📄 wpa.c
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, "Wpa2PairMsg3Action <-----\n");}/* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Process Group key 2-way handshaking Arguments: pAd Pointer to our adapter Elem Message body Return Value: None Note: ========================================================================*/VOID WpaGroupMsg1Action( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem) { PUCHAR pOutBuffer = NULL; ULONG FrameLen = 0; UCHAR EAPHEAD[8] = {0xaa, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x88,0x8e}; EAPOL_PACKET Packet; PEAPOL_PACKET pGroup; UCHAR Mic[16], OldMic[16]; UCHAR Key[32]; PNDIS_802_11_KEY pGroupKey = NULL; UCHAR *mpool, *MSG, *KEYDATA; UCHAR Header802_3[14]; USHORT NStatus; UCHAR *DescKeyData; mpool = kmalloc(3104, MEM_ALLOC_FLAG); // allocate memory if (mpool == NULL) return; // MSG Len = 2048 MSG = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4); // KEYDATA Len = 512 KEYDATA = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(MSG+2048, 4); // DescKeyData Len = 512 DescKeyData = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(KEYDATA+512, 4); if(NdisEqualMemory(&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + 8], EAPHEAD, LENGTH_802_1_H)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, "WpaGroupMsg1Action ----->MsgLen=%d\n",Elem->MsgLen); NdisMoveMemory(MSG, Elem->Msg, LENGTH_802_11); NdisMoveMemory(&MSG[LENGTH_802_11], &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11+8], (Elem->MsgLen )); } else { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, "WpaGroupMsg1Action ----->\n"); NdisMoveMemory(MSG, Elem->Msg, Elem->MsgLen); } // Process Group message 1 frame. pGroup = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &MSG[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H]; // Store KeyData, protect received data more than MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE NdisZeroMemory(DescKeyData, 512); NdisMoveMemory( DescKeyData, &MSG[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE], pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1]);#ifdef BIG_ENDIAN // recovery original byte order, before forward Elem to another routine { USHORT tmpKeyinfo; NdisMoveMemory(&tmpKeyinfo, &pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(USHORT)); tmpKeyinfo = SWAP16(tmpKeyinfo); NdisMoveMemory(&pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, &tmpKeyinfo, sizeof(USHORT));}#endif // 0. Verify RSN IE & cipher type match if (pAd->PortCfg.WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled && (pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer != 2)) { kfree(mpool); return; } else if (pAd->PortCfg.WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled && (pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer != 1)) { kfree(mpool); return; } // 1. Verify Replay counter // Check Replay Counter, it has to be larger than last one. No need to be exact one larger if (RTMPCompareMemory(pGroup->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pAd->PortCfg.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY) != 1) { kfree(mpool); return; } #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN // recovery original byte order, before forward Elem to another routine { USHORT tmpKeyinfo; NdisMoveMemory(&tmpKeyinfo, &pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(USHORT)); tmpKeyinfo = SWAP16(tmpKeyinfo); NdisMoveMemory(&pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, &tmpKeyinfo, sizeof(USHORT));}#endif // Update new replay counter NdisMoveMemory(pAd->PortCfg.ReplayCounter, pGroup->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); // 2. Verify MIC is valid // Save the MIC and replace with zero NdisMoveMemory(OldMic, pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); NdisZeroMemory(pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); if (pAd->PortCfg.WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) { // AES UCHAR digest[80]; HMAC_SHA1((PUCHAR) pGroup, pGroup->Len[1] + 4, pAd->PortCfg.PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest); NdisMoveMemory(Mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); } else { hmac_md5(pAd->PortCfg.PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, (PUCHAR) pGroup, pGroup->Len[1] + 4, Mic); } if (!NdisEqualMemory(OldMic, Mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC)) { DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, " MIC Different in group msg 1 of 2-way