draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-15.txt

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Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Expires: June 21, 2005                                      H. Haverinen
                                                                   Nokia
                                                       December 21, 2004


      Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation
               Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)
                   draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-15.txt

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of section 3 of RFC 3667.  By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
   author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
   which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
   which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
   RFC 3668.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 21, 2005.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).

IESG Note

   The EAP-AKA protocol was developed by 3GPP.  The documentation of
   EAP-AKA is provided as information to the Internet community.  While
   the EAP WG has verified that EAP-AKA is compatible with EAP as
   defined in RFC 3748, no other review has been done, including
   validation of the security claims.



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Abstract

   This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
   mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the
   Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism used in the 3rd
   generation mobile networks Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
   (UMTS) and cdma2000.  AKA is based on symmetric keys, and runs
   typically in a Subscriber Identity Module (UMTS Subscriber Identity
   Module USIM, or (Removable) User Identity Module (R)UIM), a smart
   card like device.

   EAP-AKA includes optional identity privacy support, optional result
   indications, and an optional fast re-authentication procedure.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Terms and Conventions Used in This Document  . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Protocol Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.1   Identity Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.1.1   Format, Generation and Usage of Peer Identities  . . . 16
       4.1.2   Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server  . . . . 22
       4.1.3   Choice of Identity for the EAP-Response/Identity . . . 23
       4.1.4   Server Operation in the Beginning of EAP-AKA
               Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       4.1.5   Processing of EAP-Request/AKA-Identity by the Peer . . 24
       4.1.6   Attacks against Identity Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       4.1.7   Processing of AT_IDENTITY by the Server  . . . . . . . 26
     4.2   Message Sequence Examples (Informative)  . . . . . . . . . 27
       4.2.1   Usage of AT_ANY_ID_REQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
       4.2.2   Fall Back on Full Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       4.2.3   Requesting the Permanent Identity 1  . . . . . . . . . 29
       4.2.4   Requesting the Permanent Identity 2  . . . . . . . . . 30
       4.2.5   Three EAP/AKA-Identity Round Trips . . . . . . . . . . 31
   5.  Fast Re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
     5.1   General  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
     5.2   Comparison to AKA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     5.3   Fast Re-authentication Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     5.4   Fast Re-authentication Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     5.5   Fast Re-authentication Procedure when Counter is Too
           Small  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
   6.  EAP-AKA Notifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
     6.1   General  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
     6.2   Result Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
     6.3   Error Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
       6.3.1   Peer Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
       6.3.2   Server Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43



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       6.3.3   EAP-Failure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
       6.3.4   EAP-Success  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     6.4   Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
   7.  Message Format and Protocol Extensibility  . . . . . . . . . . 47
     7.1   Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
     7.2   Protocol Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
   8.  Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
     8.1   EAP-Request/AKA-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
     8.2   EAP-Response/AKA-Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     8.3   EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     8.4   EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
     8.5   EAP-Response/AKA-Authentication-Reject . . . . . . . . . . 52
     8.6   EAP-Response/AKA-Synchronization-Failure . . . . . . . . . 52
     8.7   EAP-Request/AKA-Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
     8.8   EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
     8.9   EAP-Response/AKA-Client-Error  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
     8.10  EAP-Request/AKA-Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
     8.11  EAP-Response/AKA-Notification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
   9.  Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
     9.1   Table of Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
     9.2   AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
     9.3   AT_ANY_ID_REQ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
     9.4   AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
     9.5   AT_IDENTITY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
     9.6   AT_RAND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
     9.7   AT_AUTN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
     9.8   AT_RES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
     9.9   AT_AUTS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
     9.10  AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
     9.11  AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
     9.12  AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_PADDING . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
     9.13  AT_CHECKCODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
     9.14  AT_RESULT_IND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
     9.15  AT_MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
     9.16  AT_COUNTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
     9.17  AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
     9.18  AT_NONCE_S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
     9.19  AT_NOTIFICATION  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
     9.20  AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
   10.   IANA and Protocol Numbering Considerations . . . . . . . . . 68
   11.   Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
     11.1  Identity Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
     11.2  Mutual Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
     11.3  Flooding the Authentication Centre . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
     11.4  Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
     11.5  Brute-Force and Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
     11.6  Protection, Replay Protection and Confidentiality  . . . . 72
     11.7  Negotiation Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73



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     11.8  Protected Result Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
     11.9  Man-in-the-middle Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
     11.10   Generating Random Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
   12.   Security Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
   13.   Acknowledgements and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
   14.   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
   14.1  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
   14.2  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
   A.  Pseudo-Random Number Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 79








































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1.  Introduction and Motivation

   This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
   mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the
   3rd generation Authentication and Key Agreement mechanism, specified
   for Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) in [TS 33.102]
   and for cdma2000 in [S.S0055-A].  UMTS and cdma2000 are global third
   generation mobile network standards that use the same AKA mechanism.

   Second generation mobile networks and third generation mobile
   networks use different authentication and key agreement mechanisms.
   The Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) is a 2nd generation
   mobile network standard, and EAP-SIM [EAP-SIM] specifies an EAP
   mechanism that is based on the GSM authentication and key agreement
   primitives.

   AKA is based on challenge-response mechanisms and symmetric
   cryptography.  AKA typically runs in a UMTS Subscriber Identity
   Module (USIM) or a cdma2000 (Removable) User Identity Module
   ((R)UIM).  In this document, both modules are referred to as identity
   modules.  Compared to the 2nd generation mechanisms such as GSM AKA,
   the 3rd generation AKA provides substantially longer key lengths and
   mutual authentication.

   The introduction of AKA inside EAP allows several new applications.
   These include the following:

   o  The use of the AKA also as a secure PPP authentication method in
      devices that already contain an identity module.
   o  The use of the third generation mobile network authentication
      infrastructure in the context of wireless LANs
   o  Relying on AKA and the existing infrastructure in a seamless way
      with any other technology that can use EAP.

   AKA works in the following manner:

   o  The identity module and the home environment have agreed on a
      secret key beforehand.  (The "home environment" refers to the home
      operator's authentication network infrastructure.)
   o  The actual authentication process starts by having the home
      environment produce an authentication vector, based on the secret
      key and a sequence number.  The authentication vector contains a
      random part RAND, an authenticator part AUTN used for
      authenticating the network to the identity module, an expected
      result part XRES, a 128-bit session key for integrity check IK,
      and a 128-bit session key for encryption CK.
   o  The RAND and the AUTN are delivered to the identity module.




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   o  The identity module verifies the AUTN, again based on the secret
      key and the sequence number.  If this process is successful (the
      AUTN is valid and the sequence number used to generate AUTN is
      within the correct range), the identity moduleproduces an
      authentication result, RES and sends this to the home environment.
   o  The home environment verifies the correct result from the identity
      module.  If the result is correct, IK and CK can be used to
      protect further communications between the identity module and the