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transferred the regulation of cryptology for unclassified information to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Nevertheless, the NSA under the Bush Administration continued to forge ahead in its attempts to regulate cryptosystems. In 1991 it announced the development of the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and proposed that its system be used for private sector security. At that time the NIST was about to recommend a encryption method known as Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA), an algorithm patented by the Massachusetts Institute of
____________________ 55The Mutual Security Act of 1954. ________________________________ 56See C. B. Escobar, Nongovernmental Cryptology and Nation ___ _____________________________________ Security: The Government Seeking To Restrict Research, ________________________________________________________________ Computer/Law Journal, Vol. IV (1984). 57National Policy On Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security, National Security Decision Directive (Sept. 17, 1984). 58See R. A. Franks, The National Security Agency and Its ___ _______________________________________ Interference With Private Sector Computer Security, Iowa Law _____________________________________________________ Review, 1015 (1987). 14 Technology. Within a few months, however, NIST endorsed the DSS. Congress responded by establishing the Computer System Security and Privacy Board which called for a national debate on the use of cryptology.59 In April 1993, the Clinton Administration announced its approval of the Clipper Chip, a cryptologic device designed by engineers at the NIST for both voice and data communications. It is intended for use by the private sector in order to secure communications while at the same time enabling law enforcement agencies to conduct surveillance. In other words, the device aims at maintaining the government's ability to eavesdrop on private communications in the face of private sector cryptology that threatens current law enforcement practices. The plan for implementing the Clipper Chip includes legislation which would provide protection under the Fourth Amendment. Presumably, law enforcement agents would require a warrant to be granted in accordance with the same restrictions currently placed upon wiretapping and the interception of electronic mail. The ramifications of this controversial proposal, including its constitutional implications, are presently under debate.60 Conclusion No one denies the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Constitution, especially the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights. Yet disputes do arise over whether it should be accomplished without upsetting the balance of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In the case of protecting individuals from unreasonable electronic surveillance, we have seen that it was the Supreme Court which took the initiative. By interpreting the meaning of the term "search and seizure" to include the seizure of conversation, the Katz Court expanded the breadth of the Fourth Amendment to include electronic surveillance. From an originalist perspective, the Court gravely upset the balance of powers by deriving, defining, and applying a principle of privacy not explicitly found in the text of the Constitution. From an activist perspective, the Katz Court rightly took a biased stand in order to bring the Fourth Amendment into accord with the technological circumstances and political climate of the day. After the Supreme Court made the first move towards protecting individual privacy, Congress quickly responded with legislation designed to restrict electronic surveillance by the Executive. According to originalists, the political stand of the Court in support of civil rights was a threat to freedom. In
____________________ 59See J. A. Adams, Cryptography=privacy?, IEEE Spectrum, ___ _____________________ August 1992, pp. 29-35. 60See L. Arbetter, The Clipper Chip Debate, Security ___ __________________________ Management, August 1993, p. 8. 15 other words, by exerting their power into the political realm, non-elected justices disregard the proper authority of elected members of Congress. Yet in Katz we did not witness the collapse of democracy. On the contrary, we saw the separation of powers produce a prompt response by Congress, a response that checked the powers of the Court and the Executive. Although the adherence to original meaning defended by Justice Black and others is credible, originalists cannot legitimately claim that their method of constitutional interpretation is the only acceptable approach to adjudication. They demand that the separation of powers should be clearly defined. Yet the actual practice of checks and balances reveals that the judiciary is political by the very nature of the Constitution's design. Although the Supreme Court is the weakest of the three branches, it has just enough political power to agitate Congress and the Executive. Even when the Court refrains from adjudication, a political message is sent. Such was the case when the Olmstead Court called upon Congress to legislate protection from wiretapping under the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the activist method of constitutional interpretation is not without its own difficulties. After two decades of upholding civil rights, the Supreme Court now finds itself facing unexpected technological circumstances and situated within a very different political climate. At the time Congress and the Court endorsed a right to privacy, individual citizens lacked the technological means to protect themselves against electronic surveillance. Thus, the law was the only obstacle to surveillance. Today, however, private communications can be established with a personal computer and sophisticated encryption software. Hence, the Executive considers the new technologies a threat to its ability to enforce the law and is taking measures to maintain its electronic surveillance capabilities. Moreover, Congress is becoming less concerned about civil rights and more concerned about controlling the high rate of crime.61 What will the Court do when it is called upon to evaluate laws intended to protect the "rights" of law enforcement agencies? How will it maintain its credibility? The Supreme Court will eventually have to face the constitutionality of "crime control" statutes designed to augment the powers of law enforcement agencies. If the Court takes an
____________________ 61In fact, the Senate is currently debating over S. 618, a bill "To control and reduce violent crime." Among its many provisions designed to increase the power of law enforcement agencies is the following statute: Sec. 545. Cooperation Of Telecommunications Providers With Law Enforcement. It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communications systems permit the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law. 16 originalist stand, it will remain silent. If it takes a liberal activist stand, it will pit the liberties of citizens against the powers of the state in a battle over civil rights. However, if the Court takes a radical activist stand, it will move beyond "rights discourse" in order to pressure Congress and the Executive into addressing the vast disparity which is at the root of a considerable amount of crime. Under these circumstances, the Court may even employ its political power to instigate a constitutional convention on racial and economic injustice. Nonetheless, whichever theory of adjudication it chooses to practice, the Court's resolutions will inevitably have political repercussions. 17 BIBLIOGRAPHY Adam, John A. Cryptography = privacy? IEEE Spectrum, August 1992. Arbetter, Lisa. The Clipper Chip Debate. Security Management, August 1993. Bork, Robert. The Tempting of America. (New York: The Free Press, 1990) Chapter7. Clukey, Laura L. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: The Impact on Software Communication Technologies. Software Law Journal, Vol. II, 1988. Franks, Renae Angeroth. The National Security Agency and Its Interference with Private Sector Computer Security. Iowa Law Review, 1015, 1987. Kastenmeier, Robert W., Deborah Leavy, and David Beier. Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective. Wisconsin Law Review, 1989:715. Landever, Arthur R. Electronic Surveillance, Computers, and the Fourth Amendment - The New Telecommunications Environment Calls for Reexamination of Doctrine. Toledo Law Review, Vol. 15, Winter 1984. Merritt, Deborah Jones. The Constitution in a Brave New World: A Century of Technological Change and Constitutional Law. Oregon Law Review, Vol. 69, Num. 1, 1990. Escobar, Christy Brad. Nongovernment Cryptology and National Security: The Government Seeking To Restrict Research. Computer Law Journal, Vol. IV, 1984. Soma, John T., and Richard A. Wehmhoefer. A Legal and Technical Assessment of the Effect of Computers On Privacy. Denver Law Journal, Vol. 60.3, 1983. Southard, C. Dennis IV. Individual Privacy and Governmental Efficiency: Technology's Effect on the Government's Ability to Gather, Store, and Distribute Information. Computer/Law Journal, Vol. IX, 1989. Wintersheimer, Lisa Ann. Privacy Versus Law Enforcement - Can the Two Be Reconciled? Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 57, 1988.
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