📄 rfc1191.txt
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larger than the PMTU. NFS implementations should not reduce the datagram size below this threshold, even if PMTU Discovery suggests a lower value. (Of course, in this case datagrams should not be sent with DF set.)6.6. Management interface We suggest that an implementation provide a way for a system utility program to: - Specify that PMTU Discovery not be done on a given route. - Change the PMTU value associated with a given route. The former can be accomplished by associating a flag with the routing entry; when a packet is sent via a route with this flag set, the IP layer leaves the DF bit clear no matter what the upper layer requests. These features might be used to work around an anomalous situation, or by a routing protocol implementation that is able to obtain Path MTU values. The implementation should also provide a way to change the timeout period for aging stale PMTU information.7. Likely values for Path MTUs The algorithm recommended in section 5 for "searching" the space of Path MTUs is based on a table of values that severely restricts the search space. We describe here a table of MTU values that, as of this writing, represents all major data-link technologies in use in the Internet. In table 7-1, data links are listed in order of decreasing MTU, and grouped so that each set of similar MTUs is associated with a "plateau" equal to the lowest MTU in the group. (The table alsoMogul & Deering [page 15]RFC 1191 Path MTU Discovery November 1990 includes some entries not currently associated with a data link, and gives references where available). Where a plateau represents more than one MTU, the table shows the maximum inaccuracy associated with the plateau, as a percentage. We do not expect that the values in the table, especially for higher MTU levels, are going to be valid forever. The values given here are an implementation suggestion, NOT a specification or requirement. Implementors should use up-to-date references to pick a set of plateaus; it is important that the table not contain too many entries or the process of searching for a PMTU might waste Internet resources. Implementors should also make it convenient for customers without source code to update the table values in their systems (for example, the table in a BSD-derived Unix kernel could be changed using a new "ioctl" command). Note: It might be a good idea to add a few table entries for values equal to small powers of 2 plus 40 (for the IP and TCP headers), where no similar values exist, since this seems to be a reasonably non-arbitrary way of choosing arbitrary values. The table might also contain entries for values slightly less than large powers of 2, in case MTUs are defined near those values (it is better in this case for the table entries to be low than to be high, or else the next lowest plateau may be chosen instead).7.1. A better way to detect PMTU increases Section 6.3 suggests detecting increases in the PMTU value by periodically increasing the PTMU estimate to the first-hop MTU. Since it is likely that this process will simply "rediscover" the current PTMU estimate, at the cost of several dropped datagrams, it should not be done often. A better approach is to periodically increase the PMTU estimate to the next-highest value in the plateau table (or the first-hop MTU, if that is smaller). If the increased estimate is wrong, at most one round-trip time is wasted before the correct value is rediscovered. If the increased estimate is still too low, a higher estimate will be attempted somewhat later. Because it may take several such periods to discover a significant increase in the PMTU, we recommend that a short timeout period should be used after the estimate is increased, and a longer timeout be usedMogul & Deering [page 16]RFC 1191 Path MTU Discovery November 1990 Plateau MTU Comments Reference ------ --- -------- --------- 65535 Official maximum MTU RFC 791 65535 Hyperchannel RFC 1044 65535 32000 Just in case 17914 16Mb IBM Token Ring ref. [6] 17914 8166 IEEE 802.4 RFC 1042 8166 4464 IEEE 802.5 (4Mb max) RFC 1042 4352 FDDI (Revised) RFC 1188 4352 (1%) 2048 Wideband Network RFC 907 2002 IEEE 802.5 (4Mb recommended) RFC 1042 2002 (2%) 1536 Exp. Ethernet Nets RFC 895 1500 Ethernet Networks RFC 894 1500 Point-to-Point (default) RFC 1134 1492 IEEE 802.3 RFC 1042 1492 (3%) 1006 SLIP RFC 1055 1006 ARPANET BBN 1822 1006 576 X.25 Networks RFC 877 544 DEC IP Portal ref. [10] 512 NETBIOS RFC 1088 508 IEEE 802/Source-Rt Bridge RFC 1042 508 ARCNET RFC 1051 508 (13%) 296 Point-to-Point (low delay) RFC 1144 296 68 Official minimum MTU RFC 791 Table 7-1: Common MTUs in the Internet after the PTMU estimate is decreased because of a Datagram Too Big message. For example, after the PTMU estimate is decreased, the timeout should be set to 10 minutes; once this timer expires and a larger MTU is attempted, the timeout can be set to a much smaller value (say, 2 minutes). In no case should the timeout be shorter than the estimated round-trip time, if this is known.Mogul & Deering [page 17]RFC 1191 Path MTU Discovery November 19908. Security considerations This Path MTU Discovery mechanism makes possible two denial-of- service attacks, both based on a malicious party sending false Datagram Too Big messages to an Internet host. In the first attack, the false message indicates a PMTU much smaller than reality. This should not entirely stop data flow, since the victim host should never set its PMTU estimate below the absolute minimum, but at 8 octets of IP data per datagram, progress could be slow. In the other attack, the false message indicates a PMTU greater than reality. If believed, this could cause temporary blockage as the victim sends datagrams that will be dropped by some router. Within one round-trip time, the host would discover its mistake (receiving Datagram Too Big messages from that router), but frequent repetition of this attack could cause lots of datagrams to be dropped. A host, however, should never raise its estimate of the PMTU based on a Datagram Too Big message, so should not be vulnerable to this attack. A malicious party could also cause problems if it could stop a victim from receiving legitimate Datagram Too Big messages, but in this case there are simpler denial-of-service attacks available.References[1] R. Braden, ed. Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication Layers. RFC 1122, SRI Network Information Center, October, 1989.[2] Geof Cooper. IP Datagram Sizes. Electronic distribution of the TCP-IP Discussion Group, Message-ID <8705240517.AA01407@apolling.imagen.uucp>.[3] ISO. ISO Transport Protocol Specification: ISO DP 8073. RFC 905, SRI Network Information Center, April, 1984.[4] Van Jacobson. Congestion Avoidance and Control. In Proc. SIGCOMM '88 Symposium on Communications Architectures and Protocols, pages 314-329. Stanford, CA, August, 1988.[5] C. Kent and J. Mogul. Fragmentation Considered Harmful. In Proc. SIGCOMM '87 Workshop on Frontiers in Computer Communications Technology. August, 1987.[6] Drew Daniel Perkins. Private Communication.Mogul & Deering [page 18]RFC 1191 Path MTU Discovery November 1990[7] J. Postel. Internet Control Message Protocol. RFC 792, SRI Network Information Center, September, 1981.[8] J. Postel. Internet Protocol. RFC 791, SRI Network Information Center, September, 1981.[9] J. Postel. The TCP Maximum Segment Size and Related Topics. RFC 879, SRI Network Information Center, November, 1983.[10] Michael Reilly. Private Communication.[11] Sun Microsystems, Inc. RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol. RFC 1057, SRI Network Information Center, June, 1988.Authors' Addresses Jeffrey Mogul Digital Equipment Corporation Western Research Laboratory 100 Hamilton Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94301 Phone: (415) 853-6643 EMail: mogul@decwrl.dec.com Steve Deering Xerox Palo Alto Research Center 3333 Coyote Hill Road Palo Alto, CA 94304 Phone: (415) 494-4839 EMail: deering@xerox.comMogul & Deering [page 19]
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