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1000 HOWTOs for various needs [WINDOWS]

       I have no ideas about accessing TRW through
any type of network, but,m you cal dial TRW directly
(although you will probably want to code out..Even if
format has changed or anything in the past 5 years.. its
still db idpw first, ast, etc...So anyway, if you do
know how to use it,you can get at it from that number.


    39.  In the above, "Nemesis" gives a telephone number in area code 602
(Arizona) for TRW.  "Code out" refers to using a stolen customer
authorization code ("if only to save yourself the fone bill") to call the
TRW number.  The format for getting in to the TRW computer that he gives
Marianne Birkinshaw, TRW investigator advised that the telephone number
posted in the message is "a legitimate telephone number into TRW's
database".


Numb   138  (57r4q2k2-138)
 Sub   5
>From   Chris X  (#134)
To     PEOPLE WHO HAVE OR HACK CODEZ
Date   01/22/90  05:54:00 PM

                                - 24 -


Dear Anyone,

          I am in desperate need of a code.   SOMEONE
PLEASE Post a code with a dialup and the format the code
must be entered.  I will be ever so greatful.  PLEASE
HELP!!!


                                        Max Man - Chris X

    40.  In the above, user #134 asks for a code (customer authorization
code), "dialup" (the local access or 800 number through which the code may
be used), and the format (the order in which code, area code and number
must be dialed in order to place a call on the particular network).



Numb  146
 Sub  Here's your code beggar
>From  POWER ASSIST (#524)
To    beggars
Date  01/23/90  12:40:00  AM

950-0266

6552513   1564844

probably die before you use it.
  -PA

    41.  On 4/19/90, John Elerick, ComSstems Security, verified that the
codes posted with his company's local access number (950-0266) in the

above message are valid; 6552513 has suffered $185.31 in fraud loss, and
it" refers to the code -- customer authorization codes "die" when they are
deactivated or cancelled by the carrier.

                                - 25 -


    42.  On 1/26/90, CI 404-235 again accessed the BBS and observed the
following message, a copy of which was provided to the affiant:


Numb  147  (50r5q2k2-147)
 Sub  ALL
>From  THE SILENCER (#269)
To    ALL
Date  01/25/90  08:26:00 PM

YO...UMM...WHO ASKED FOR CARDS? hahahahah that is
pretty pathetic..god.  If you want Credit Cards get
your own.  One step closer to safe carding....getting
cc's off bbs's is the most disgusting thing I've ever
heard...use TRW..use
CBI...trash...steal...pickpocket....but dont get em off
a bbs...jeez..
0266 working:1593527
lets hope that this dies real fast so the REAL phreaks
will be left alone by the leacherz...heheheh

                     - Silencer

    43.  In the above message, "carding" is a common hacker/phone phreak
term which refers to the fraudulent use of credit cards or credit card
numbers to obtain merchandise which will be billed to the cardholder.
"The Silencer" advises "all" users on the BBS to use TRW, or CBI (both
national credit bureaus) or to "trash" (the practice of obtaining credit
card numbers and related information from receipts or carbons discarded in
trash -- sometimes also referred to as "dumpster diving"), steal or
pickpocket, but not to get them (credit cards) from a bulletin board
system. He then gives the a ComSystems code identified by the the last
four digits (0266) of the ComSystems local access number.  "Leacher"
is a common hacker insult for those BBS

                                - 26 -

users who copy codes, credit cards, or software from a BBS but do not
contribute their share.
    44.  On 4/13/90, John Elrick, ComSystems Security, verified that
1593527 is a valid customer authorization code which has suffered $27,
353.34 in fraud loss.
    45.  It should be noted that in message #138 above, dated 1/22/90,
Chris X asked for codes.  On 1/26/90 the following followup
message was noted by CI 404-235:


Numb  149  (50rq2k2-149)
 Sub  Credit Card's for Codez
>From  Chris X (#134)
To    ALL
Date  02/26/90  07:43:00 AM

Okay,
     Tell ya what.  I will exchange any amount of credit
cards for a code or two.  You name the credit limit you
want on the credit card and I will get it for you.  I do
this cause i go to ganitorial work at night INSIDE the bank
when no one is there..... heheheheheh

