📄 seisure warrent documents for ripco bbs.txt
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The warrant alleges violations under Title 18, USC, Sections1343, 1030, 1029, 1962, 1963, and 371.******************************************* --------------(Begin Barbara Golden's Affidavit)-----------------State of Illinois ) ) SSCounty of Cook ) AFFIDAVIT 1. I, Barbara Golden, am a Special Agent of the United StatesSecret Service and have been so employed for the past fourteen years; thepast three years as a Special Agent. I am present assigned to theComputer Fraud Section of the United States Secret Service in Chicago. Iam submitting this affidavit in support of the search warrants for theresidence of Bruce Xxxxxxxxxxx xxxx North Lawndale, Chicago, Illinois(including the detached garage behind the house) and his business addressat xxxx North Clybourn, Chicago, Illinois. 2. This affidavit is based upon my investigation and informationprovided to me by Special Agent G. Kirt Lawson of the United States SecretService in Phoenix, Arizona and by other agents of the United StatesSecret Service. I have also received information from Sergeant AbigailAbrahams of the Illinois State Police. 3. Additionally, I have received technical information andinvestigative assistance from Roland Kwasny of Illinois Bell TelephoneCorporate Security. VIOLATIONS INVOLVED 4. This warrant is requested to recover unauthorized and illegallyused access codes posted on the RIPCO BBS by computer hackers and todevelop evidence of their illegal use of those codes in violation offederal criminal laws, including: - 1 - a. 18 USC 2314 which provides federal criminal sanctions againstindividuals who knowingly and intentionally transport stolen property orproperty contained by fraud, valued at $5,000.00 or more, in interstatecommerce. b. 18 USC 1030(a)(6) provides federal criminal sanctions againstindividuals who, knowingly and with intent to defraud, traffic ininterstate commerce any information through which a computer may beaccessed without authorization in interstate commerce. c. Other federal violations involved in this case may include WireFraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), Access Device Fraud (U.S.C. 1029) and otherviolations listed and described on page 15, 16, and 17 of the attachedaffidavit of Special Agent Lawson. LAWSON AFFIDAVIT 5. The attached affidavit of Special Agent Kirt Lawson isincorporated herein in its entirety and is attached as Attachment 1.Lawson's affidavit is based upon a two year undercover investigation ofthe United States Secret Service involving an undercover bulletin boardlocated in Phoenix, Arizona. Essentially, Lawson's affidavit and myinvestigation establish probably cause to believe: a. Bruce Xxxxxxxxxxx, using the computer hacker handle "Dr. Ripco",has been operating the RIPCO BBS in Chicago since approximatelyDecember 10, 1983. - 2 - b. During the time period named in the Lawson affidavit unauthorizedaccess codes were posted on the RIPCO BBS by various computer hackers. c. The access codes posted on the RIPCO BBS have been determined bySpecial Agent Lawson to be valid access codes which are being used withoutauthorization of the true authorized user of the access codes. Moreover,in many cases the access codes have been reported stolen by the trueauthorized user(s). d. Special Agent Lawson's investigation has further determined thatthe access codes posted on the RIPCO BBS are not concealed from the systemadministrator of the BBS and could be seen by the system administratorduring an examination of the BBS. 6. I have personally worked with S.A. Lawson on computer crimeinvestigations and known him to be a reliable agent of the Secret Serviceand an expert in the field of telecommunication investigations. 7. I personally received the attached affidavit on May 1, 1990 andhave verified with S.A. Lawson that it is in fact his affidavit and haveverified with S.A. Lawson that it is in fact his affidavit and that itaccurately reflects his investigation. I have verified information withrespect to his investigation with Special Agent Lawson as recently as May7, 1990. - 3 - UPDATED PROBABLE CAUSE 8. On May 1, 1990, I personally observed that the surveillancecameras described on pages 32 and 33 of Lawson's affidavit stillappear to be in operation. (The antennas and surveillance cameraslocated at the Clybourn address are reflected in the photographsattached as Attachment 2.) 9. On May 4, 19900, I personally updated the status of thetelephone lines at the Clybourn address with Roland Kwasny of IllinoisBell Telephone. Kwasny advised me that those telephones continue tobe in active service at this time. ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 10. On pages 36 to 39 of his affidavit S.A. Lawson describes theitems to be seized at the search locations. Locations to be Searched 11. The complete description of the business location to be searchedon Clybourn Street is contained on page 30 of S.A. Lawson's affidavit.(Photographs of that location are in Attachment 2.) I have personallyobserved the resident to be searched on Lawndale on May 1, 1990. Thephotographs attached to this affidavit as Attachment 3 truly andaccurately show the residence known as xxxx North Lawndale, Chicago,Illinois, as of May 1, 1990. - 4 - EXAMINATION OF COMPUTER RECORDS 13. Request is made herein to search and seize the above describedcomputer and computer data and to read the information contained in and onthe computer and computer data. 14. The following attachments are incorporated herein by reference:Attachment 1 - Affidavit of S.A. Lawson (39 pages): Attachment 2 -Photographs of the Clybourn address (2 pages); Attachment 3 - Photographsof the Lawndale address (1 page). (signature) Special Agent Barbara Golden United States Secret ServiceSworn and Subscribed to beforeme this 7th day of May, 1990.