ga---dca-scott010506.nlogo

NETLOGO

89
exponential-mean
exponential-mean
0
30
6
1
1
NIL

PLOT
6
305
260
462
Average Revenue
# of auctions
$
0.0
10.0
0.0
80.0
true
true
PENS
"open-auction" 1.0 0 -2064490 true
"open-posted" 1.0 0 -5825686 true
"sealed-auction" 1.0 0 -10899396 true
"sealed-posted" 1.0 0 -13345367 true
"only-posted" 1.0 0 -16777216 true

MONITOR
185
551
309
600
total auction revenue
auction-revenue
0
1

MONITOR
7
551
181
600
total posted price revenue
posted-price-revenue
0
1

TEXTBOX
162
287
252
305
Auction Station

TEXTBOX
65
475
173
493
Posted Price Station

MONITOR
3
184
409
233
current winning agents
winner-info
0
1

BUTTON
2
20
57
53
NIL
setup
NIL
1
T
OBSERVER
T
NIL

BUTTON
61
20
121
53
1 auction
go
NIL
1
T
OBSERVER
T
NIL

SLIDER
4
93
108
126
Q-quantity
Q-quantity
1
10
4
1
1
NIL

BUTTON
125
20
248
53
Repeated auctions
go
T
1
T
OBSERVER
T
NIL

SLIDER
113
94
254
127
the-posted-price
the-posted-price
50
100
80
5
1
NIL

SLIDER
272
56
409
89
max-waiting-cost
max-waiting-cost
0.1
10
1.0
0.1
1
NIL

SLIDER
260
94
410
127
increment
increment
0
2
2.0
0.1
1
NIL

SLIDER
279
306
398
339
crazy-louie
crazy-louie
0
5
1
1
1
NIL

SLIDER
279
343
398
376
less-crazy
less-crazy
0
5
0
1
1
NIL

SLIDER
279
379
398
412
money-saver
money-saver
0
5
0
1
1
NIL

SLIDER
278
415
398
448
hate-bidding
hate-bidding
0
5
0
1
1
NIL

SLIDER
277
451
398
484
rational-guy
rational-guy
0
5
0
1
1
NIL

MONITOR
3
232
409
281
winning bids
winning-bid-info
0
1

SLIDER
135
56
269
89
R-reserve-price
R-reserve-price
0
20
10
1
1
NIL

CHOOSER
4
132
102
177
p-a-calculation
p-a-calculation
"increasing" "random" "linear1" "linear2"
0

CHOOSER
106
132
214
177
payment-plan
payment-plan
"uniform-price" "non-uniform-price"
0

SLIDER
277
487
398
520
want-to-win
want-to-win
0
5
0
1
1
NIL

PLOT
414
363
967
513
% by which both differs from just posted
# of auctions
% difference
0.0
10.0
0.0
0.6
true
true
PENS
"open" 1.0 0 -13345367 true
"plus50percent" 1.0 0 -16777216 true
"minus50percent" 1.0 0 -16777216 true
"zero" 1.0 0 -16777216 true
"sealed" 1.0 0 -5825686 true

MONITOR
356
132
408
181
Auct #
auction-num
0
1

CHOOSER
218
132
352
177
lowest-new-basis
lowest-new-basis
"lowest-winning-bid" "reserve"
0

CHOOSER
261
10
409
55
waiting-cost-values
waiting-cost-values
"equal" "uniform"
0

@#$#@#$#@
WHAT IS IT?
-----------
This model simulates a firm running an auction at the same time as when it sells items at posted prices. It also simulates what would have happened if the auction were a (q+1)-sealed bid auction rather than an open ascending auction. The results from this simulated sealed bid auction are not reflected in the visible auction process; rather, they are shown in the graphics plot.


HOW IT WORKS
------------
Each auction runs under the open ascending bid auction. The firm also has posted price sales going on at the same time. Depending upon the consumer's own valuation of the good (based on a variety of factors), it decides whether or not to participate in the auction or to buy at the posted price. At the end of the auction the firm determines who the winners are.

At the end of the auction the model runs another simulated auction using the exact same consumers arriving at the same times and with the same valuations. This auction is the (q+1) sealed bid auction. The model determines who would have bought at the posted price, who would have bid, what they would have bid, and then who would have won the auction.


HOW TO USE IT
-------------
Click on "setup" button before running the simulation.
Click on "1 auction" button in order to run an auction. This is what you'll normally use when initially exploring the model. You cannot interrupt the running of the auction.
Click on "Repeated auctions" button in order to run many auctions serially. In order to stop this process, click on the button again (just once!) and wait for the current auction to complete.

Set the waiting-cost-values chooser to determine if the waiting costs for all of the consumers should be equal or chosen from a uniform distribution.
Set the exponential-mean slider to set the arrival rate of consumers.
Set the max-waiting-cost slider to set the maximum waiting cost for a consumer. Its waiting cost is chosen from a distribution of values.
Set the R-reserve-price slider in order to set the reserve price for both auctions.
Set the Q-quantity slider to determine how many items are up for auction.
Set the-posted-price slider to determine the value of the posted price.
Set the increment slider to determine the smallest increment by which a bid can be increased.
Set the p-a-calculation chooser to determine how each consumer will calculate p(a).
Set the payment-plan chooser to determine the price the auction winners will pay --- either all pay the same or each pays what he/she bid.
Set the lowest-new-basis to determine how the value of the lowest acceptable new bid is calculated (when there are less than Q bidders) --- either it is based on the current lowest winning bid or it is based on the reserve price.

Set the 5 sliders in the bottom middle of model page to set the relative ratio of each of the bidding strategy types.

THINGS TO NOTICE
----------------
Watch the "Average Revenues" plot and see if you can determine if, under the current model settings, one type of auction or the other causes the firm to make more revenue from auctions or from posted price sales.


THINGS TO TRY
-------------
This section could give some ideas of things for the user to try to do (move sliders, switches, etc.) with the model.


EXTENDING THE MODEL
-------------------
This section could give some ideas of things to add or change in the procedures tab to make the model more complicated, detailed, accurate, etc.