rfc1510.txt

著名的RFC文档,其中有一些文档是已经翻译成中文的的.

Network Working Group                                            J. Kohl
Request for Comments: 1510                 Digital Equipment Corporation
                                                               C. Neuman
                                                                     ISI
                                                          September 1993


            The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)

Status of this Memo

   This RFC specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status
   of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   This document gives an overview and specification of Version 5 of the
   protocol for the Kerberos network authentication system. Version 4,
   described elsewhere [1,2], is presently in production use at MIT's
   Project Athena, and at other Internet sites.

Overview

   Project Athena, Athena, Athena MUSE, Discuss, Hesiod, Kerberos,
   Moira, and Zephyr are trademarks of the Massachusetts Institute of
   Technology (MIT).  No commercial use of these trademarks may be made
   without prior written permission of MIT.

   This RFC describes the concepts and model upon which the Kerberos
   network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version 5
   of the Kerberos protocol.

   The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design
   decisions are treated cursorily; for Version 4 they are fully
   described in the Kerberos portion of the Athena Technical Plan [1].
   The protocols are under review, and are not being submitted for
   consideration as an Internet standard at this time.  Comments are
   encouraged.  Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for
   discussion of Kerberos, [e-mail], may be addressed to
   [e-mail].  This mailing list is gatewayed onto the
   Usenet as the group comp.protocols.kerberos.  Requests for further
   information, including documents and code availability, may be sent
   to [e-mail].





Kohl & Neuman                                                   [Page 1]

RFC 1510                        Kerberos                  September 1993


Background

   The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's
   trusted third-party authentication protocol [3] and on modifications
   suggested by Denning and Sacco [4].  The original design and
   implementation of Kerberos Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two
   former Project Athena staff members, Steve Miller of Digital
   Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman (now at the Information
   Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California), along
   with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project Athena, and
   Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager.  Many other members of
   Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Kerberos.
   Version 4 is publicly available, and has seen wide use across the
   Internet.

   Version 5 (described in this document) has evolved from Version 4
   based on new requirements and desires for features not available in
   Version 4.  Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4
   and 5 can be found in [5].

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction .......................................    5
   1.1. Cross-Realm Operation ............................    7
   1.2. Environmental assumptions ........................    8
   1.3. Glossary of terms ................................    9
   2. Ticket flag uses and requests ......................   12
   2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets ............   12
   2.2. Invalid tickets ..................................   12
   2.3. Renewable tickets ................................   12
   2.4. Postdated tickets ................................   13
   2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets ......................   14
   2.6. Forwardable tickets ..............................   15
   2.7. Other KDC options ................................   15
   3. Message Exchanges ..................................   16
   3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange ..............   16
   3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message ...............   17
   3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message ..................   17
   3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message ...............   17
   3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message ................   19
   3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message ..................   19
   3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message ...................   20
   3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange ........   20
   3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message .........................   20
   3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message .............   20
   3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message ..................   21
   3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message .............   23
   3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message ..................   23



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RFC 1510                        Kerberos                  September 1993


   3.2.6. Using the encryption key .......................   24
   3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange .......   24
   3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message ..............   25
   3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message .................   26
   3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message ..............   27
   3.3.3.1. Encoding the transited field .................   29
   3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message .................   31
   3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange ............................   31
   3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message ...............   31
   3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message ....................   32
   3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange ............................   33
   3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message ...............   33
   3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message ....................   33
   3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange ............................   34
   3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message ...............   34
   3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message ....................   34
   4. The Kerberos Database ..............................   35
   4.1. Database contents ................................   35
   4.2. Additional fields ................................   36
   4.3. Frequently Changing Fields .......................   37
   4.4. Site Constants ...................................   37
   5. Message Specifications .............................   38
   5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation ......   38
   5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions ...........................   38
   5.3. Tickets and Authenticators .......................   42
   5.3.1. Tickets ........................................   42
   5.3.2. Authenticators .................................   47
   5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges ......   49
   5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition .........................   49
   5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition .........................   56
   5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications ........   58
   5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition ..........................   58
   5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition ..........................   60
   5.5.3. Error message reply ............................   61
   5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification ...................   61
   5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition ............................   61
   5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification ...................   62
   5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition ............................   62
   5.8. KRB_CRED message specification ...................   63
   5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition ............................   63
   5.9. Error message specification ......................   65
   5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition ...........................   66
   6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications .............   67
   6.1. Encryption Specifications ........................   68
   6.2. Encryption Keys ..................................   71
   6.3. Encryption Systems ...............................   71
   6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) ..............   71
   6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (descbc-crc)71