(signature)James T. BalogUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE - 5 - ** (End Barbara Golden's Affidavit) **++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ** (Begin G. Kirt Lawson's affidavit) **++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++State of Arizona ) ) SSCounty of Maricopa ) AFFIDAVIT 1. Your affiant G. Kirt Lawson has been a Special Agent of the U.S.Secret service for eighteen years and in the course of his employment hasinvestigated over 100 cases involving credit card fraud, theft, computer-related crime, and other offenses. I have training from the SecretService in the investigation of computer fraud, have attended six or moreseminars on investigative procedures from AT&T and the Secret Service, andhave lectured on computer crime for the IEEE (an internationalprofessional group of electrical engineers) and Bellcore (the research /security organization owned by the regional Bell operating companies.)Within the last year, I have assisted the Arizona Attorney General'soffice with the execution of three computer-crime search warrants, and theAustin, Texas field office of the Secret Service with the execution ofanother computer-related search warrant. Over the last two years, Ihave assisted numerous state, local, and federal law enforcementagents in half a dozen U.S. cities by providing information andtechnical assistance which has led to the execution of over a dozensearch warrants in computer crime cases nationwide. - 1 - SOURCES OF INFORMATION 2. Your affiant has also received technical information andinvestigative assistance from the following experts in the field oftelecommunication fraud and computer crime: a. R.E. "Sandy" Sandquist,, Regional Security Manager, U.S. SprintCommunications Company, who has been so employed since 1987, and waspreviously employed by General Telephone (GTE) as a special agent,technical investigations since 1983. He has investigated cases ofcommunications fraud involving computer hackers, computer bulletin boardsystems (see Definitions section below), and the abuse of voice mailmessage computers, involving over 100 systems. He has assisted lawenforcement search teams in the execution of search warrants, and hastrained many state, local and federal agents in the investigation ofcomputer and communications crime. b. Stephen R. Purdy, Special Agent, U.S. Secret Service, currentlythe Assistant to the Special Agent In Charge of Fraud Division of theComputer Diagnostic Lab in Washington, D.C. He is a member of the FederalComputer Investigations Committee, and is currently its Co-Chair. He hashelped to design training programs in computer crime andtelecommunications fraud investigations for the Federal Law EnforcementTraining Center in Glynco, Georgia. He also developed and instructs inthe Secret Service's training program in computer fraud investigations. - 2 - c. George Mehnert has been a Special Agent with the Arizona AttorneyGeneral's office for more than twelve years; for the last three years, hehas been responsible for special projects including the investigation ofcomputer crime. He has taken courses relating to computer hardware andsoftware programs from various industry sources and a local college, andhas worked with computer hardware and software, including communicationsequipment and analysis tools, in investigative matters for more than sixyears. Mehnert has instructed numerous state and local law enforcementagencies in the methodology of executing search warrants involvingcomputers, and in the investigation of computer crimes. He recentlypublished of article on this subject in a law enforcement periodical. Inthe past two years, Mehnert has been involved in thirty warrant searchesrelating to the seizure of computer of communications-related evidence. d. In addition to the above, affiant has also received technicalassistance and information from the following communication industrysources: Steve Matthews, Telenet; Leila Stewart, MCI; Sue Welch, MCI;Toni Ames, U.S. West; Connie Bullock, ComSystems (a long-distancecarrier); Karen Torres, MidAmerican Communications Company; RichardPetiollo and Richard Kopacz, AT&T; Hank Kluepfel and David Bauer,Bellcore (a research/security company owned by the Bell Regional OperatingCompanies); Marty Locker, International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT),and credit industry sources: Valerie Larrison, American Express; MaryAnnBirkinshaw, TRW: Michelle Mason, CBI (TRW and CBI are national cardbureaus). - 3 - DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 3. Computer hackers: individuals involved in the unauthorizedintrusion into computer systems by various means. They commonly identifythemselves by aliases of "hacker handles" when communicating by voice orelectronically with other hackers. Because they normally communicatethrough electronic bulletin board systems in several states, and becausethey often conduct their hacking activities against victims at manylocations outside their local calling area, computer hackers typically uselong-distance carrier customer authorization codes without the permissionof the individuals or corporations to which they are assigned, in order toachieve "free" long distance telecommunications (over standard voicelines, or over data-communications services). Search warrants executed inhacker cases routinely produce evidence of theft of communicationsservices, and often product of possession, use, and/or distribution ofcredit cards as well. 4. Electronic Bulletin Board System (BBS): an electronicbulletin board is a computer operated as a medium of electroniccommunications between computer users at different locations.Users access the BBS by telephone from distant locations (oftentheir residences), using their own computers and communicationdevices (modems). Typical functions of a BBS include (1) providingstorage for a software library; (2) allowing users to "download"(copy to their own computers) various files or software programs;(3) allowing users to - 4 -exchange and store messages by "electronic mail"; and (4) publishingof text files and tutorials, which contain information or instructionson various subjects of interest to the users. Although many BBS's areoperated as commercial services to the public (large services such asCompuserve and The Source may offer many more functions than thoselisted above), thousands of BBS's are privately operated byindividuals who run them from their residences, or by special-interestclubs. It is common for a BBS to have several sections or"conferences" on the system, to which a particular level of access isrequired: many users might have access to lower-level sections, whileonly some users would be permitted to access the highest-levelsections (many sysops --defined below-- "voice validate" a prospectiveuser, using a telephone call to screen users and determine whether
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