pgprngpriv.h

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/*
 * pgpRngPriv.h
 *
 * Copyright (C) 1994-1997 Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. All rights reserved.
 *
 * $Id: pgpRngPriv.h,v 1.11.2.1 1997/06/07 09:50:39 mhw Exp $
 */

#ifndef PGPRNGPRIV_H
#define PGPRNGPRIV_H

#include <stdio.h>		/* For size_t */
#include "pgpRngPub.h"

/* Private */

#include "pgpMemPool.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

/*
 * This number should probably be increased for multiple keyrings and GUIs.
 * At the moment, it is low to help memory consumption.
 */
#ifndef RINGMASKBITS
#define RINGMASKBITS 16
#endif

#define MEMRINGBIT (RINGMASKBITS-1)

#if RINGMASKBITS <= 8
typedef byte ringmask;
#elif RINGMASKBITS <= 16
typedef word16 ringmask;
#elif RINGMASKBITS <= 32
typedef word32 ringmask;
#else
#error Invalid RINGMASKBITS value
#endif

#define MEMRINGMASK ((ringmask)1<<MEMRINGBIT)

/* PGP version information */
#define PGPVERSION_2 2
#define KNOWN_PGP_VERSION(x) ((x)==PGPVERSION_2 || (x) == PGPVERSION_2_6 || \
	    	    	    	    						(x)==PGPVERSION_3)

/* Position in a file */
struct FilePos {
		union {
	struct FilePos *next;
			void *buf;
		} ptr;
		word32 fpos;
};

#define NULLFILEPOS { { (struct FilePos *)0 }, (word32)0 }

/*
 * Since C requires in-order allocation of structure fields, a poor choice of
 * field order can cause lots of holes in a structure for alignment reasons.
 * E.g. long/char/long/char/long/char/long/char assuming the usual 4-byte
 * longs aligned on 4-byte boundaries requires 32 bytes of storage, while
 * long/long/long/long/char/char/char/char requires only 20.
 * Storage required can be minimized by allocating the largest fields in
 * the structure at the ends, against the aligned edges of the structure,
 * and filling the hole in the middle with progressively less aligned
 * fields. We use this by declaring the common (generic) fields in
 * largest-to-smallest order, then the type-specific extensions in
 * smallest-to-largest.
 *
 * The sizes listed are for the platform where memory consumption is the
 * greatest concern - the IBM PC. Other platforms aren't quite as tight.
 */

struct RingGeneric
{
/* 0*/	union RingObject *next, *down, *up;
/*12*/	struct FilePos pos;
/*20*/	ringmask mask;
/*21*/	byte flags;
/*22*/
};

/* Generic flags (apply to more than one type) */
#define RINGOBJF_TRUST 128
#define RINGOBJF_TRUSTCHANGED 64
/*
 * The three type bits are encoded as follows:
 * 76543210
 * 1 - Name (n)
 * 01 - Signature (s)
 * 001 - Key (k)
 * 0010 - Topkey
 * 0011 - Subkey (letter "B")
 * 0001 - Secret (We use the letter "c" for this)
 * 0000 - Unknown keyring object
 * Changes here need to be propagated to ringObjectType().
 */
#define RINGOBJF_NAME 32		/* If 1, lower bits are used by UID */
#define RINGOBJF_SIG 16			/* If 1, this is a signature */
#define RINGOBJF_KEY 8			/* If 1, this is a key */
#define RINGOBJF_SUBKEY 12		/* If both bits set, this is a subkey */
#define RINGOBJF_SEC 4			/* If 1, this is a key's secret components */

/* Combinations of type flags */
#define RINGOBJF_NS	 (RINGOBJF_NAME | RINGOBJF_SIG)
#define RINGOBJF_NSK	(RINGOBJF_NS | RINGOBJF_KEY)
#define RINGOBJF_NSKB	(RINGOBJF_NSK | RINGOBJF_SUBKEY)
#define RINGOBJF_NSKC	(RINGOBJF_NSK | RINGOBJF_SEC)

