cmm_wpa.c

ralink最新rt3070 usb wifi 无线网卡驱动程序

	OUT	PUCHAR			pRsnIe,
	OUT	UCHAR			*rsn_len)
{
	RSN_CAPABILITIES    *pRSN_Cap;

	// it could be ignored in WPA1 mode
	if (ElementID == WpaIe)
		return;
	
	pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
	
					 
	pRSN_Cap->word = cpu2le16(pRSN_Cap->word);
	
	(*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES);	// update current RSNIE length

}


/*
	========================================================================

	Routine Description:
		Build RSN IE context. It is not included element-ID and length.

	Arguments:
		pAd			-	pointer to our pAdapter context	
    	AuthMode	-	indicate the authentication mode
    	WepStatus	-	indicate the encryption type
		apidx		-	indicate the interface index
		
	Return Value:
		
	Note:
		
	========================================================================
*/
VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
    IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
    IN  UINT            AuthMode,
    IN  UINT            WepStatus,
	IN	UCHAR			apidx)
{
	PUCHAR		pRsnIe = NULL;			// primary RSNIE
	UCHAR 		*rsnielen_cur_p = 0;	// the length of the primary RSNIE 		
	UCHAR		*rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0;	// the length of the secondary RSNIE	  	
	UCHAR		PrimaryRsnie;			
	BOOLEAN		bMixCipher = FALSE;	// indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
	UCHAR		p_offset;		
	WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER		FlexibleCipher = MIX_CIPHER_NOTUSE;	// it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode
		
	rsnielen_cur_p = NULL;
	rsnielen_ex_cur_p = NULL;

	{
#ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT
		IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd)
		{
#ifdef WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT
			if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP != WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE)
			{
				if (AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
					return;
			}
			else
#endif // WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT //
			{
				// Support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK in STA-Infra mode
				// Support WPANone in STA-Adhoc mode
				if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) && 
					(AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) && 
					(AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone)
					)
					return;
			}	
	
			DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n"));

			// Zero RSNIE context 
			pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len = 0;
			NdisZeroMemory(pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE);

			// Pointer to RSNIE 
			rsnielen_cur_p = &pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
			pRsnIe = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;

			bMixCipher = pAd->StaCfg.bMixCipher;						
		}
#endif // CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT //
	}

	// indicate primary RSNIE as WPA or WPA2
	if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) || 
		(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) || 
		(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) || 
		(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) || 
		(AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK))
		PrimaryRsnie = WpaIe;
	else
		PrimaryRsnie = Wpa2Ie;

	{
		// Build the primary RSNIE
		// 1. insert cipher suite
		RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
	
		// 2. insert AKM
		RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);

		// 3. insert capability
		RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
	}

	// 4. update the RSNIE length
	*rsnielen_cur_p = p_offset; 

	hex_dump("The primary RSNIE", pRsnIe, (*rsnielen_cur_p));


}

/*
    ==========================================================================
    Description:
		Check whether the received frame is EAP frame.

	Arguments:
		pAd				-	pointer to our pAdapter context	
		pEntry			-	pointer to active entry
		pData			-	the received frame
		DataByteCount 	-	the received frame's length		
		FromWhichBSSID	-	indicate the interface index
       
    Return:
         TRUE 			-	This frame is EAP frame
         FALSE 			-	otherwise
    ==========================================================================
*/
BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
    IN PRTMP_ADAPTER    pAd,
    IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY	pEntry,
    IN PUCHAR           pData,
    IN ULONG            DataByteCount,
	IN UCHAR			FromWhichBSSID)
{
	ULONG	Body_len;
	BOOLEAN Cancelled;


    if(DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H))
        return FALSE;

    
	// Skip LLC header	
    if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) ||
        // Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL
        NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6)) 
    {
        pData += 6;
    }
	// Skip 2-bytes EAPoL type 
    if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2)) 
    {
        pData += 2;         
    }
    else    
        return FALSE;

    switch (*(pData+1))     
    {   
        case EAPPacket:
			Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
            break;
        case EAPOLStart:
            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
			if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE)
            {    
            	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
                RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled);
                pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE;             
            }				
            break;
        case EAPOLLogoff:
            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n"));
            break;
        case EAPOLKey:
			Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
            break;
        case EAPOLASFAlert:
            DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n"));
            break;
        default:
            return FALSE;
    
    }   
    return TRUE;
}


/*
    ==========================================================================
    Description:
        ENCRYPT AES GTK before sending in EAPOL frame.
        AES GTK length = 128 bit,  so fix blocks for aes-key-wrap as 2 in this function.
        This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key wrap algorithm.
    Return:
    ==========================================================================
*/  
VOID AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP( 
    IN UCHAR    *key,
    IN UCHAR    *plaintext,
    IN UCHAR    p_len,
    OUT UCHAR   *ciphertext)
{
    UCHAR       A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
    UCHAR       R[512];
    INT         num_blocks = p_len/8;   // unit:64bits
    INT         i, j;
    aes_context aesctx;
    UCHAR       xor;

    rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);

    // Init IA
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
        A[i] = 0xa6;

    //Input plaintext
    for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; i++)
    {
        for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
            R[8 * (i + 1) + j] = plaintext[8 * i + j];
    }

    // Key Mix
    for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
    {
        for(i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
        {
            //phase 1
            NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
            NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[8 * i], 8);
            rtmp_aes_encrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);

            NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
            xor = num_blocks * j + i;
            A[7] = BOUT[7] ^ xor;
            NdisMoveMemory(&R[8 * i], &BOUT[8], 8);
        }
    }

    // Output ciphertext
    NdisMoveMemory(ciphertext, A, 8);

    for (i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
    {
        for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
            ciphertext[8 * i + j] = R[8 * i + j];
    }
}


/*
	========================================================================
	
	Routine Description:
		Misc function to decrypt AES body
	
	Arguments:
			
	Return Value:
	
	Note:
		This function references to	RFC	3394 for aes key unwrap algorithm.
			