    46.  On 1/30/90, Zimmerman left a message on the BBS for CI 404-235,
stating that he "will be ready to exchange your codez for cards.  I have
got 2 right now.  1 witch contains a $1500 credit limit and the other
containing a $2200 credit limit.  I will 'steal' some more when I go to
the bank this weekend.  Talk to ya tomorrow..."  On 1/31/90 CI 404-235

gave Chris X Sprint Customer authorization code 25259681433275,
provided to affiant by U.S. Sprint Regional Security Manager R.E.
Sandquist for this purpose.  On 3/18/90 in a computer-to-computer

                                - 27 -

conversation (not on the BBS), Chris X gave CI 404-235 a list of
ten (10) credit card numbers with names, addresses, credit limits, and
expiration dates.  All of the credit cards appear to be issued in
Illinois.  Zimmerman told CI 404-235 that all of the cards "belong" to
Consumers Co Op Credit Union.
    47.  On 4/28/90, CI 404-235 again accessed the BBS and provided
printouts of messages which he observed on the BBS.  In one, dated
3/27/90, "Scott Sxxxxx", user #160, offered to trade "virgin" credit
cards (newly acquired and not yet used for fraudulent purposes) for AT&T
cards (calling card numbers), PBX's (see Definition section above) or
numbers that will call overseas.  In a message dated 4/17/90, "SLI FOLKS",
user #572, stated that he was calling from Edmonton, Canada, "using a
stolen account on Datapac for this call" (Datapac is a data communications
carrier).  He tells "all" users that he has access to phone rooms for two
apartment buildings "which gives me access to several hundred phone lines.
new bpox that lets me get free LD on someone elses line frommy house.  So
I hope you guys can teach me some stuff."  On 4/24/90, Chris X
left another message to "anyone" offering to trade credit cards and codes
for information on how to get "information on a non-published person.  It
can be found if you have a persons phone number and want a name and
address or vice-versa."  (He is referring to obtaining non-published
subscriber information maintained by the telephone companies.)

                                - 28 -

    48.  In attempting to located the BBS which operates on telephone
number 312-528-5020, affiant has discovered several significant facts
which appear to indicated that an attempt has been made to disguise the
actual location of the BBS.  These facts, and the sources for them, are
detailed below.  In summary, the BBS telephone line is listed to an
address as one of its facilities, the BBS telephone line ends at an
Illinois Bell junction box where an non-Illinois Bell (unauthorized) line
leads from the BBS line to an apparent retail/office structure at another
address.  The BBS telephone bills are sent to a post office box opened in
the corporate name, but the applicant, who is not listed as an officer of
the corporation, described himself in a police report as "self-employed".
A second, unlisted, telephone line, billed to the post office box
applicant's home address, is installed at the retail/office structure
where the non-Illinois bell (BBS) line also leads.
    49.  Illinois Bell telephone records show that the BBS telephone
number 312-528-5020 is subscribed to by Mxxx Xxxxxx, Inc., xxxx West
Belmont, xxxx xxx, Chicago, Illinois.  The bills for this service are
sent in the name of Mxxx Xxxxxx, Inc., at P.O. Box xxxx, Chicago,
Illinois, 60618-0169.  The BBS line was installed on December 1, 1982.
    50.  In April of 1989, Sgt. Abigail Abraham, Illinois State Police,
conducted an investigation of the bulletin board

                                - 29 -

system at telephone number 312-528-5020.  She checked directory
assistance, and both white and yellow-page telephone directories:
although she found several telephone numbers and address for Micro
Repair, Inc., 312-528-5020 and xxxx West Belmont were not among them.
She investigated the purported BBS site, and determined that xxxx West
Belmont, xxxx xxx, Chicago, Illinois, does not exist.  She reported
that at xxxx W. Belmont, there is a structure which would incorporate
the address of xxxx W. Belmont.  Sgt. Abraham had a telephone company
repairman check the physical junction pole: they discovered that the
312-528-5020 line ran from the phone via a non-Illinois Bell
(unauthorized) connection to a building at xxxx N. Clybourn, Chicago,
Illinois.  This building appears to be a retail/office structure, at
which, according to SA Conway, Secret Service Chicago field office, as
of 4/16/90 "there is nothing to indicate that there are any businesses
operating out of xxxx N. Clybourn, Chicago, Illinois."  It is a one
story section of a larger one-and-two story building which is "V"
shaped, fronting on both Clybourn and Belmont Avenues.  The third leg
of the larger building (southeast side) fronts on a parking lot, with
a fenced courtyard section off the parking lot.  The xxxx address is
approximately the last thirty feet at the south end of the Clybourn
side of the building.

