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📄 pkix-concepts.htm

📁 The Open–source PKI Book Version 2.4.6 Edition Copyright &copy 1999, 2000 by Symeon (Simos) Xenite
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<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Concepts</TITLE><METANAME="GENERATOR"CONTENT="Modular DocBook HTML Stylesheet Version 1.55"><LINKREL="HOME"TITLE="The Open&#8211;source PKI Book"HREF="ospki-book.htm"><LINKREL="UP"TITLE="Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX)"HREF="pkix.htm"><LINKREL="PREVIOUS"TITLE="Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX)"HREF="pkix.htm"><LINKREL="NEXT"TITLE="Overview of the PKIX approach"HREF="pkix-overview.htm"></HEAD><BODYCLASS="SECT1"BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF"TEXT="#000000"LINK="#0000FF"VLINK="#840084"ALINK="#0000FF"><DIVCLASS="NAVHEADER"><TABLEWIDTH="100%"BORDER="0"CELLPADDING="0"CELLSPACING="0"><TR><THCOLSPAN="3"ALIGN="center">The Open&#8211;source PKI Book: A guide to PKIs and Open&#8211;source Implementations</TH></TR><TR><TDWIDTH="10%"ALIGN="left"VALIGN="bottom"><AHREF="pkix.htm">Prev</A></TD><TDWIDTH="80%"ALIGN="center"VALIGN="bottom">Chapter 6. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX)</TD><TDWIDTH="10%"ALIGN="right"VALIGN="bottom"><AHREF="pkix-overview.htm">Next</A></TD></TR></TABLE><HRALIGN="LEFT"WIDTH="100%"></DIV><DIVCLASS="SECT1"><H1CLASS="SECT1"><ANAME="PKIX-CONCEPTS">Concepts</A></H1><P>  We describe important concepts with regard to the PKIX standards.  A Public Key Infrastructure does not only need an infrastructure to handle identities,  it needs an infrastructure to handle privileges. The distinction between the  two will become more evident in the following sections.  </P><DIVCLASS="SECT2"><H2CLASS="SECT2"><ANAME="CERTIFICATE-USING-SYSTEMS-AND-PKI">Certificate&#8211;using Systems and PKIs</A></H2><P>   At the heart of recent efforts to improve Internet security are a   group of security protocols such as Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail   Extensions (<SPANCLASS="ACRONYM">S/MIME</SPAN>), Transport Layer Security    (<SPANCLASS="ACRONYM">TLS</SPAN>), and Internet   Protocol Security (<SPANCLASS="ACRONYM">IPSec</SPAN>). All of these protocols    rely on public&#8211;key cryptography to provide services such as    confidentiality, data integrity, data origin authentication, and    non-repudiation. The   purpose of a PKI is to provide trusted and efficient key and public   key certificate management, thus enabling the use of authentication,   non-repudiation, and confidentiality.  </P><TABLECLASS="SIDEBAR"BORDER="1"CELLPADDING="5"><TR><TD><DIVCLASS="SIDEBAR"><P><B>Security services</B></P><P>  Essential services to ensure the security on the Internet are   confidentiality, data integrity, data origin authentication and   non&#8211;repudiation. These can be achieved with protocols like  <SPANCLASS="ACRONYM">S/MIME</SPAN>, <SPANCLASS="ACRONYM">TLS</SPAN> and <SPANCLASS="ACRONYM">IPSec  </SPAN>. The protocols need a <SPANCLASS="ACRONYM">PKI</SPAN> in order to  function effectively.  </P></DIV></TD></TR></TABLE><P>   Users of public key-based systems must be confident that, any time   they rely on a public key, the associated private key is owned by the   subject with which they are communicating. (This applies whether an   encryption or digital signature mechanism is used.) This confidence   is obtained through the use of PKCs, which are data structures that   bind public key values to subjects. The binding is achieved by having   a trusted CA verify the subject's identity and digitally sign each   PKC. </P><P>   A PKC has a limited valid lifetime, which is indicated in its signed   contents. Because a PKC's signature and timeliness can be   independently checked by a certificate-using client, PKCs can be   distributed via untrusted communications and server systems, and can   be cached in unsecured storage in certificate-using systems. </P><P>   PKCs are used in the process of validating signed data. Specifics   vary according to which algorithm is used, but the general process   works as follows:  <DIVCLASS="NOTE"><P></P><TABLECLASS="NOTE"WIDTH="100%"BORDER="0"><TR><TDWIDTH="25"ALIGN="CENTER"VALIGN="TOP"><IMGSRC="stylesheet-images/note.gif"HSPACE="5"ALT="Note"></TD><TDALIGN="LEFT"VALIGN="TOP"><P>     There is no specific order in which the checks listed below     must be made; implementors are free to implement them in the most     efficient way for their systems.  </P></TD></TR></TABLE></DIV>    <P></P><UL><LISTYLE="list-style-type: BULLET"><P>  	The recipient of signed data verifies that the claimed identity       	of the user is in accordance with the identity contained in the       	PKC;  </P></LI><LISTYLE="list-style-type: BULLET"><P>  	The recipient validates that no PKC in the path is revoked (e.g.,       	by retrieving a suitably-current Certificate Revocation List       	(CRL) or querying an on-line certificate status responder), and       	that all PKCs are within their validity periods at the time the       	data was signed;  </P></LI><LISTYLE="list-style-type: BULLET"><P>       	The recipient verifies that the data are not claimed to have any       	values for which the PKC indicates that the signer is not       	authorized;  </P></LI><LISTYLE="list-style-type: BULLET"><P>       The recipient verifies that the data have not been altered since       signing, by using the public key in the PKC.  </P></LI></UL>  </P><P>   If all of these checks pass, the recipient can accept that the data   was signed by the purported signer. The process for keys used for   encryption is similar.  </P><DIVCLASS="NOTE"><P></P><TABLECLASS="NOTE"WIDTH="100%"BORDER="0"><TR><TDWIDTH="25"ALIGN="CENTER"VALIGN="TOP"><IMGSRC="stylesheet-images/note.gif"HSPACE="5"ALT="Note"></TD><TDALIGN="LEFT"VALIGN="TOP"><P>     It is of course possible that the data was signed by someone     very different from the signer, if for example the purported     signer's private key was compromised. Security depends on all parts     of the certificate-using system, including but not limited to:     physical security of the place the computer resides; personnel     security (i.e., the trustworthiness of the people who actually     develop, install, run, and maintain the system); the security     provided by the operating system on which the private key is used;     and the security provided the CA. A failure in any one of these     areas can cause the entire system security to fail. PKIX is limited     in scope, however, and only directly addresses issues related to     the operation of the PKI subsystem. For guidance in many of the     other areas, see RFC 2527.  </P></TD></TR></TABLE></DIV></DIV><DIVCLASS="SECT2"><H2CLASS="SECT2"><ANAME="CERTIFICATE-USING-SYSTEMS-AND-PMI">Certificate&#8211;using Systems and PMIs</A></H2><P>   Many systems use the PKC to perform identity based access control   decisions (i.e., the identity may be used to support identity-based   access control decisions after the client proves that it has access   to the private key that corresponds to the public key contained in   the PKC). For many systems this is sufficient, but increasingly   systems are beginning to find that rule-based, role-based, and rank-   based access control is required. These forms of access control   decisions require additional information that is normally not   included in a PKC, because the lifetime of the information is much   shorter than the lifetime of the public-private key pair. To support   binding this information to a PKC the Attribute Certificate (AC) was   defined in ANSI and later incorporated into ITU&#8211;T Recommendation   X.509. The AC format allows any additional information to be bound to   a PKC by including, in a digitally signed data structure, a reference   back to one specific PKC or to multiple PKCs, useful when the subject   has the same identity in multiple PKCs. Additionally, the AC can be   constructed in such a way that it is only useful at one or more   particular targets (e.g., web server, mail host).  </P><P>   Users of a PMI must be confident that the identity purporting to   posess an attribute has the right to possess that attribute. This   confidence may be obtained through the use of PKCs or it may be   configured in the AC-using system. If PKCs are used the party making   the access control decision can determine "if the AC issuer is   trusted to issue ACs containing this attribute."  </P></DIV></DIV><DIVCLASS="NAVFOOTER"><HRALIGN="LEFT"WIDTH="100%"><TABLEWIDTH="100%"BORDER="0"CELLPADDING="0"CELLSPACING="0"><TR><TDWIDTH="33%"ALIGN="left"VALIGN="top"><AHREF="pkix.htm">Prev</A></TD><TDWIDTH="34%"ALIGN="center"VALIGN="top"><AHREF="ospki-book.htm">Home</A></TD><TDWIDTH="33%"ALIGN="right"VALIGN="top"><AHREF="pkix-overview.htm">Next</A></TD></TR><TR><TDWIDTH="33%"ALIGN="left"VALIGN="top">Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX)</TD><TDWIDTH="34%"ALIGN="center"VALIGN="top"><AHREF="pkix.htm">Up</A></TD><TDWIDTH="33%"ALIGN="right"VALIGN="top">Overview of the PKIX approach</TD></TR></TABLE></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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