draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt

bind 9.3结合mysql数据库

IPSECKEY WG                                                M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                                       SSW
|Expires: August 1, 2004                                   February 2004


           A Method for Storing IPsec Keying Material in DNS
|                    draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-09.txt

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

|  This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2004.

Copyright Notice

|  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

|  This document describes a new resource record for Domain Name System
|  (DNS).  This record may be used to store public keys for use in IP
|  security (IPsec) systems.  The record also includes provisions for
|  indicating what system should be contacted when establishing an IPsec
|  tunnel with the entity in question.

   This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY
   Resource Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC3445.







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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
|  1.2 Use of reverse (in-addr.arpa) map  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
|  1.3 Usage Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
|  2.  Storage formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
|  2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
|  2.2 RDATA format - precedence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
|  2.3 RDATA format - gateway type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
|  2.4 RDATA format - algorithm type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
|  2.5 RDATA format - gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
|  2.6 RDATA format - public keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
|  3.  Presentation formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
|  3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
|  3.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
|  4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
|  4.1 Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records . . 10
|  5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
|  6.  Intellectual Property Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
|  7.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
|      Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
|      Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
|      Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
|      Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17


























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1. Introduction

   It postulated that there is an end system desiring to establish an
   IPsec tunnel with some remote entity on the network.  This system,
   having only a DNS name of some kind (forward, reverse or even
   user@FQDN) needs a public key to authenticate the remote entity.  It
   also desires some guidance about whether to contact the entity
   directly, or whether to contact another entity, as the gateway to
   that desired entity.

   The IPSECKEY RR provides a storage mechanism for such items as the
   public key, and the gateway information.

   The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD.

1.1 Overview

   The IPSECKEY resource record (RR) is used to publish a public key
   that is to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name for use
   with the IPsec protocol suite.  This can be the  public key of a
   host, network, or application (in the case of per-port keying).

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [7].

|1.2 Use of reverse (in-addr.arpa) map

|  Often a security gateway will only have access to the IP address to
|  which communication is desired.  It will not know the forward name.
|  As such, it will frequently be the case that the IP address will be
|  used an index into the reverse map.

|  The lookup is done in the usual fashion as for PTR records.  The IP
|  address' octets (IPv4) or nibbles (IPv6) are reversed and looked up
|  under the .arpa.  zone.  Any CNAMEs or DNAMEs found SHOULD be
|  followed.

|  Note: even when the IPsec function is the end-host, often only the
|  application will know the forward name used.  While the case where
|  the application knows the forward name is common, the user could
|  easily have typed in a literal IP address.  This storage mechanism
|  does not preclude using the forward name when it is available, but
|  does not require it.

|1.3 Usage Criteria

   An IPSECKEY resource record SHOULD be used in combination with DNSSEC



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   unless some other means of authenticating the IPSECKEY resource
   record is available.

   It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource
   records at the same name.  This will be due to the presence of
   multiple gateways and the need to rollover keys.

   This resource record is class independent.











































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2. Storage formats

2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format

   The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a
   gateway type, a public key, algorithm type, and an optional gateway
   address.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |  precedence   | gateway type  |  algorithm  |     gateway     |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+                 +
      ~                            gateway                            ~
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               /
      /                          public key                           /
      /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|


2.2 RDATA format - precedence

   This is an 8-bit precedence for this record.  This is interpreted in
   the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section 3.3.9 of
   RFC1035 [2].

   Gateways listed in IPSECKEY records with  lower precedence are to be
   attempted first.  Where there is a tie in precedence, the order
   should be non-deterministic.

2.3 RDATA format - gateway type

   The gateway type field indicates the format of the information that
   is stored in the gateway field.

   The following values are defined:

   0  No gateway is present

   1  A 4-byte IPv4 address is present

   2  A 16-byte IPv6 address is present

   3  A wire-encoded domain name is present.  The wire-encoded format is
      self-describing, so the length is implicit.  The domain name MUST
      NOT be compressed.  (see section 3.3 of RFC1035 [2]).




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2.4 RDATA format - algorithm type

   The algorithm type field identifies the public key's cryptographic
   algorithm and determines the format of the public key field.

   A value of 0 indicates that no key is present.