                                - 30 -

    51.  Illinois Bell records show that a non-published telephone line is
installed at xxxx N. Clybourn, which is 312-xxx-xxxx.  Per Sgt. Abraham,
the subscriber is Bruce Xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxx N. Lawndale, Chicago, Illinois and
the bills are mailed to Fred Xxxxxxxxxxx at the same address.  Telephone
service for 312-xxx-xxxx was installed at xxxx N. Clybourn on January 1,
1982.
    52.  On April 26, 1989, Sgt. Abraham wrote down all of the vehicle
license plates parked in the parking lot next to xxxx N. Clybourn and
those parked immediately in front of it.  PTxxxx, which was a 1987, four-
door Ford, was registered to Bruce Xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxx N. Lawndale, Chicago,
Illinois.
    53.  On 4/5/90, the Secret Service office in Chicago was notified by
the Illinois Department of Revenue that there are not business
licenses for xxxx N. Clybourn, Chicago, Illinois, nor are there any
licenses issued to Bruce Xxxxxxxxxxx.
    54.  On 4/2/90 the Illinois Secretary of State, Corporation Division,
advised that Martin and Wendy Gilmore are the only officers for Micro
Repair listed on its Illinois Articles of Incorporation.
    55.  On 4/3/90, the Chicago Postal Inspector's Office informed the
Secret Service office in Chicago that the billing address for telephone
number 312-528-5020 (the BBS) is Post Office Box xxxx and is open in the
name of Mxxx Xxxxxx.  The name of the person who made the application for
the post office box is Bruce Xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxx N. Lawndale, Chicago, Illinois,

                                - 31 -

telephone number 312-xxx-xxxx.  Identification used to open the
box was Illinois Driver's License exxx-xxxx-xxxx (per the Illinois
Secretary of State this license is that of Bruce Xxxxxxxxxxx), and according
to Sgt. Abraham, his license address is also xxxx N. Lawndale.
    56.  To the rear of the property where xxxx N. Clybourn is located,
there is an antenna and a satellite dish.  SA William P. Conway of the
Chicago field office contacted the Coast Guard for assistance in
determining the latitude and longitude of the satellite antenna.  On
4/3/90, the Coast Guard Air Operations Duty Officer at the Glenview Naval
Air Station, Chicago, Illinois, advised that the Belmont/Western/Clybourn
intersection, Chicago, Illinois, has a latitude of 41 degrees, 56 minutes,
9 seconds north, and a longitude of 87 degrees, 41 minutes, 5 seconds
west.  With that information, SA Conway was able to obtain assistance from
the Federal Communications Commission in determining the owner of the
satellite antenna.  Will Gray, of the Chicago FCC office, advised that the
FCC license for the antenna (which is mounted on a tower located in the
fenced courtyard section of the larger building of which xxxx N. Clybourn
is a part) is registered to the American United Cab Company at xxxx N.
Belmont.  The satellite dish is affixed to the rear of xxxx N. Clybourn.
Mounted on the tower are two closed circuit cameras.  The first camera is
located approximately 20 feet above the ground, the second camera is
approximately 45 feet above the ground.

                                - 32 -


    57.  Chicago Police Department General Offense Report #Mxxxxxx, dated
3/13/89, lists Bruce Xxxxxxxxxxx as the victim, with the address of
occurrence listed as xxxx N. Clybourn, Chicago, Illinois.  Xxxxxxxxxxx
reported that his car window was broken by two subjects.  Per this police
report, Xxxxxxxxxxx states that he watched on a closed circuit security
camera as the two subjects entered the parking lot adjacent to xxxx N.
Clybourn, and broke his automobile window.  Xxxxxxxxxxx told the officers
that the cameras are used for parking lot security, due to "breakins".
This incident took place at 2:30 PM.  The report lists Xxxxxxxxxxx's
residence address as xxxx N. Lawndale, Chicago, Illinois, his home phone
number as 312-xxx-xxxx (that telephone number is listed to Fred Xxxxxxxxxxx
at the xxxx N. Lawndale address, according to Sgt. Abraham), and his work
phone number as 312-xxx-xxxx (the unlisted line billed to his residence).
He stated that he is self-employed.
    58.  On 4/5/90, the Chicago Office of the Secret Service requested
Rolonie Kwasny, Security Supervisor, Illinois Bell Telephone to  verify
that there are no other authorized or unauthorized telephone lines into
xxxx N. Clybourn other than 31