draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-07.txt

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       to generate positive responses to queries other than the name for
       which the original answer was first received.
   2.  NSEC RRs received to prove the non-existence of a name could be
       reused by a security aware resolver to prove the non-existence of
       any name in the name range it spans.

   In theory, a resolver could use wildcards or NSEC RRs to generate
   positive and negative responses (respectively) until the TTL or
   signatures on the records in question expire.  However, it seems
   prudent for resolvers to avoid blocking new authoritative data or
   synthesizing new data on their own.  Resolvers which follow this
   recommendation will have a more consistent view of the namespace.






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4.6  Handling of the CD and AD bits

   A security-aware resolver MAY set a query's CD bit in order to
   indicate that the resolver takes responsibility for performing
   whatever authentication its local policy requires on the RRsets in
   the response.  See Section 3.2 for the effect this bit has on the
   behavior of security-aware recursive name servers.

   A security-aware resolver MUST clear the AD bit when composing query
   messages to protect against buggy name servers which blindly copy
   header bits which they do not understand from the query message to
   the response message.

   A resolver MUST disregard the meaning of the CD and AD bits in a
   response unless the response was obtained using a secure channel or
   the resolver was specifically configured to regard the message header
   bits without using a secure channel.

4.7  Caching BAD Data

   While many validation errors will be transient, some are likely to be
   more persistent, such as those caused by administrative error
   (failure to re-sign a zone, clock skew, and so forth).  Since
   requerying will not help in these cases, validating resolvers might
   generate a significant amount of unnecessary DNS traffic as a result
   of repeated queries for RRsets with persistent validation failures.

   To prevent such unnecessary DNS traffic, security-aware resolvers MAY
   cache data with invalid signatures, with some restrictions.
   Conceptually, caching such data is similar to negative caching
   [RFC2308], except that instead of caching a valid negative response,
   the resolver is caching the fact that a particular answer failed to
   validate.  This document refers to a cache of data with invalid
   signatures as a "BAD cache".

   Resolvers which implement a BAD cache MUST take steps to prevent the
   cache from being useful as a denial-of-service attack amplifier.  In
   particular:
   o  Since RRsets which fail to validate do not have trustworthy TTLs,
      the implementation MUST assign a TTL.  This TTL SHOULD be small,
      in order to mitigate the effect of caching the results of an
      attack.
   o  In order to prevent caching of a transient validation failure
      (which might be the result of an attack), resolvers SHOULD track
      queries that result in validation failures, and SHOULD only answer
      from the BAD cache after the number of times that responses to
      queries for that particular <QNAME, QTYPE, QCLASS> have failed to
      validate exceeds a threshold value.



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   Resolvers MUST NOT return RRsets from the BAD cache unless the
   resolver is not required to validate the signatures of the RRsets in
   question under the rules given in Section 4.2 of this document.  See
   Section 3.2.2 for discussion of how the responses returned by a
   security-aware recursive name server interact with a BAD cache.

4.8  Synthesized CNAMEs

   A validating security-aware resolver MUST treat the signature of a
   valid signed DNAME RR as also covering unsigned CNAME RRs which could
   have been synthesized from the DNAME RR as described in [RFC2672], at
   least to the extent of not rejecting a response message solely
   because it contains such CNAME RRs.  The resolver MAY retain such
   CNAME RRs in its cache or in the answers it hands back, but is not
   required to do so.

4.9  Stub resolvers

   A security-aware stub resolver MUST support the DNSSEC RR types, at
   least to the extent of not mishandling responses just because they
   contain DNSSEC RRs.

4.9.1  Handling of the DO Bit

   A non-validating security-aware stub resolver MAY include the DNSSEC
   RRs returned by a security-aware recursive name server as part of the
   data that the stub resolver hands back to the application which
   invoked it but is not required to do so.  A non-validating stub
   resolver that wishes to do this will need to set the DO bit in
   receive DNSSEC RRs from the recursive name server.

   A validating security-aware stub resolver MUST set the DO bit, since
   otherwise it will not receive the DNSSEC RRs it needs to perform
   signature validation.

4.9.2  Handling of the CD Bit

   A non-validating security-aware stub resolver SHOULD NOT set the CD
   bit when sending queries unless requested by the application layer,
   since by definition, a non-validating stub resolver depends on the
   security-aware recursive name server to perform validation on its
   behalf.

   A validating security-aware stub resolver SHOULD set the CD bit,
   since otherwise the security-aware recursive name server will answer
   the query using the name server's local policy, which may prevent the
   stub resolver from receiving data which would be acceptable to the
   stub resolver's local policy.



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4.9.3  Handling of the AD Bit

   A non-validating security-aware stub resolver MAY chose to examine
   the setting of the AD bit in response messages that it receives in
   order to determine whether the security-aware recursive name server
   which sent the response claims to have cryptographically verified the
   data in the Answer and Authority sections of the response message.
   Note, however, that the responses received by a security-aware stub
   resolver are heavily dependent on the local policy of the
   security-aware recursive name server, so as a practical matter there
   may be little practical value to checking the status of the AD bit
   except perhaps as a debugging aid.  In any case, a security-aware
   stub resolver MUST NOT place any reliance on signature validation
   allegedly performed on its behalf except when the security-aware stub
   resolver obtained the data in question from a trusted security-aware
   recursive name server via a secure channel.