   The following values are defined:

   1  A DSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC2536 [10]

   2  A RSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC3110 [11]


2.5 RDATA format - gateway

   The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be
   created in order to reach the entity named by this resource record.

   There are three formats:

   A 32-bit IPv4 address is present in the gateway field.  The data
   portion is an IPv4 address as described in section 3.4.1 of RFC1035
   [2].  This is a 32-bit number in network byte order.

   A 128-bit IPv6 address is present in the gateway field.  The data
   portion is an IPv6 address as described in section 2.2 of RFC3596
   [13].  This is a 128-bit number in network byte order.

   The gateway field is a normal wire-encoded domain name, as described
   in section 3.3 of RFC1035 [2].  Compression MUST NOT be used.

2.6 RDATA format - public keys

   Both of the public key types defined in this document (RSA and DSA)
   inherit their public key formats from the corresponding KEY RR
   formats.  Specifically, the public key field contains the algorithm-
   specific portion of the KEY RR RDATA, which is all of the KEY RR DATA
   after the first four octets.  This is the same portion of the KEY RR
   that must be specified by documents that define a DNSSEC algorithm.
   Those documents also specify a message digest to be used for
   generation of SIG RRs; that specification is not relevant for
   IPSECKEY RR.

   Future algorithms, if they are to be used by both DNSSEC (in the KEY
   RR) and IPSECKEY, are likely to use the same public key encodings in
   both records.  Unless otherwise specified, the IPSECKEY public key
   field will contain the algorithm-specific portion of the KEY RR RDATA



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   for the corresponding algorithm.  The algorithm must still be
   designated for use by IPSECKEY, and an IPSECKEY algorithm type number
   (which might be different than the DNSSEC algorithm number) must be
   assigned to it.

   The DSA key format is defined in RFC2536 [10]

   The RSA key format is defined in RFC3110 [11], with the following
   changes:

   The earlier definition of RSA/MD5 in RFC2065 limited the exponent and
   modulus to 2552 bits in length.  RFC3110 extended that limit to 4096
   bits for RSA/SHA1 keys.  The IPSECKEY RR imposes no length limit on
   RSA public keys, other than the 65535 octet limit imposed by the two-
   octet length encoding.  This length extension is applicable only to
   IPSECKEY and not to KEY RRs.



































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3. Presentation formats

3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs

   IPSECKEY RRs may appear in a zone data master file.  The precedence,
   gateway type and algorithm and gateway fields are REQUIRED.  The
   base64 encoded public key block is OPTIONAL; if not present, then the
   public key field of the resource record MUST be construed as being
   zero octets in length.

   The algorithm field is an unsigned integer.  No mnemonics are
   defined.

   If no gateway is to be indicated, then the gateway type field MUST be
   zero, and the gateway field MUST be "."

   The Public Key field is represented as a Base64 encoding of the
   Public Key.  Whitespace is allowed within the Base64 text.  For a
   definition of Base64 encoding, see RFC3548 [6] Section 5.2.

   The general presentation for the record as as follows:

   IN     IPSECKEY ( precedence gateway-type algorithm
                     gateway base64-encoded-public-key )


3.2 Examples

   An example of a node 192.0.2.38 that will accept IPsec tunnels on its
   own behalf.

   38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN     IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2
                    192.0.2.38
                    AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )

   An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has published its key only.

   38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN     IPSECKEY ( 10 0 2
                    .
                    AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )

   An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has delegated authority to the
   node 192.0.2.3.

   38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN     IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2
                    192.0.2.3
                    AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )




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   An example of a node, 192.0.1.38 that has delegated authority to the
   node with the identity "mygateway.example.com".

   38.1.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN     IPSECKEY ( 10 3 2
                    mygateway.example.com.
                    AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )

   An example of a node, 2001:0DB8:0200:1:210:f3ff:fe03:4d0 that has
   delegated authority to the node 2001:0DB8:c000:0200:2::1

   $ORIGIN 1.0.0.0.0.0.2.8.B.D.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.
   0.d.4.0.3.0.e.f.f.f.3.f.0.1.2.0 7200 IN     IPSECKEY ( 10 2 2
                    2001:0DB8:0:8002::2000:1
                    AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== )