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📄 rfc2408.txt

📁 著名的RFC文档,其中有一些文档是已经翻译成中文的的.
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Maughan, et. al.            Standards Track                    [Page 19]RFC 2408                         ISAKMP                    November 19982.5 Miscellaneous2.5.1 Transport Protocol   ISAKMP can be implemented over any transport protocol or over IP   itself.  Implementations MUST include send and receive capability for   ISAKMP using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) on port 500.  UDP Port   500 has been assigned to ISAKMP by the Internet Assigned Numbers   Authority (IANA). Implementations MAY additionally support ISAKMP   over other transport protocols or over IP itself.2.5.2 RESERVED Fields   The existence of RESERVED fields within ISAKMP payloads are used   strictly to preserve byte alignment.  All RESERVED fields in the   ISAKMP protocol MUST be set to zero (0) when a packet is issued.  The   receiver SHOULD check the RESERVED fields for a zero (0) value and   discard the packet if other values are found.2.5.3 Anti-Clogging Token ("Cookie") Creation   The details of cookie generation are implementation dependent, but   MUST satisfy these basic requirements (originally stated by Phil Karn   in [Karn]):      1.    The cookie must depend on the specific parties.  This            prevents an attacker from obtaining a cookie using a real IP            address and UDP port, and then using it to swamp the victim            with Diffie-Hellman requests from randomly chosen IP            addresses or ports.      2.    It must not be possible for anyone other than the issuing            entity to generate cookies that will be accepted by that            entity.  This implies that the issuing entity must use local            secret information in the generation and subsequent            verification of a cookie.  It must not be possible to deduce            this secret information from any particular cookie.      3.    The cookie generation function must be fast to thwart            attacks intended to sabotage CPU resources.   Karn's suggested method for creating the cookie is to perform a fast   hash (e.g.  MD5) over the IP Source and Destination Address, the UDP   Source and Destination Ports and a locally generated secret random   value.  ISAKMP requires that the cookie be unique for each SA   establishment to help prevent replay attacks, therefore, the date and   time MUST be added to the information hashed.  The generated cookies   are placed in the ISAKMP Header (described in section 3.1) InitiatorMaughan, et. al.            Standards Track                    [Page 20]RFC 2408                         ISAKMP                    November 1998   and Responder cookie fields.  These fields are 8 octets in length,   thus, requiring a generated cookie to be 8 octets.  Notify and Delete   messages (see sections 3.14, 3.15, and 4.8) are uni-directional   transmissions and are done under the protection of an existing ISAKMP   SA, thus, not requiring the generation of a new cookie.  One   exception to this is the transmission of a Notify message during a   Phase 1 exchange, prior to completing the establishment of an SA.   Sections 3.14 and 4.8 provide additional details.3 ISAKMP Payloads   ISAKMP payloads provide modular building blocks for constructing   ISAKMP messages.  The presence and ordering of payloads in ISAKMP is   defined by and dependent upon the Exchange Type Field located in the   ISAKMP Header (see Figure 2).  The ISAKMP payload types are discussed   in sections 3.4 through 3.15.  The descriptions of the ISAKMP   payloads, messages, and exchanges (see Section 4) are shown using   network octet ordering.3.1 ISAKMP Header Format   An ISAKMP message has a fixed header format, shown in Figure 2,   followed by a variable number of payloads.  A fixed header simplifies   parsing, providing the benefit of protocol parsing software that is   less complex and easier to implement.  The fixed header contains the   information required by the protocol to maintain state, process   payloads and possibly prevent denial of service or replay attacks.   The ISAKMP Header fields are defined as follows:    o  Initiator Cookie (8 octets) - Cookie of entity that initiated SA       establishment, SA notification, or SA deletion.    o  Responder Cookie (8 octets) - Cookie of entity that is responding       to an SA establishment request, SA notification, or SA deletion.Maughan, et. al.            Standards Track                    [Page 21]RFC 2408                         ISAKMP                    November 1998                         1                   2                   3     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+    !                          Initiator                            !    !                            Cookie                             !    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+    !                          Responder                            !    !                            Cookie                             !    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+    !  Next Payload ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type !     Flags     !    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+    !                          Message ID                           !    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+    !                            Length                             !    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                 Figure 2:  ISAKMP Header Format    o  Next Payload (1 octet) - Indicates the type of the first payload       in the message.  