12]RFC 2684 Multiprotocol Over AALS September 1999 In case of Ethernet, 802.3, 802.4, 802.5, and FDDI PDUs the presense or absence of the trailing LAN FCS shall be identified implicitly by the VC, since the PID field is not included. PDUs with the LAN FCS and PDUs without the LAN FCS are thus considered to belong to different protocols even if the bridged media type would be the same.7. Bridging in an ATM Network A bridge with an ATM interface that serves as a link to one or more other bridge MUST be able to flood, forward, and filter bridged PDUs. Flooding is performed by sending the PDU to all possible appropriate destinations. In the ATM environment this means sending the PDU through each relevant VC. This may be accomplished by explicitly copying it to each VC or by using a point-to-multipoint VC. To forward a PDU, a bridge MUST be able to associate a destination MAC address with a VC. It is unreasonable and perhaps impossible to require bridges to statically configure an association of every possible destination MAC address with a VC. Therefore, ATM bridges must provide enough information to allow an ATM interface to dynamically learn about foreign destinations beyond the set of ATM stations. To accomplish dynamic learning, a bridged PDU MUST conform to the encapsulation described in section 5. In this way, the receiving ATM interface will know to look into the bridged PDU and learn the association between foreign destination and an ATM station.8. Virtual Private Network (VPN) identification The encapsulation defined in this section applies only to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) that operate over an ATM subnet. A mechanism for globally unique identification of Virtual Private multiprotocol networks is defined in [11]. The 7-octet VPN-Id consists of a 3-octet VPN-related OUI (IEEE 802-1990 Organizationally Unique Identifier), followed by a 4-octet VPN index which is allocated by the owner of the VPN-related OUI. Typically, the VPN- related OUI value is assigned to a VPN service provider, which then allocates VPN index values for its customers.Grossman & Heinanen Standards Track [Page 13]RFC 2684 Multiprotocol Over AALS September 19998.1 VPN Encapsulation Header The format of the VPN encapsulation header is as follows: VPN Encapsulation Header +-------------------------------+ | LLC 0xAA-AA-03 | +-------------------------------+ | OUI 0x00-00-5E | +-------------------------------+ | PID 0x00-08 | +-------------------------------+ | PAD 0x00 | +-------------------------------+ | VPN related OUI (3 octets) | +-------------------------------+ | VPN Index (4 octets) | +-------------------------------+ | | | (remainder of PDU) | | | +-------------------------------+ When the encapsulation header is used, the remainder of the PDU MUST be structured according to the appropiate format described in section 5 or 6 (i.e., the VPN encapsulation header is prepended to the PDU within an AAL5 CPCS SDU).8.2 LLC-encapsulated routed or bridged PDUs within a VPN When a LLC-encapsulated routed or bridged PDU is sent within a VPN using ATM over AAL5, a VPN encapsulation header MUST be prepended to the appropriate routed or bridged PDU format defined in sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.8.3 VC multiplexing of routed or bridged PDUs within a VPN When a routed or bridged PDU is sent within a VPN using VC multiplexing, the VPN identifier MAY either be specified a priori, using ATM connection control signalling or adminstrative assignment to an ATM interface, or it MAY be indicated using an encapsulation header. If the VPN is identified using ATM connection control signalling, all PDUs carried by the ATM VC are associated with the same VPN. In this case, the payload formats of routed and bridged PDUs MUST be as defined in sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. If a PDU is received containing a VPN encapsulation header when the VPN has beenGrossman & Heinanen Standards Track [Page 14]RFC 2684 Multiprotocol Over AALS September 1999 identified using ATM signalling, the receiver MAY drop it and/or take other actions which are implementation specific. Specification of the mechanism in ATM connection control signalling for carrying VPN identifiers is outside the scope of this Memo. If a VPN identifier is administratively assigned to an ATM interface, then all PDUs carried by any ATM VCs within that interface are associated with that VPN. In this case, the payload formats of routed and bridged PDUs MUST be as defined in sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. If a PDU is received