handshake!!!!!!!!!! \n"); kfree(mpool); return; } else DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, " MIC VALID in group msg 1 of 2-way handshake!!!!!!!!!! \n");#ifdef BIG_ENDIAN // recovery original byte order, before forward Elem to another routine { USHORT tmpKeyinfo; NdisMoveMemory(&tmpKeyinfo, &pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(USHORT)); tmpKeyinfo = SWAP16(tmpKeyinfo); NdisMoveMemory(&pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, &tmpKeyinfo, sizeof(USHORT));}#endif // 3. Decrypt GTK from Key Data DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, " Install = %d!!!!EKD_DL = %d!!!!!KeyIndex = %d! \n", pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install, pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL, pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex); pGroupKey = kmalloc(MAX_LEN_OF_MLME_BUFFER, MEM_ALLOC_FLAG); // allocate memory if (pGroupKey == NULL) { kfree(mpool); return; } if (pAd->PortCfg.WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) { // Decrypt AES GTK NdisZeroMemory(KEYDATA, 128); //if (pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL == 1) AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(&pAd->PortCfg.PTK[16], KEYDATA, pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1], DescKeyData); // Update GTK ParseKeyData(pAd, KEYDATA, pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1], pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex, TRUE); } else // TKIP { INT i; // Decrypt TKIP GTK // Construct 32 bytes RC4 Key NdisMoveMemory(Key, pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyIv, 16); NdisMoveMemory(&Key[16], &pAd->PortCfg.PTK[16], 16); ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Key, 32); //discard first 256 bytes for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) ARCFOUR_BYTE(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT); // Decrypt GTK. Becareful, there is no ICV to check the result is correct or not ARCFOUR_DECRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, KEYDATA, DescKeyData, pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1]); DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, "TKIP GTK = \n"); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, "%2x ", KEYDATA[i]); if (i%16 == 15) DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, "\n "); } DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, "\n \n"); // Update GTK ParseKeyData(pAd, KEYDATA, pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1], pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex, TRUE); } // 4. Construct Group Message 2 pAd->Sequence = ((pAd->Sequence) + 1) & (MAX_SEQ_NUMBER); WPAMake8023Hdr(pAd, pAd->PortCfg.Bssid, Header802_3); // Zero Group message 1 body NdisZeroMemory(&Packet, sizeof(Packet)); Packet.Version = EAPOL_VER; Packet.Type = EAPOLKey; Packet.Len[1] = sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE; // No data field // // Group Message 2 as EAPOL-Key(1,0,0,0,G,0,0,MIC,0) // Packet.KeyDesc.Type = RSN_KEY_DESC; // Key descriptor version and appropriate RSN IE Packet.KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer = pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer; // Update Key Length and Key Index Packet.KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex; Packet.KeyDesc.KeyLength[0] = pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyLength[0]; Packet.KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = pGroup->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1]; // Key Type Group key Packet.KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = 0; // KeyMic field presented Packet.KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1; // Secure bit if (pAd->PortCfg.AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) Packet.KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1; // Key Replay count NdisMoveMemory(Packet.KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pGroup->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY); #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN // recovery original byte order, before forward Elem to another routine { USHORT tmpKeyinfo; NdisMoveMemory(&tmpKeyinfo, &Packet.KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(USHORT)); tmpKeyinfo = SWAP16(tmpKeyinfo); NdisMoveMemory(&Packet.KeyDesc.KeyInfo, &tmpKeyinfo, sizeof(USHORT));}#endif // Out buffer for transmitting group message 2 NStatus = MlmeAllocateMemory(pAd, (PVOID *)&pOutBuffer); //Get an unused nonpaged memory if (NStatus != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS) { kfree(pGroupKey); kfree(mpool); return; } // Prepare EAPOL frame for MIC calculation // Be careful, only EAPOL frame is counted for MIC calculation MakeOutgoingFrame(pOutBuffer, &FrameLen, Packet.Len[1] + 4, &Packet, END_OF_ARGS); // Prepare and Fill MIC value NdisZeroMemory(Mic, sizeof(Mic)); if (pAd->PortCfg.WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) { // AES UCHAR digest[80]; HMAC_SHA1(pOutBuffer, FrameLen, pAd->PortCfg.PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest); NdisMoveMemory(Mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); } else { INT i; DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_INFO, "PTK = "); for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_INFO, "%2x-", pAd->PortCfg.PTK[i]); DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_INFO, "\n FrameLen = %d\n", FrameLen); hmac_md5(pAd->PortCfg.PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, pOutBuffer, FrameLen, Mic); } NdisMoveMemory(Packet.KeyDesc.KeyMic, Mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC); FrameLen = 0; MakeOutgoingFrame(pOutBuffer, &FrameLen, LENGTH_802_3, &Header802_3,// sizeof(EAPHEAD), EAPHEAD, Packet.Len[1] + 4, &Packet, END_OF_ARGS); // 5. Copy frame to Tx ring and prepare for encryption RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pOutBuffer, FrameLen); // Free allocated memory MlmeFreeMemory(pAd, pOutBuffer); kfree(pGroupKey); kfree(mpool); DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, "WpaGroupMsg1Action <-----\n");}/* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Init WPA MAC header Arguments: pAd Pointer to our adapter Return Value: None Note: ========================================================================*/VOID WpaMacHeaderInit( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN OUT PHEADER_802_11 pHdr80211, IN UCHAR wep, IN PUCHAR pAddr1) { NdisZeroMemory(pHdr80211, sizeof(HEADER_802_11)); pHdr80211->FC.Type = BTYPE_DATA; pHdr80211->FC.ToDs = 1; if (wep == 1) pHdr80211->FC.Wep = 1; // Addr1: DA, Addr2: BSSID, Addr3: SA COPY_MAC_ADDR(pHdr80211->Addr1, pAddr1); COPY_MAC_ADDR(pHdr80211->Addr2, pAd->CurrentAddress); COPY_MAC_ADDR(pHdr80211->Addr3, pAd->PortCfg.Bssid); pHdr80211->Sequence = pAd->Sequence;}/* ======================================================================== Routine Description: SHA1 function Arguments: Return Value: Note: ========================================================================*/VOID HMAC_SHA1( IN UCHAR *text, IN UINT text_len, IN UCHAR *key, IN UINT key_len, IN UCHAR *digest){ SHA_CTX context; UCHAR k_ipad[65]; /* inner padding - key XORd with ipad */ UCHAR k_opad[65]; /* outer padding - key XORd with opad */ INT i; // if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=SHA1(key) if (key_len > 64) { SHA_CTX tctx; SHAInit(&tctx); SHAUpdate(&tctx, key, key_len); SHAFinal(&tctx, key); key_len = 20; } NdisZeroMemory(k_ipad, sizeof(k_ipad)); NdisZeroMemory(k_opad, sizeof(k_opad)); NdisMoveMemory(k_ipad, key, key_len); NdisMoveMemory(k_opad, key, key_len); // XOR key with ipad and opad values for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36; k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c; } // perform inner SHA1 SHAInit(&context); /* init context for 1st pass */ SHAUpdate(&context, k_ipad, 64); /* start with inner pad */ SHAUpdate(&context, text, text_len); /* then text of datagram */ SHAFinal(&context, digest); /* finish up 1st pass */ //perform outer SHA1 SHAInit(&context); /* init context for 2nd pass */ SHAUpdate(&context, k_opad, 64); /* start with outer pad */ SHAUpdate(&context, digest, 20); /* then results of 1st hash */ SHAFinal(&context, digest); /* finish up 2nd pass */}/* ======================================================================== Routine Description: Parse KEYDATA field. KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK. GTK is encaptulated in KDE format at p.83 802.11i D10 Arguments: Return Value: Note: 802.11i D10 ========================================================================*/VOID ParseKeyData( IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd, IN PUCHAR pKeyData, IN UCHAR KeyDataLen, IN UCHAR KeyIdx, IN BOOLEAN IsGroupMsg){ PKDE_ENCAP pKDE = NULL; PNDIS_802_11_KEY pGroupKey = NULL; PUCHAR pMyKeyData=NULL;// = pKeyData;
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