The format for each payload is defined in       sections 3.4 through 3.16.  The processing for the payloads is       defined in section 5.                        Next Payload Type       Value                    NONE                           0                    Security Association (SA)      1                    Proposal (P)                   2                    Transform (T)                  3                    Key Exchange (KE)              4                    Identification (ID)            5                    Certificate (CERT)             6                    Certificate Request (CR)       7                    Hash (HASH)                    8                    Signature (SIG)                9                    Nonce (NONCE)                 10                    Notification (N)              11                    Delete (D)                    12                    Vendor ID (VID)               13                    RESERVED                   14 - 127                    Private USE               128 - 255    o  Major Version (4 bits) - indicates the major version of the ISAKMP       protocol in use.  Implementations based on this version of the       ISAKMP Internet-Draft MUST set the Major Version to 1.       Implementations based on previous versions of ISAKMP Internet-       Drafts MUST set the Major Version to 0.  Implementations SHOULDMaughan, et. al.            Standards Track                    [Page 22]RFC 2408                         ISAKMP                    November 1998       never accept packets with a major version number larger than its       own.    o  Minor Version (4 bits) - indicates the minor version of the       ISAKMP protocol in use.  Implementations based on this version of       the ISAKMP Internet-Draft MUST set the Minor Version to 0.       Implementations based on previous versions of ISAKMP Internet-       Drafts MUST set the Minor Version to 1.  Implementations SHOULD       never accept packets with a minor version number larger than its       own, given the major version numbers are identical.    o  Exchange Type (1 octet) - indicates the type of exchange being       used.  This dictates the message and payload orderings in the       ISAKMP exchanges.                            Exchange Type      Value                         NONE                    0                         Base                    1                         Identity Protection     2                         Authentication Only     3                         Aggressive              4                         Informational           5                         ISAKMP Future Use     6 - 31                         DOI Specific Use     32 - 239                         Private Use         240 - 255    o  Flags (1 octet) - indicates specific options that are set for the       ISAKMP exchange.  The flags listed below are specified in the       Flags field beginning with the least significant bit, i.e the       Encryption bit is bit 0 of the Flags field, the Commit bit is bit       1 of the Flags field, and the Authentication Only bit is bit 2 of       the Flags field.  The remaining bits of the Flags field MUST be       set to 0 prior to transmission.      --  E(ncryption Bit) (1 bit) - If set (1), all payloads following          the header are encrypted using the encryption algorithm          identified in the ISAKMP SA. The ISAKMP SA Identifier is the          combination of the initiator and responder cookie.  It is          RECOMMENDED that encryption of communications be done as soon          as possible between the peers.  For all ISAKMP exchanges          described in section 4.1, the encryption SHOULD begin after          both parties have exchanged Key Exchange payloads.  If the          E(ncryption Bit) is not set (0), the payloads are not          encrypted.Maughan, et. al.            Standards Track                    [Page 23]RFC 2408                         ISAKMP                    November 1998      -- C(ommit Bit) (1 bit) - This bit is used to signal key exchange          synchronization.  It is used to ensure that encrypted material          is not received prior to completion of the SA establishment.          The Commit Bit can be set (at anytime) by either party          participating in the SA establishment, and can be used during          both phases of an ISAKMP SA establishment.  However, the value          MUST be reset after the Phase 1 negotiation.  If set(1), the          entity which did not set the Commit Bit MUST wait for an          Informational Exchange containing a Notify payload (with the          CONNECTED Notify Message) from the entity which set the Commit          Bit.  In this instance, the Message ID field of the          Informational Exchange MUST contain the Message ID of the          original ISAKMP Phase 2 SA negotiation.  This is done to          ensure that the Informational Exchange with the CONNECTED          Notify Message can be associated with the correct Phase 2 SA.          The receipt and processing of the Informational Exchange          indicates that the SA establishment was successful and either          entity can now proceed with encrypted traffic communication.          In addition to synchronizing key exchange, the Commit Bit can          be used to protect against loss of transmissions over          unreliable networks and guard against the need for multiple          re-transmissions.          NOTE: It is always possible that the final message of an          exchange can be lost.  In this case, the entity expecting to          receive the final message of an exchange would receive the          Phase 2 SA negotiation message following a Phase 1 exchange or          

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