containing a VPN encapsulation header when the VPN identifier has been administratively assigned, the receiver MAY drop it and/or take other actions which are implementation specific. Specification of mechanisms (such as MIBs) for assigning VPN identifiers to ATM interfaces is outside the scope of this memo. If the VPN identifier is to be indicated using an encapsulation header, then a VPN encapsulation header MUST be prepended to the appropriate routed or bridged PDU format defined in sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively.9. Security Considerations This memo defines mechanisms for multiprotocol encapsulation over ATM. There is an element of trust in any encapsulation protocol: a receiver must trust that the sender has correctly identified the protocol being encapsulated. There is no way to ascertain that the sender did use the proper protocol identification (nor would this be desirable functionality). The encapsulation mechanisms described in this memo are believed not to have any other properties that might be exploited by an attacker. However, architectures and protocols operating above the encapsulation layer may be subject to a variety of attacks. In particular, the bridging architecture discussed in section 7 has the same vulnerabilities as other bridging architectures. System security may be affected by the properties of the underlying ATM network. The ATM Forum has published a security framework [12] and a security specification [13] which may be relevant.Grossman & Heinanen Standards Track [Page 15]RFC 2684 Multiprotocol Over AALS September 1999Acknowledgements This memo replaces RFC 1483, which was developed by the IP over ATM working group, and edited by Juha Heinanen (then at Telecom Finland, now at Telia). The update was developed in the IP-over-NBMA (ION) working group, and Dan Grossman (Motorola) was editor and also contributed to the work on RFC 1483. This material evolved from RFCs [1] and [4] from which much of the material has been adopted. Thanks to their authors Terry Bradley, Caralyn Brown, Andy Malis, Dave Piscitello, and C. Lawrence. Other key contributors to the work included Brian Carpenter (CERN), Rao Cherukuri (IBM), Joel Halpern (then at Network Systems), Bob Hinden (Sun Microsystems, presently at Nokia), and Gary Kessler (MAN Technology). The material concerning VPNs was developed by Barbara Fox (Lucent) and Bernhard Petri (Siemens).References [1] Piscitello, D. and C. Lawrence, "The Transmission of IP Datagrams over the SMDS Service", RFC 1209, March 1991. [2] ITU-T Recommendation I.363.5, "B-ISDN ATM Adaptation Layer (AAL) Type 5 Specification", August 1996. [3] ITU-T Recommendation I.365.1, "Frame Relaying Service Specific Convergence Sublayer (SSCS), November 1993. [4] Brown, C. and A. Malis, "Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay", RFC 2427, September 1998. [5] Perez M., Liaw, F., Mankin, E., Grossman, D. and A. Malis, "ATM Signalling Support for IP over ATM", RFC 1755, February 1995. [6] Information technology - Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems, "Protocol Identification in the Network Layer". ISO/IEC TR 9577, October 1990. [7] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over IEEE 802 Networks", STD 43, RFC 1042, February 1988. [8] Maher, M., "IP over ATM Signalling - SIG 4.0 Update", RFC 2331, April 1998.Grossman & Heinanen Standards Track [Page 16]RFC 2684 Multiprotocol Over AALS September 1999 [9] ITU-T Recommendation I.555, "Frame Relay Bearer Service Interworking", September 1997. [10] Bradner, S. "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [11] Fox, B. and B. Gleeson, "Virtual Private Networks Identifier", RFC 2685, September 1999. [12] The ATM Forum, "ATM Security Framework Version 1.0", af-sec- 0096.000, February 1998. [13] The ATM Forum, "ATM Security Specification v1.0", af-sec- 0100.001, February 1999.Grossman & Heinanen Standards Track [Page 17]RFC 2684 Multiprotocol Over AALS September 1999Appendix A. Multiprotocol Encapsulation over FR-SSCS ITU-T Recommendation I.365.1 defines a Frame Relaying Specific Convergence Sublayer (FR- SSCS) to be used on the top of the Common Part Convergence Sublayer CPCS) of the AAL type 5 for Frame Relay/ATM interworking. The service offered by FR-SSCS corresponds to the Core service for Frame Relaying as described in I.233. An FR-SSCS-PDU consists of Q.922 Address field followed by Q.922 Information field. The Q.922 flags and the FCS are omitted, since the corresponding functions are provided by the AAL. The figure
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