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RFC 1510                        Kerberos                  September 1993


   6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (descbc-md4)  72
   6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (descbc-md5)  72
   6.4. Checksums ........................................   74
   6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) ....................   74
   6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) .................   75
   6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES
   (rsa-md4-des) .........................................   75
   6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) .................   76
   6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES
   (rsa-md5-des) .........................................   76
   6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac)
   6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES
   alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) ...........................   77
   6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative
   (des-mac-k) ...........................................   77
   7. Naming Constraints .................................   78
   7.1. Realm Names ......................................   77
   7.2. Principal Names ..................................   79
   7.2.1. Name of server principals ......................   80
   8. Constants and other defined values .................   80
   8.1. Host address types ...............................   80
   8.2. KDC messages .....................................   81
   8.2.1. IP transport ...................................   81
   8.2.2. OSI transport ..................................   82
   8.2.3. Name of the TGS ................................   82
   8.3. Protocol constants and associated values .........   82
   9. Interoperability requirements ......................   86
   9.1. Specification 1 ..................................   86
   9.2. Recommended KDC values ...........................   88
   10. Acknowledgments ...................................   88
   11. References ........................................   89
   12. Security Considerations ...........................   90
   13. Authors' Addresses ................................   90
   A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing ................   91
   A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation ............................   91
   A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation    92
   A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification ..........................   95
   A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks .........   96
   A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation ...........................   97
   A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation  98
   A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification .........................  104
   A.8. Authenticator generation .........................  104
   A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation ............................  105
   A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification .........................  105
   A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation ...........................  106
   A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification .........................  107
   A.13. KRB_SAFE generation .............................  107
   A.14. KRB_SAFE verification ...........................  108



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RFC 1510                        Kerberos                  September 1993


   A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks .............  108
   A.16. KRB_PRIV generation .............................  109
   A.17. KRB_PRIV verification ...........................  110
   A.18. KRB_CRED generation .............................  110
   A.19. KRB_CRED verification ...........................  111
   A.20. KRB_ERROR generation ............................  112

1.  Introduction

   Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals,
   (e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an open
   (unprotected) network.  This is accomplished without relying on
   authentication by the host operating system, without basing trust on
   host addresses, without requiring physical security of all the hosts
   on the network, and under the assumption that packets traveling along
   the network can be read, modified, and inserted at will. (Note,
   however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only upon the
   initiation of a stream-based network connection, and assume the
   absence of any "hijackers" who might subvert such a connection.  Such
   use implicitly trusts the host addresses involved.)  Kerberos
   performs authentication under these conditions as a trusted third-
   party authentication service by using conventional cryptography,
   i.e., shared secret key.  (shared secret key - Secret and private are
   often used interchangeably in the literature.  In our usage, it takes
   two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key is a secret
   key.  Something is only private when no one but its owner knows it.
   Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private
   key.)

   The authentication process proceeds as follows: A client sends a
   request to the authentication server (AS) requesting "credentials"
   for a given server.  The AS responds with these credentials,
   encrypted in the client's key.  The credentials consist of 1) a
   "ticket" for the server and 2) a temporary encryption key (often
   called a "session key").  The client transmits the ticket (which
   contains the client's identity and a copy of the session key, all
   encrypted in the server's key) to the server.  The session key (now
   shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the client,