   A validating security-aware stub resolver SHOULD NOT examine the
   setting of the AD bit in response messages, since, by definition, the
   stub resolver performs its own signature validation regardless of the
   setting of the AD bit.






























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5.  Authenticating DNS Responses

   In order to use DNSSEC RRs for authentication, a security-aware
   resolver requires configured knowledge of at least one authenticated
   DNSKEY or DS RR.  The process for obtaining and authenticating this
   initial trust anchors is achieved via some external mechanism.  For
   example, a resolver could use some off-line authenticated exchange to
   obtain a zone's DNSKEY RR or obtain a DS RR that identifies and
   authenticates a zone's DNSKEY RR.  The remainder of this section
   assumes that the resolver has somehow obtained an initial set of
   trust anchors.

   An initial DNSKEY RR can be used to authenticate a zone's apex DNSKEY
   RRset.  To authenticate an apex DNSKEY RRset using an initial key,
   the resolver MUST:
   1.  Verify that the initial DNSKEY RR appears in the apex DNSKEY
       RRset, and verify that the DNSKEY RR MUST have the Zone Key Flag
       (DNSKEY RDATA bit 7) set.
   2.  Verify that there is some RRSIG RR that covers the apex DNSKEY
       RRset, and that the combination of the RRSIG RR and the initial
       DNSKEY RR authenticates the DNSKEY RRset.  The process for using
       an RRSIG RR to authenticate an RRset is described in Section 5.3.

   Once the resolver has authenticated the apex DNSKEY RRset using an
   initial DNSKEY RR, delegations from that zone can be authenticated
   using DS RRs.  This allows a resolver to start from an initial key,
   and use DS RRsets to proceed recursively down the DNS tree obtaining
   other apex DNSKEY RRsets.  If the resolver were configured with a
   root DNSKEY RR, and if every delegation had a DS RR associated with
   it, then the resolver could obtain and validate any apex DNSKEY
   RRset.  The process of using DS RRs to authenticate referrals is
   described in Section 5.2.

   Once the resolver has authenticated a zone's apex DNSKEY RRset,
   Section 5.3 shows how the resolver can use DNSKEY RRs in the apex
   DNSKEY RRset and RRSIG RRs from the zone to authenticate any other
   RRsets in the zone.  Section 5.4 shows how the resolver can use
   authenticated NSEC RRsets from the zone to prove that an RRset is not
   present in the zone.

   When a resolver indicates support for DNSSEC (by setting the DO bit),
   a security-aware name server should attempt to provide the necessary
   DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, and DS RRsets in a response (see Section 3).
   However, a security-aware resolver may still receive a response that
   that lacks the appropriate DNSSEC RRs, whether due to configuration
   issues such as an upstream security-oblivious recursive name server
   that accidentally interferes with DNSSEC RRs or due to a deliberate
   attack in which an adversary forges a response, strips DNSSEC RRs



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   from a response, or modifies a query so that DNSSEC RRs appear not to
   be requested.  The absence of DNSSEC data in a response MUST NOT by
   itself be taken as an indication that no authentication information
   exists.

   A resolver SHOULD expect authentication information from signed
   zones.  A resolver SHOULD believe that a zone is signed if the
   resolver has been configured with public key information for the
   zone, or if the zone's parent is signed and the delegation from the
   parent contains a DS RRset.

5.1  Special Considerations for Islands of Security

   Islands of security (see [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro]) are signed
   zones for which it is not possible to construct an authentication
   chain to the zone from its parent.  Validating signatures within an
   island of security requires the validator to have some other means of
   obtaining an initial authenticated zone key for the island.  If a
   validator cannot obtain such a key, it SHOULD switch to operating as
   if the zones in the island of security are unsigned.

   All the normal processes for validating responses apply to islands of
   security.  The only difference between normal validation and
   validation within an island of security is in how the validator
   obtains a trust anchor for the authentication chain.

5.2  Authenticating Referrals

   Once the apex DNSKEY RRset for a signed parent zone has been
   authenticated, DS RRsets can be used to authenticate the delegation
   to a signed child zone.  A DS RR identifies a DNSKEY RR in the child
   zone's apex DNSKEY RRset, and contains a cryptographic digest of the
   child zone's DNSKEY RR.  A strong cryptographic digest algorithm
   ensures that an adversary can not easily generate a DNSKEY RR that
   matches the digest.  Thus, authenticating the digest allows a
   resolver to authenticate the matching DNSKEY RR.  The resolver can
   then use this child DNSKEY RR to authenticate the entire child apex
   DNSKEY RRset.

   Given a DS RR for a delegation, the child zone's apex DNSKEY RRset
   can be authenticated if all of the following hold:
   o  The DS RR has be