draft-ietf-dnsop-misbehavior-against-aaaa-00.txt

bind 9.3结合mysql数据库

IETF DNSOP Working Group                                    Y. Morishita
Internet-Draft                                                      JPRS
Expires: July 11, 2004                                         T. Jinmei
                                                                 Toshiba
                                                        January 11, 2004


       Common Misbehavior against DNS Queries for IPv6 Addresses
            draft-ietf-dnsop-misbehavior-against-aaaa-00.txt

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 11, 2004.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   There is some known misbehavior of DNS authoritative servers when
   they are queried for AAAA resource records. Such behavior can block
   IPv4 communication which should actually be available, cause a
   significant delay in name resolution, or even make a denial of
   service attack. This memo describes details of the known cases and
   discusses the effect of the cases.

1. Introduction

   Many DNS clients (resolvers) that support IPv6 first search for AAAA
   Resource Records (RRs) of a target host name, and then for A RRs of



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   the same name. This fallback mechanism is based on the DNS
   specifications, which if not obeyed by authoritative servers can
   produce unpleasant results. In some cases, for example, a web browser
   fails to connect to a web server it could otherwise. In the following
   sections, this memo describes some typical cases of the misbehavior
   and its (bad) effects.

   Note that the misbehavior is not specific to AAAA RRs. In fact, all
   known examples also apply to the cases of queries for MX, NS, and SOA
   RRs. The authors even believe this can be generalized for all types
   of queries other than those for A RRs. In this memo, however, we
   concentrate on the case for AAAA queries, since the problem is
   particularly severe for resolvers that support IPv6, which thus
   affects many end users. Resolvers at end users normally send A and/or
   AAAA queries only, and so the problem for the other cases is
   relatively minor.

2. Network Model

   In this memo, we assume a typical network model of name resolution
   environment using DNS. It consists of three components; stub
   resolvers, caching servers, and authoritative servers. A stub
   resolver issues a recursive query to a caching server, which then
   handles the entire name resolution procedure recursively. The caching
   server caches the result of the query as well as sends the result to
   the stub resolver. The authoritative servers respond to queries for
   names for which they have the authority, normally in a non-recursive
   manner.

3. Expected Behavior

   Suppose that an authoritative server has an A RR but not a AAAA RR
   for a host name. Then the server should return a response to a query
   for a AAAA RR of the name with the RCODE being 0 (indicating no
   error) and with an empty answer section [1]. Such a response
   indicates that there is at least one RR of a different type than AAAA
   for the queried name, and the stub resolver can then look for A RRs.

   This way, the caching server can cache the fact that the queried name
   does not have a AAAA RR (but may have other types of RRs), and thus
   can improve the response time to further queries for a AAAA RR of the
   name.

4. Problematic Behaviors

   There are some known cases at authoritative servers that do not
   conform to the expected behavior. This section describes those
   problematic cases.



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4.1 Return NXDOMAIN

   This type of server returns a response with the RCODE being 3
   (NXDOMAIN) to a query for a AAAA RR, indicating it does not have any
   RRs of any type for the queried name.

   With this response, the stub resolver may immediately give up and
   never fall back. Even if the resolver retries with a query for an A
   RR, the negative response for the name has been cached in the caching
   server, and the caching server will simply return the negative
   response. As a result, the stub resolver considers this as a fatal
   error in name resolution.

   There have been several known examples of this behavior, but all the
   examples that the authors know have changed their behavior as of this
   writing.

4.2 Return NOTIMP

   Other authoritative servers return a response with the RCODE being 4
   (NOTIMP), indicating the servers do not support the requested type of
   query.

   This case is less harmful than the previous one; if the stub resolver
   falls back to querying for an A RR, the caching server will process
   the query correctly and return an appropriate response.

   In this case, the caching server does not cache the fact that the
   queried name has no AAAA RR, resulting in redundant queries for AAAA
   RRs in the future. The behavior will waste network bandwidth and
   increase the load of the authoritative server.

   Using SERVFAIL or FORMERR would cause the same effect, though the
   authors have not seen such implementations yet.

4.3 Return a Broken Response

   Another different type of authoritative servers returns broken
   responses to AAAA queries. A known behavior of this category is to
   return a response whose RR type is AAAA, but the length of the RDATA
   is 4 bytes. The 4-byte data looks like the IPv4 address of the
   queried host name. That is, the RR in the answer section would be
   described like this:

     www.bad.example. 600 IN AAAA 192.0.2.1

   which is, of course, bogus (or at least meaningless).




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   A widely deployed caching server implementation transparently returns
   the broken response (as well as caches it) to the stub resolver.
   Another known server implementation parses the response by
   themselves, and sends a separate response with the RCODE being 2
   (SERVFAIL).

   In either case, the broken response does not affect queries for an A
   RR of the same name. If the stub resolver falls back to A queries, it
   will get an appropriate response.

   The latter case, however, causes the same bad effect as that
   described in the previous section: redundant queries for AAAA RRs.

4.4 Make Lame Delegation

   Some authoritative servers respond to AAAA queries in a way causing
   lame delegation. In this case the parent zone specifies that the
   authoritative server should have the authority of a zone, but the
   server does not return an authoritative response for AAAA queries
   within the zone (i.e., the AA bit in the response is not set). On the
   other hand, the authoritative server returns an authoritative
   response for A queries.

   When a caching server asks the server for AAAA RRs in the zone, it
   recognizes the delegation is lame, and return a response with the
   RCODE being 2 (SERVFAIL) to the stub resolver.

   Furthermore, some caching servers record the authoritative server as
   lame for the zone and will not use it for a certain period of time.
   With this type of caching server, even if the stub resolver falls
   back to querying for an A RR, the caching server will simply return a
   response with the RCODE being SERVFAIL, since all the servers are
   known to be "lame."

   There is also an implementation that relaxes the behavior a little
   bit. It basically tries to avoid using the lame server, but still
   continues to try it as a last resort. With this type of caching
   server, the stub resolver will get a correct response if it falls
   back after SERVFAIL. However, this still causes redundant AAAA
   queries as explained in the previous sections.

4.5 Ignore Queries for AAAA

   Some authoritative severs seem to ignore queries for a AAAA RR,
   causing a delay at the stub resolver to fall back to a query for an A
   RR. This behavior may even cause a fatal timeout at the resolver.





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5. Security Considerations

   The CERT/CC pointed out that the response with NXDOMAIN described in
   Section 4.1 can be used for a denial of service attack [2]. The same
   argument applies to the case of "lame delegation" described in
   Section 4.4 with a certain type of caching server.

6. Acknowledgements

   Erik Nordmark encouraged the authors to publish this document as an
   Internet Draft. Akira Kato and Paul Vixie reviewed a preliminary
   version of this document. Pekka Savola carefully reviewed a previous
   version and provided detailed comments.

Informative References

   [1]  Mockapetris, P., "DOMAIN NAMES - CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES", RFC
        1034, November 1987.

   [2]  The CERT Coordination Center, "Incorrect NXDOMAIN responses from
        AAAA queries could cause denial-of-service conditions", March
        2003, <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/714121>.


Authors' Addresses