📄 draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-11.txt
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the AT_MAC is invalid, then the client MUST silently discard the EAP packet. If the AT_MAC attribute is valid, then the client MAY decrypt the encrypted data in AT_ENCR_DATA and use the obtained pseudonym on the next full authentication. If the client does not receive a new pseudonym in the EAP- Request/SIM/Challenge message, the client MAY use an old pseudonym instead of the permanent identity on next full authentication. The EAP server produces pseudonyms in an implementation-dependent manner. Please see [7] for examples on how to produce pseudonyms. Only the EAP server needs to be able to map the pseudonym to the permanent identity. Regardless of construction method, the pseudonym MUST conform to the grammar specified for the username portion of an NAI. In any case, it is necessary that permanent usernames and pseudonyms are separate and recognizable from each other. It is also desirable that EAP SIM and EAP AKA user names be recognizable from each other as an aid for the server to which method to offer. In general, it is the task of the EAP server and the policies of its administrator to ensure sufficient separation in the usernames. Pseudonyms, for instance, are both produced and used by the EAP server. The EAP server MUST compose pseudonyms so that it can recognize if a NAI username is an EAP SIM pseudonym. For instance, when the usernames have been derived from the IMSI, the pseudonym could begin with a leading "3" character. On the next full authentication with the EAP server, the client MAY transmit the received pseudonym in the first EAP-Response/Identity packet. The client concatenates the received pseudonym with the "@" Haverinen and Salowey Expires in six months [Page 14] Internet Draft EAP SIM Authentication June 2003 character and the NAI realm portion. The client selects the realm name portion similarly as it select the realm name portion when using the permanent identity. If the EAP server successfully decodes the pseudonym received in the EAP-Response/Identity packet to a known client permanent identity, the authentication proceeds with the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message as usual. Because the client may fail to save a pseudonym sent to in an EAP- Request/SIM/Challenge, for example due to malfunction, the EAP server SHOULD maintain at least one old pseudonym in addition to the most recent pseudonym. If the EAP server requests the client to include its identity in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet, as specified in Section 5.2, the client MAY transmit the received pseudonym in the AT_IDENTITY attribute. If the EAP server successfully decodes the pseudonym to a known identity, then the authentication proceeds with the EAP- Request/SIM/Challenge packet as usual. If the EAP server fails to decode the pseudonym to a known identity, then the EAP server requests the permanent identity (non-pseudonym identity) by including the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute (Section 9) in the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message. Because another EAP server may have generated the pseudonym using a different coding scheme, the EAP server SHOULD use AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ also in cases when it does not recognize the format of the client identity. The EAP server issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Start message also in the case when it received the undecodable pseudonym in AT_IDENTITY included the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet. In this case, an extra EAP/SIM/Start round trip is required. A received AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ does not necessarily originate from the valid network, but an active attacker may transmit an EAP- Request/SIM/Start packet with an AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to the client, in an effort to find out the true identity of the user. The client MAY silently discard any EAP-Request/SIM/Start messages that include AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ for a while in order to wait for an EAP-Request/SIM/Start packet without AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. If the valid network sent the message, the message will be retransmitted, so the client can reconsider replying to the message when it receives a retransmission. Basically, there are two different policies that the client can employ with regard to AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. A "conservative" client assumes that the network is able to maintain pseudonyms robustly. Therefore, if a conservative client has a pseudonym, the client silently ignores the EAP packet with AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, because the client believes that the valid network is able to decode the pseudonym. (Alternatively, the conservative client may respond to AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ in certain circumstances, for example if the pseudonym was received a long time ago.) The benefit of this policy is that it protects the client against active attacks on anonymity. Haverinen and Salowey Expires in six months [Page 15] Internet Draft EAP SIM Authentication June 2003 On the other hand, a "liberal" client always accepts the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ and responds with the permanent identity. The benefit of this policy is that it works even if the valid network sometimes loses pseudonyms and is not able to decode them to the permanent identity. Regardless how the identity is communicated to the server, the full authentication message sequence and the attributes are the same in all cases. For example, AT_NONCE_MT and AT_SELECTED_VERSION are always included in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet on full authentication, even if they were already transmitted in the previous EAP-Response/SIM/Start. AT_VERSION_LIST is also included in every EAP-Request/SIM/Start message. The values used on the last EAP/SIM/Start round trip are used and the previous EAP/SIM/Start round trips is ignored. (However, all EAP/SIM/Start rounds are taken into account when calculating the checkcode for AT_CHECKCODE. AT_CHECKCODE is specified in Section 8.2). The NONCE_MT value and the version negotiation attributes included in the last EAP- Response/SIM/Start packet are used in all calculations. The EAP/SIM client MAY use the same NONCE_MT value in both EAP- Response/SIM/Start packets. The value field of the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ does not contain any data but the attribute is included to request the client to include the AT_IDENTITY attribute (Section 10) with the permanent authentication identity in the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. In this case, the AT_IDENTITY attribute contains the client's permanent identity in the clear. Please note that the EAP/SIM client and the EAP/SIM server only process the AT_IDENTITY attribute and entities that only pass through EAP packets do not process this attribute. Hence, if the EAP server is not co-located in the authenticator, then the authenticator and other intermediate AAA elements (such as possible AAA proxy servers) will continue to refer to the client with the original identity from the EAP-Response/Identity packet regardless if the decoding fails in the EAP server. The figure below illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to decode the pseudonym included in the EAP-Response/Identity packet. Haverinen and Salowey Expires in six months [Page 16] Internet Draft EAP SIM Authentication June 2003 Client Authenticator | | | EAP-Request/Identity | |<------------------------------------------------------| | | | EAP-Response/Identity | | (Includes a pseudonym) | |------------------------------------------------------>| | | | +------------------------------+ | | Server fails to decode the | | | Pseudonym. | | +------------------------------+ | | | EAP-Request/SIM/Start | | (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) | |<------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | EAP-Response/SIM/Start | | (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity, AT_NONCE_MT, | | AT_SELECTED_VERSION) | |------------------------------------------------------>| | | If the server recognizes the permanent identity, then the authentication sequence proceeds as usual with the EAP Server issuing the EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge message. If the server does not recognize the permanent identity, or if the server is not able to continue the authentication exchange with the client after receiving the permanent identity, then the server issues the EAP Failure packet and the authentication exchange terminates. The figure below illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to decode the pseudonym included in the AT_IDENTITY attribute. Haverinen and Salowey Expires in six months [Page 17] Internet Draft EAP SIM Authentication June 2003 Client Authenticator | | | +------------------------------+ | | Server does not have any | | | Subscriber identity available| | | When starting EAP/SIM | | +------------------------------+ | | | EAP-Request/SIM/Start | | (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) | |<------------------------------------------------------| | | | | |EAP-Response/SIM/Start | |(AT_IDENTITY with a pseudonym identity, AT_NONCE_MT, | | AT_SELECTED_VERSION) | |------------------------------------------------------>| | | | | | +------------------------------+ | | Server fails to decode the | | | Pseudonym in AT_IDENTITY | | +------------------------------+ | | | EAP-Request/SIM/Start | | (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) | |<------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | EAP-Response/SIM/Start | | (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity, | | AT_NONCE_MT, AT_SELECTED_VERSION) | |------------------------------------------------------>| | | In the worst case, there are three EAP/SIM/Start round trips before the server has obtained an acceptable identity: on the first round, the client sends its re-authentication identity in AT_IDENTITY. The server fails to accept it and request a full authentication identity with a second EAP-Request/SIM/Start. The client responds with a pseudonym identity in AT_IDENTITY. The server fails to decode the pseudonym and has to issue a third EAP-Request/SIM/Start, including AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. Finally, the server accepts the client's EAP- Response/SIM/Start with the AT_IDENTITY attribute and proceeds with full authentication. This is illustrated in the figure below.
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