draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-11.txt

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6.  Resolver Considerations   A security-aware resolver needs to be able to perform cryptographic   functions necessary to verify digital signatures using at least the   mandatory-to-implement algorithm(s).  Security-aware resolvers must   also be capable of forming an authentication chain from a newly   learned zone back to an authentication key, as described above.  This   process might require additional queries to intermediate DNS zones to   obtain necessary DNSKEY, DS and RRSIG records.  A security-aware   resolver should be configured with at least one trust anchor as the   starting point from which it will attempt to establish authentication   chains.   If a security-aware resolver is separated from the relevant   authoritative name servers by a recursive name server or by any sort   of device which acts as a proxy for DNS, and if the recursive name   server or proxy is not security-aware, the security-aware resolver   may not be capable of operating in a secure mode.  For example, if a   security-aware resolver's packets are routed through a network   address translation device that includes a DNS proxy which is not   security-aware, the security-aware resolver may find it difficult or   impossible to obtain or validate signed DNS data.   If a security-aware resolver must rely on an unsigned zone or a name   server that is not security aware, the resolver may not be able to   validate DNS responses, and will need a local policy on whether to   accept unverified responses.   A security-aware resolver should take a signature's validation period   into consideration when determining the TTL of data in its cache, to   avoid caching signed data beyond the validity period of the   signature, but should also allow for the possibility that the   security-aware resolver's own clock is wrong.  Thus, a security-aware   resolver which is part of a security-aware recursive name server will   need to pay careful attention to the DNSSEC "checking disabled" (CD)   bit [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records].  This is in order to avoid   blocking valid signatures from getting through to other   security-aware resolvers which are clients of this recursive name   server.  See [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol] for how a secure   recursive server handles queries with the CD bit set.Arends, et al.          Expires January 13, 2005               [Page 14]Internet-Draft    DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements         July 20047.  Stub Resolver Considerations   Although not strictly required to do so by the protocol, most DNS   queries originate from stub resolvers.  Stub resolvers, by   definition, are minimal DNS resolvers which use recursive query mode   to offload most of the work of DNS resolution to a recursive name   server.  Given the widespread use of stub resolvers, the DNSSEC   architecture has to take stub resolvers into account, but the   security features needed in a stub resolver differ in some respects   from those needed in a full security-aware resolver.   Even a security-oblivious stub resolver may get some benefit from   DNSSEC if the recursive name servers it uses are security-aware, but   for the stub resolver to place any real reliance on DNSSEC services,   the stub resolver must trust both the recursive name servers in   question and the communication channels between itself and those name   servers.  The first of these issues is a local policy issue: in   essence, a security-oblivious stub resolver has no real choice but to   place itself at the mercy of the recursive name servers that it uses,   since it does not perform DNSSEC validity checks on its own.  The   second issue requires some kind of channel security mechanism; proper   use of DNS transaction authentication mechanisms such as SIG(0) or   TSIG would suffice, as would appropriate use of IPsec, and particular   implementations may have other choices available, such as operating   system specific interprocess communication mechanisms.   Confidentiality is not needed for this channel, but data integrity   and message authentication are.   A security-aware stub resolver that does trust both its recursive   name servers and its communication channel to them may choose to   examine the setting of the AD bit in the message header of the   response messages it receives.  The stub resolver can use this flag   bit as a hint to find out whether the recursive name server was able   to validate signatures for all of the data in the Answer and   Authority sections of the response.   There is one more step that a security-aware stub resolver can take   if, for whatever reason, it is not able to establish a useful trust   relationship with the recursive name servers which it uses: it can   perform its own signature validation, by setting the Checking   Disabled (CD) bit in its query messages.  A validating stub resolver   is thus able to treat the DNSSEC signatures as a trust relationship   between the zone administrator and the stub resolver itself.Arends, et al.          Expires January 13, 2005               [Page 15]Internet-Draft    DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements         July 20048.  Zone Considerations   There are several differences between signed and unsigned zones.  A   signed zone will contain additional security-related records (RRSIG,   DNSKEY, DS and NSEC records).  RRSIG and NSEC records may be   generated by a signing process prior to serving the zone.  The RRSIG   records that accompany zone data have defined inception and   expiration times, which establish a validity period for the   signatures and the zone data the signatures cover.8.1  TTL values vs. RRSIG validity period   It is important to note the distinction between a RRset's TTL value   and the signature validity period specified by the RRSIG RR covering   that RRset.  DNSSEC does not change the definition or function of the   TTL value, which is intended to maintain database coherency in   caches.  A caching resolver purges RRsets from its cache no later   than the end of the time period specified by the TTL fields of those   RRsets, regardless of whether or not the resolver is security-aware.   The inception and expiration fields in the RRSIG RR   [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records], on the other hand, specify the time   period during which the signature can be used to validate the covered   RRset.  The signatures associated with signed zone data are only   valid for the time period specified by these fields in the RRSIG RRs   in question.  