	========================================================================
*/
VOID	AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP( 
	IN	UCHAR	*key,
	OUT	UCHAR	*plaintext,
	IN	UCHAR    c_len,
	IN	UCHAR	*ciphertext)
	
{
	UCHAR       A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
	UCHAR       xor;
	INT         i, j;
	aes_context aesctx;
	UCHAR       *R;
	INT         num_blocks = c_len/8;	// unit:64bits

	
	os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&R, 512);

	if (R == NULL)
    {
        DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP: no memory!!!\n"));
        return;
    } /* End of if */

	// Initialize
	NdisMoveMemory(A, ciphertext, 8);
	//Input plaintext
	for(i = 0; i < (c_len-8); i++)
	{
		R[ i] = ciphertext[i + 8];
	}

	rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);

	for(j = 5; j >= 0; j--)
	{
		for(i = (num_blocks-1); i > 0; i--)
		{
			xor = (num_blocks -1 )* j + i;
			NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
			BIN[7] = A[7] ^ xor;
			NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[(i-1)*8], 8);
			rtmp_aes_decrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
			NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
			NdisMoveMemory(&R[(i-1)*8], &BOUT[8], 8);
		}
	}

	// OUTPUT
	for(i = 0; i < c_len; i++)
	{
		plaintext[i] = R[i];
	}
	

	os_free_mem(NULL, R);
}

/*
    ==========================================================================
    Description:
		Report the EAP message type

	Arguments:
		msg		-	EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
					EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
					EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
					EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
											       
    Return:
         message type string

    ==========================================================================
*/
CHAR *GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
{
    if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
        return "Pairwise Message 1";
    else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
        return "Pairwise Message 2";
	else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
        return "Pairwise Message 3";
	else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
        return "Pairwise Message 4";
	else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
        return "Group Message 1";
	else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
        return "Group Message 2";
    else
    	return "Invalid Message";
}


/*
    ========================================================================
    
    Routine Description:
    Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message

    Arguments:
        
    Return Value:

		
    ========================================================================
*/
BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
	IN  PUCHAR          pData,
	IN  UCHAR           DataLen,
	IN  MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
	OUT	UCHAR			*Offset)
{
	PUCHAR              pVIE;
	UCHAR               len;
	PEID_STRUCT         pEid;
	BOOLEAN				result = FALSE;
		
	pVIE = pData;
	len	 = DataLen;
	*Offset = 0;

	while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2))
	{
		pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;	
		// WPA RSN IE
		if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4)))
		{			
			if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
				(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
				(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2)))
			{
					result = TRUE;				
			}		
			
			*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);			
		}
		// WPA2 RSN IE
		else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3)))
		{
			if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
				(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
				(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2))/* ToDo-AlbertY for mesh*/)
			{
					result = TRUE;				
			}			

			*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
		}		
		else
		{			
			break;
		}

		pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
		len  -= (pEid->Len + 2);
	}
	
		
	return result;
	
}


/*
    ========================================================================
    
    Routine Description:
    Parse KEYDATA field.  KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.  
    GTK  is encaptulated in KDE format at  p.83 802.11i D10

    Arguments:
        
    Return Value:

    Note:
        802.11i D10  
        
    ========================================================================
*/
BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
	IN  PRTMP_ADAPTER   pAd,
	IN  PUCHAR          pKeyData,
	IN  UCHAR           KeyDataLen,
	IN	UCHAR			GroupKeyIndex,
	IN	UCHAR			MsgType,
	IN	BOOLEAN			bWPA2,
	IN  MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
{
    PKDE_ENCAP          pKDE = NULL;
    PUCHAR              pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
    UCHAR               KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
    UCHAR               GTKLEN = 0;
	UCHAR				DefaultIdx = 0;
	UCHAR				skip_offset;		
	    
	// Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
	if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
    {
		// Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK   		
		if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE(pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset))
		{
			// send wireless event - for RSN IE different
			if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
				RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0); 

        	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));			
			hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
			hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len);	
					
			return FALSE;			
    	}
    	else
		{
			if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
			{
				// skip RSN IE
				pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
				KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
				DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset));
			}
			else
				return TRUE;			
		}
	}

	DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength));

	// Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
	if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
	{				
		if (KeyDataLength >= 8)	// KDE format exclude GTK length
    	{
        	pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
	        
			
			DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;

			// Sanity check - KED length
			if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2))
    		{
        		DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
        		return FALSE;			
    		}

			// Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
			GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6;
			if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY)
			{
				DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN));
        		return FALSE;
			}
			
    	}
		else
    	{