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📄 rfc2943.txt

📁 著名的RFC文档,其中有一些文档是已经翻译成中文的的.
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RFC 2943            TELNET Authentication Using DSA       September 2000 Client (Party A)                   Server (Party B) IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS DSS AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER |     AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL |     ENCRYPT_OFF |     INI_CRED_FWD_OFF DSS_CERTA_TOKENAB Sequence( TokenID, CertA, TokenAB ) IAC SE                        -->                                    <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY                                        DSS                                        AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER |                                            AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL |                                            ENCRYPT_OFF |                                            INI_CRED_FWD_OFF                                        DSS_CERTB_TOKENBA2                                        Sequence( TokenID, CertB,                                                  TokenBA2 )                                        IAC SE---------------------------------------------------------------------                              Figure 24.  ASN.1 Syntax   As stated earlier, a conformant subset of the defined fields and   subfields from FIPS PUB 196 have been selected.  This section   provides the ASN.1 syntax for that conformant subset.   Figure 1 and Figure 2 include representations of the structures   defined in this section.  Implementors should refer to the following   table to determine the ASN.1 definitions that match the figure   references:      Figure 1   Sequence( TokenID, TokenBA )           MessageBA                 Sequence( TokenID, CertA, TokenAB )    MessageAB      Figure 2   Sequence( TokenID, TokenBA )           MessageBA                 Sequence( TokenID, CertA, TokenAB )    MessageAB                 Sequence( TokenID, CertB, TokenBA2 )   MessageBA2   The following ASN.1 definitions specify the conformant subset of FIPS   196.  For simplicity, no optional fields or subfields are included.   The ASN.1 definition for CertificationPath is imported from CCITT   Recommendation X.509 [X.509], and The ASN.1 definition for Name is   imported from CCITT Recommendation X.501 [X.501].  These ASN.1Housley, et al.             Standards Track                     [Page 7]RFC 2943            TELNET Authentication Using DSA       September 2000   definitions are not repeated here.  All DSA signature values are   encoded as a sequence of two integers, employing the same conventions   specified in RFC 2459, section 7.2.2.      MessageBA  ::=  SEQUENCE  {        tokenId       [0] TokenId,        tokenBA           TokenBA  }      TokenBA  ::=  SEQUENCE  {        ranB              RandomNumber,        timestampB        TimeStamp  }      MessageAB  ::=  SEQUENCE  {        tokenId       [0] TokenId,        certA         [1] CertData,        tokenAB           TokenAB  }      TokenAB  ::=  SEQUENCE  {        ranA              RandomNumber,        ranB              RandomNumber,        entityB           EntityName,        timestampB        TimeStamp,        absigValue        OCTET STRING  }      MessageBA2  ::=  SEQUENCE  {        tokenId       [0] TokenId,        certB         [1] CertData,        tokenBA2          TokenBA2  }      TokenBA2  ::=  SEQUENCE  {        ranB          [0] RandomNumber,        ranA          [1] RandomNumber,        entityA           EntityName,        timestampB2       TimeStamp,        ba2sigValue       OCTET STRING  }      CertData  ::=  SEQUENCE  {        certPath      [0] CertificationPath  }  -- see X.509      EntityName  ::=  SEQUENCE OF CHOICE  {    -- only allow one!        directoryName [4] Name  }               -- see X.501      RandomNumber  ::=  INTEGER                -- 20 octetsHousley, et al.             Standards Track                     [Page 8]RFC 2943            TELNET Authentication Using DSA       September 2000      TokenId  ::=  SEQUENCE  {        tokenType         INTEGER,              -- see table below        protoVerNo        INTEGER  }            -- always 0x0001      TimeStamp  ::=  GeneralizedTime   The TokenId.TokenType is used to distinguish the message type and the   authentication type (either unilateral or mutual).  The following   table provides the values needed to implement this specification:      Message Type    Authentication Type     TokenId.TokenType        MessageBA       Unilateral              0x0001                        Mutual                  0x0011        MessageAB       Unilateral              0x0002                        Mutual                  0x0012        MessageBA       Mutual                  0x00135.  Security Considerations   This entire memo is about security mechanisms.  For DSA to provide   the authentication discussed, the implementation must protect the   private key from disclosure.   Implementations must randomly generate DSS private keys, 'k' values   used in DSS signatures, and nonces.  The use of inadequate pseudo-   random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic values can   result in little or no security.  An attacker may find it much easier   to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the values, searching   the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than using a brute   force search.  The generation of quality random numbers is difficult.   RFC 1750 [RFC1750] offers important guidance in this area, and   Appendix 3 of FIPS PUB 186 [FIPS186] provides one quality PRNG   technique.6.  Acknowledgements   We would like to thank William Nace for support during implementation   of this specification.Housley, et al.             Standards Track                     [Page 9]RFC 2943            TELNET Authentication Using DSA       September 20007. IANA Considerations   The authentication type DSS and its associated suboption values are   registered with IANA.  Any suboption values used to extend the   protocol as described in this document must be registered with IANA   before use.  IANA is instructed not to issue new suboption values   without submission of documentation of their use.8.  References   FIPS180-1 Secure Hash Standard. FIPS Pub 180-1. April 17, 1995.             <http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fips180-1.pdf>   FIPS186   Digital Signature Standard (DSS). FIPS Pub 186.  May 19,             1994. <http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fips186.pdf>   FIPS196   Standard for Entity Authentication Using Public Key             Cryptography.  FIPS Pub 196. February 18, 1997.             <http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fips196.pdf>   RFC1750   Eastlake, 3rd, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness             Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.   RFC2459   Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet             X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: X.509 Certificate and CRL             Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.   RFC2941   T'so, T. and J. Altman, "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC             2941, September 2000.   X.208     CCITT.  Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract             Syntax Notation One (ASN.1).  1988.   X.501     CCITT. Recommendation X.501: The Directory - Models. 1988.   X.509     CCITT.  Recommendation X.509: The Directory -             Authentication Framework.  1988.Housley, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 10]RFC 2943            TELNET Authentication Using DSA       September 20009.  Authors' Addresses   Russell Housley   SPYRUS   381 Elden Street, Suite 1120   Herndon, VA 20172   USA   EMail: housley@spyrus.com   Todd Horting   SPYRUS   381 Elden Street, Suite 1120   Herndon, VA 20172   USA   EMail: thorting@spyrus.com   Peter Yee   SPYRUS   5303 Betsy Ross Drive   Santa Clara, CA 95054   USA   EMail: yee@spyrus.comHousley, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 11]RFC 2943            TELNET Authentication Using DSA       September 200010.  Full Copyright Statement   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than   English.   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Acknowledgement   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the   Internet Society.Housley, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 12]

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