TTL values cannot extend the validity period of signed   RRsets in a resolver's cache, but the resolver may use the time   remaining before expiration of the signature validity period of a   signed RRset as an upper bound for the TTL of the signed RRset and   its associated RRSIG RR in the resolver's cache.8.2  New Temporal Dependency Issues for Zones   Information in a signed zone has a temporal dependency which did not   exist in the original DNS protocol.  A signed zone requires regular   maintenance to ensure that each RRset in the zone has a current valid   RRSIG RR.  The signature validity period of an RRSIG RR is an   interval during which the signature for one particular signed RRset   can be considered valid, and the signatures of different RRsets in a   zone may expire at different times.  Re-signing one or more RRsets in   a zone will change one or more RRSIG RRs, which in turn will require   incrementing the zone's SOA serial number to indicate that a zone   change has occurred and re-signing the SOA RRset itself.  Thus,   re-signing any RRset in a zone may also trigger DNS NOTIFY messages   and zone transfers operations.Arends, et al.          Expires January 13, 2005               [Page 16]Internet-Draft    DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements         July 20049.  Name Server Considerations   A security-aware name server should include the appropriate DNSSEC   records (RRSIG, DNSKEY, DS and NSEC) in all responses to queries from   resolvers which have signaled their willingness to receive such   records via use of the DO bit in the EDNS header, subject to message   size limitations.  Since inclusion of these DNSSEC RRs could easily   cause UDP message truncation and fallback to TCP, a security-aware   name server must also support the EDNS "sender's UDP payload"   mechanism.   If possible, the private half of each DNSSEC key pair should be kept   offline, but this will not be possible for a zone for which DNS   dynamic update has been enabled.  In the dynamic update case, the   primary master server for the zone will have to re-sign the zone when   updated, so the private key corresponding to the zone signing key   will have to be kept online.  This is an example of a situation where   the ability to separate the zone's DNSKEY RRset into zone signing   key(s) and key signing key(s) may be useful, since the key signing   key(s) in such a case can still be kept offline and may have a longer   useful lifetime than the zone signing key(s).   DNSSEC, by itself, is not enough to protect the integrity of an   entire zone during zone transfer operations, since even a signed zone   contains some unsigned, nonauthoritative data if the zone has any   children.  Therefore, zone maintenance operations will require some   additional mechanisms (most likely some form of channel security,   such as TSIG, SIG(0), or IPsec).Arends, et al.          Expires January 13, 2005               [Page 17]Internet-Draft    DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements         July 200410.  DNS Security Document Family   The DNSSEC document set can be partitioned into several main groups,   under the larger umbrella of the DNS base protocol documents.   The "DNSSEC protocol document set" refers to the three documents   which form the core of the DNS security extensions:   1.  DNS Security Introduction and Requirements (this document)   2.  Resource Records for DNS Security Extensions       [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records]   3.  Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions       [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol]   Additionally, any document that would add to, or change the core DNS   Security extensions would fall into this category.  This includes any   future work on the communication between security-aware stub   resolvers and upstream security-aware recursive name servers.   The "Digital Signature Algorithm Specification" document set refers   to the group of documents that describe how specific digital   signature algorithms should be implemented to fit the DNSSEC resource   record format.  Each document in this set deals with a specific   digital signature algorithm.   The "Transaction Authentication Protocol" document set refers to the   group of documents that deal with DNS message authentication,   including secret key establishment and verification.  While not   strictly part of the DNSSEC specification as defined in this set of   documents, this group is noted because of its relationship to DNSSEC.   The final document set, "New Security Uses", refers to documents that   seek to use proposed DNS Security extensions for other security   related purposes.  DNSSEC does not provide any direct security for   these new uses, but may be used to support them.  Documents that fall   in this category include the use of DNS in the storage and   distribution of certificates [RFC2538].Arends, et al.          Expires January 13, 2005               [Page 18]Internet-Draft    DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements         July 200411.  IANA Considerations   This overview document introduces no new IANA considerations.  Please   see [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records] for a complete review of the   IANA considerations introduced by DNSSEC.Arends, et al.          Expires January 13, 2005               [Page 19]Internet-Draft    DNSSEC Introduction and Requirements         July 200412.  Security Considerations   This document introduces the DNS security extensions and describes   the document set that contains the new security records and DNS   protocol modifications.  The extensions provide data origin   authentication and data integrity using digital signatures over   resource record sets.This document discusses the capabilities and   limitations of these extensions.   In order for a security-aware resolver to validate a DNS response,   all zones along the path from the trusted starting point to the zone   containing the response zones must be signed, and all name servers   and resolvers involved in the resolution process must be   security-aware, as defined in this document set.  A security-aware   resolver cannot verify responses originating from an unsigned zone,   from a zone not served by a security-aware name server, or for any   DNS data which the resolver is only able to obtain through a   recursive name server which is not security-aware.  If there is a   break in the authentication chain such that a security-aware resolver   cannot obtain and validate the authentication keys it needs, then the   security-aware resolver cannot validate the affected DNS data.   This document briefly discusses other methods of adding security to a   DNS query, such as using a channel secured by IPsec or using a DNS   transaction authentication mechanism, but transaction security is not   part of DNSSEC per se.   A non-validating security-aware stub resolver, by definition, does

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