#define OBJISNAME(obj) ((obj)->g.flags & RINGOBJF_NAME)
#define OBJISSIG(obj) (((obj)->g.flags & RINGOBJF_NS) == RINGOBJF_SIG)
/* Note that this includes top-level keys *and* subkeys */
#define OBJISKEY(obj) (((obj)->g.flags & RINGOBJF_NSK) == RINGOBJF_KEY)
#define OBJISTOPKEY(obj) (((obj)->g.flags & RINGOBJF_NSKB) == RINGOBJF_KEY)
#define OBJISSUBKEY(obj) (((obj)->g.flags & RINGOBJF_NSKB) == RINGOBJF_SUBKEY)
#define OBJISSEC(obj) (((obj)->g.flags & RINGOBJF_NSKC) == RINGOBJF_SEC)
#define OBJISUNK(obj) (((obj)->g.flags & RINGOBJF_NSKC) == 0)

/* These versions are for pgpAssert() macro use */
#define NAMEISNAME(name) ((name)->flags & RINGOBJF_NAME)
#define SIGISSIG(sig) (((sig)->flags & RINGOBJF_NS) == RINGOBJF_SIG)
#define KEYISKEY(key) (((key)->flags & RINGOBJF_NSK) == RINGOBJF_KEY)
#define KEYISTOPKEY(key) (((key)->flags & RINGOBJF_NSKB) == RINGOBJF_KEY)
#define KEYISSUBKEY(key) (((key)->flags & RINGOBJF_NSKB) == RINGOBJF_SUBKEY)

#define OBJFLAGS_NAME	RINGOBJF_NAME
#define OBJFLAGS_SIG	RINGOBJF_SIG
#define OBJFLAGS_KEY	RINGOBJF_KEY
#define OBJFLAGS_SUBKEY	RINGOBJF_SUBKEY
#define OBJFLAGS_SEC	RINGOBJF_SEC
#define OBJFLAGS_UNK	0

/* Does this object's up pointer point to a meaningful parent? */
#define OBJISTOP OBJISTOPKEY
/* Does this object's down pointer point to a meaningful child? */
#define OBJISBOT(obj) (OBJISSIG(obj)||OBJISSEC(obj))

/* Maximum depth of nesting in a keyring */
#define RINGMAXDEPTH 3

/* A subkey is the same, but the "sigsby" pointer is "up" */
struct RingKey
{
		union RingObject *next, *down, *sigsby;
		struct FilePos pos;
		ringmask mask;
		byte flags;
/*22*/	byte trust;
/*23*/	byte pkalg;
/*24*/	word16 validity;		/* Validity period, in days */
#if PGPTRUSTMODEL>0
/*26*/ word16 confidence;		/* A trust value temporary */
#endif
/*28*/	word16 keybits;
/*30*/	word32 tstamp;
/*34*/	byte keyID[8];
/*42*/	struct RingKey *util;
/*46*/
};

#if PGPTRUSTMODEL>0
#define NULLRINGKEY { (union RingObject *)0, (union RingObject *)0,	 \
	(union RingObject *)0, NULLFILEPOS, (ringmask)0, OBJFLAGS_KEY,	\
	0, 0, (word16)0, (word16)0, (word16)0, (word32)0, \
	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, (struct RingKey *)0	}

#define NULLRINGSUBKEY { (union RingObject *)0, (union RingObject *)0,	\
	(union RingObject *)0, NULLFILEPOS, (ringmask)0, OBJFLAGS_SUBKEY, \
	0, 0, (word16)0, (word16)0, (word16)0, (word32)0, \
	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, (struct RingKey *)0	}
#else
#define NULLRINGKEY { (union RingObject *)0, (union RingObject *)0,	 \
	(union RingObject *)0, NULLFILEPOS, (ringmask)0, OBJFLAGS_KEY,	\
	0, 0, (word16)0, (word16)0, (word32)0,	\
	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, (struct RingKey *)0	}

