draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt

bind 9.3结合mysql数据库

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4. Security Considerations

   This entire memo pertains to the provision of public keying material
   for use by key management protocols such as ISAKMP/IKE (RFC2407) [8].

   The IPSECKEY resource record contains information that SHOULD be
   communicated to the end client in an integral fashion - i.e.  free
   from modification.  The form of this channel is up to the consumer of
   the data - there must be a trust relationship between the end
   consumer of this resource record and the server.  This relationship
   may be end-to-end DNSSEC validation, a TSIG or SIG(0) channel to
   another secure source, a secure local channel on the host, or some
   combination of the above.

   The keying material provided by the IPSECKEY resource record is not
   sensitive to passive attacks.  The keying material may be freely
   disclosed to any party without any impact on the security properties
   of the resulting IPsec session: IPsec and IKE provide for defense
   against both active and passive attacks.

   Any derivative standard that makes use of this resource record MUST
   carefully document their trust model, and why the trust model of
   DNSSEC is appropriate, if that is the secure channel used.

4.1 Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records

   This section deals with active attacks against the DNS.  These
   attacks require that DNS requests and responses be intercepted and
   changed.  DNSSEC is designed to defend against attacks of this kind.

   The first kind of active attack is when the attacker replaces the
   keying material with either a key under its control or with garbage.

   If the attacker is not able to mount a subsequent man-in-the-middle
   attack on the IKE negotiation after replacing the public key, then
   this will result in a denial of service, as the authenticator used by
   IKE would fail.

   If the attacker is able to both to mount active attacks against DNS
   and is also in a position to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on
   IKE and IPsec negotiations, then the attacker will be in a position
   to compromise the resulting IPsec channel.  Note that an attacker
   must be able to perform active DNS attacks on both sides of the IKE
   negotiation in order for this to succeed.

   The second kind of active attack is one in which the attacker
   replaces the the gateway address to point to a node under the
   attacker's control.  The attacker can then either replace the public



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   key or remove it, thus providing an IPSECKEY record of its own to
   match the gateway address.

   This later form creates a simple man-in-the-middle since the attacker
   can then create a second tunnel to the real destination.  Note that,
   as before, this requires that the attacker also mount an active
   attack against the responder.

   Note that the man-in-the-middle can not just forward cleartext
   packets to the original destination.  While the destination may be
   willing to speak in the clear, replying to the original sender, the
   sender will have already created a policy expecting ciphertext.
   Thus, the attacker will need to intercept traffic from both sides.
   In some cases, the attacker may be able to accomplish the full
   intercept by use of Network Addresss/Port Translation (NAT/NAPT)
   technology.

|  Note that risk of a man-in-the-middle attack mediated by the IPSECKEY
|  RR only applies to cases where the gateway field of the IPSECKEY RR
|  indicates a different entity than the owner name of the IPSECKEY RR.

|  An active attack on the DNS that caused the wrong IP address to be
|  retrieved (via forged A RR), and therefore the wrong QNAME to be
|  queried would also result in a man-in-the-middle attack.  This
|  situation exists independantly of whether or not the IPSECKEY RR is
|  used.

|  In cases where the end-to-end integrity of the IPSECKEY RR is
|  suspect, the end client MUST restrict its use of the IPSECKEY RR to
|  cases where the RR owner name matches the content of the gateway
|  field.




















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5. IANA Considerations

   This document updates the IANA Registry for DNS Resource Record Types
   by assigning type X to the IPSECKEY record.

   This document creates two new IANA registries, both specific to the
   IPSECKEY Resource Record:

   This document creates an IANA registry for the algorithm type field.

   Values 0, 1 and 2 are defined in Section 2.4.  Algorithm numbers 3
   through 255 can be assigned by IETF Consensus (see RFC2434 [5]).

   This document creates an IANA registry for the gateway type field.

   Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 are defined in Section 2.3.  Gateway type
   numbers 4 through 255 can be assigned by Standards Action (see
   RFC2434 [5]).

































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6. Intellectual Property Claims

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
   has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
   IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
   standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
   claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
   licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
   obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
   proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
   be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Executive
   Director.






























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7. Acknowledgments

   My thanks to Paul Hoffman, Sam Weiler, Jean-Jacques Puig, Rob
   Austein, and Olafur Gurmundsson who reviewed this document carefully.
   Additional thanks to Olafur Gurmundsson for a reference
   implementation.













































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Normative references

   [1]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
        13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [2]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
        specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [3]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
        9, RFC 2026, October 1996.

   [4]  Eastlake, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System Security
        Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997.

   [5]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
        Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.

   [6]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings",
        RFC 3548, July 2003.
































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Non-normative references

   [7]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [8]   Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
         for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.

   [9]   Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
         2535, March 1999.

   [10]  Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System
         (DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.

   [11]  Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name
         System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.

   [12]  Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource
         Record (RR)", RFC 3445, December 2002.

   [13]  Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V. and M. Souissi, "DNS
         Extensions to Support IP Version 6", RFC 3596, October 2003.


Author's Address

   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z 5V7
   CA

   EMail: [e-mail]
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/

















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Full Copyright Statement

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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















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