#define NULLRINGSUBKEY { (union RingObject *)0, (union RingObject *)0,	\
	(union RingObject *)0, NULLFILEPOS, (ringmask)0, OBJFLAGS_SUBKEY, \
	0, 0, (word16)0, (word16)0, (word32)0,	\
	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, (struct RingKey *)0	}
#endif

/* The key has some sort of error */
#define KEYF_ERROR 1

/* The key is a trusted introducer, used in the maintenance pass. */
#define KEYF_TRUSTED 2

/*
 * @@@ Who put these here? They conflict...
 * #define KEYF_USE_SIGN	0x80
 * #define KEYF_USE_ENCRYPT	0x40
 * #define KEYF_USE_SIGN_ENCRYPT	(KEYF_USE_SIGN | KEYF_USE_ENCRYPT)
 */

/*
 * This is used to record information about the locations for a key's
 * secret components. If present, it is always the FIRST child of a
 * key. This is a very boring structure, as there's nothing we can
 * read in about the encrypted secret componenets without the passphrase.
 * (Option: have multiples of these for different encrypted forms of the
 * secret components?)
 *
 * The FilePos entries on this are a subset of the entries in the
 * parent RingKey's.
 */
struct RingSec
{
		union RingObject *next, *down, *up;
		struct FilePos pos;
		ringmask mask;
		byte flags;
/*22*/
/*24*/	word32 hash;	/* Hash of secret fr matching purposes */
/*28*/
};

#define NULLRINGSEC { (union RingObject *)0, (union RingObject *)0,	 \
	(union RingObject *)0, NULLFILEPOS, (ringmask)0, OBJFLAGS_SEC }

/*
 * If SECF_VERSION_BUG is set, then patch the version byte from 3 to 2
 * when using the secret key. This is to fix a bug in 2.6 through early 2.9
 * that, when editing a secret key, would write out the edited secret key
 * with a version byte of 3 even if it originally had a version byte
 * of 2. This has been fixed in 2.9, but it is common enough (due to 2.6)
 * that we need to kludge around it.
 */
#define SECF_VERSION_BUG 1

#if PGPTRUSTMODEL==0
struct RingName
{
		union RingObject *next, *down, *up;
		struct FilePos pos;
		ringmask mask;
		byte flags;
/*22*/	byte trust;
/*23*/	byte flags2;
/*24*/	int trustval;
/*26*/	size_t len;
/*28*/	union {
				char const *ptr;		/* If cached, pointer to string */
				word32 hash;			/* If not cached, hash code */
		} name;
/*32*/
};

#define NULLRINGNAME { (union RingObject *)0, (union RingObject *)0,	\
	    (union RingObject *)0, NULLFILEPOS, (ringmask)0, OBJFLAGS_NAME,	\
	    0, 0, 0, (size_t)0, { (char const *)0 }}

#else /* New trust */
struct RingName
{
		union RingObject *next, *down, *up;
		struct FilePos pos;
		ringmask mask;
		byte flags;
/*22*/	byte trust;
/*23*/	byte validity;			/* Stored validity */
/*24*/	byte confidence;		/* Stored confidence */
/*25*/	byte flags2;
/*26*/	word16 valid;			/* Computed validity */
/*28*/	size_t len;
/*30*/	union {
				char const *ptr;		/* If cached, pointer to string */
				word32 hash;			/* If not cached, hash code */
		} name;
/*34*/
};

/*
 * The intermediate validity results are 16 bits wide instead of 8.
 * This is used for extra precision (fraction bits) and extra range.
 * This is the number of extra precision bits. (4 more range bits
 * increases the upper bound to 10^-25.)
 */
#define TRUST_CERTSHIFT 6

#define NULLRINGNAME { (union RingObject *)0, (union RingObject *)0,	\