rfc1928.txt

著名的RFC文档,其中有一些文档是已经翻译成中文的的.

Network Working Group                                           M. Leech
Request for Comments: 1928                    Bell-Northern Research Ltd
Category: Standards Track                                       M. Ganis
                                         International Business Machines
                                                                  Y. Lee
                                                  NEC Systems Laboratory
                                                                R. Kuris
                                                       Unify Corporation
                                                               D. Koblas
                                                  Independent Consultant
                                                                L. Jones
                                                 Hewlett-Packard Company
                                                              March 1996


                        SOCKS Protocol Version 5

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Acknowledgments

   This memo describes a protocol that is an evolution of the previous
   version of the protocol, version 4 [1]. This new protocol stems from
   active discussions and prototype implementations.  The key
   contributors are: Marcus Leech: Bell-Northern Research, David Koblas:
   Independent Consultant, Ying-Da Lee: NEC Systems Laboratory, LaMont
   Jones: Hewlett-Packard Company, Ron Kuris: Unify Corporation, Matt
   Ganis: International Business Machines.

1.  Introduction

   The use of network firewalls, systems that effectively isolate an
   organizations internal network structure from an exterior network,
   such as the INTERNET is becoming increasingly popular.  These
   firewall systems typically act as application-layer gateways between
   networks, usually offering controlled TELNET, FTP, and SMTP access.
   With the emergence of more sophisticated application layer protocols
   designed to facilitate global information discovery, there exists a
   need to provide a general framework for these protocols to
   transparently and securely traverse a firewall.





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   There exists, also, a need for strong authentication of such
   traversal in as fine-grained a manner as is practical. This
   requirement stems from the realization that client-server
   relationships emerge between the networks of various organizations,
   and that such relationships need to be controlled and often strongly
   authenticated.

   The protocol described here is designed to provide a framework for
   client-server applications in both the TCP and UDP domains to
   conveniently and securely use the services of a network firewall.
   The protocol is conceptually a "shim-layer" between the application
   layer and the transport layer, and as such does not provide network-
   layer gateway services, such as forwarding of ICMP messages.

2.  Existing practice

   There currently exists a protocol, SOCKS Version 4, that provides for
   unsecured firewall traversal for TCP-based client-server
   applications, including TELNET, FTP and the popular information-
   discovery protocols such as HTTP, WAIS and GOPHER.

   This new protocol extends the SOCKS Version 4 model to include UDP,
   and extends the framework to include provisions for generalized
   strong authentication schemes, and extends the addressing scheme to
   encompass domain-name and V6 IP addresses.

   The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the
   recompilation or relinking of TCP-based client applications to use
   the appropriate encapsulation routines in the SOCKS library.

Note:

   Unless otherwise noted, the decimal numbers appearing in packet-
   format diagrams represent the length of the corresponding field, in
   octets.  Where a given octet must take on a specific value, the
   syntax X'hh' is used to denote the value of the single octet in that
   field. When the word 'Variable' is used, it indicates that the
   corresponding field has a variable length defined either by an
   associated (one or two octet) length field, or by a data type field.

3.  Procedure for TCP-based clients

   When a TCP-based client wishes to establish a connection to an object
   that is reachable only via a firewall (such determination is left up
   to the implementation), it must open a TCP connection to the
   appropriate SOCKS port on the SOCKS server system.  The SOCKS service
   is conventionally located on TCP port 1080.  If the connection
   request succeeds, the client enters a negotiation for the



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   authentication method to be used, authenticates with the chosen
   method, then sends a relay request.  The SOCKS server evaluates the
   request, and either establishes the appropriate connection or denies
   it.

   Unless otherwise noted, the decimal numbers appearing in packet-
   format diagrams represent the length of the corresponding field, in
   octets.  Where a given octet must take on a specific value, the
   syntax X'hh' is used to denote the value of the single octet in that
   field. When the word 'Variable' is used, it indicates that the
   corresponding field has a variable length defined either by an
   associated (one or two octet) length field, or by a data type field.

   The client connects to the server, and sends a version
   identifier/method selection message:

                   +----+----------+----------+
                   |VER | NMETHODS | METHODS  |
                   +----+----------+----------+
                   | 1  |    1     | 1 to 255 |
                   +----+----------+----------+

   The VER field is set to X'05' for this version of the protocol.  The
   NMETHODS field contains the number of method identifier octets that
   appear in the METHODS field.

   The server selects from one of the methods given in METHODS, and
   sends a METHOD selection message:

                         +----+--------+
                         |VER | METHOD |
                         +----+--------+
                         | 1  |   1    |
                         +----+--------+

   If the selected METHOD is X'FF', none of the methods listed by the
   client are acceptable, and the client MUST close the connection.

   The values currently defined for METHOD are:

          o  X'00' NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED
          o  X'01' GSSAPI
          o  X'02' USERNAME/PASSWORD
          o  X'03' to X'7F' IANA ASSIGNED
          o  X'80' to X'FE' RESERVED FOR PRIVATE METHODS
          o  X'FF' NO ACCEPTABLE METHODS

   The client and server then enter a method-specific sub-negotiation.



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   Descriptions of the method-dependent sub-negotiations appear in
   separate memos.

   Developers of new METHOD support for this protocol should contact
   IANA for a METHOD number.  The ASSIGNED NUMBERS document should be
   referred to for a current list of METHOD numbers and their
   corresponding protocols.

   Compliant implementations MUST support GSSAPI and SHOULD support
   USERNAME/PASSWORD authentication methods.

4.  Requests

   Once the method-dependent subnegotiation has completed, the client
   sends the request details.  If the negotiated method includes
   encapsulation for purposes of integrity checking and/or
   confidentiality, these requests MUST be encapsulated in the method-
   dependent encapsulation.

   The SOCKS request is formed as follows:

        +----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+
        |VER | CMD |  RSV  | ATYP | DST.ADDR | DST.PORT |
        +----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+
        | 1  |  1  | X'00' |  1   | Variable |    2     |
        +----+-----+-------+------+----------+----------+

     Where:

          o  VER    protocol version: X'05'
          o  CMD
             o  CONNECT X'01'
             o  BIND X'02'
             o  UDP ASSOCIATE X'03'
          o  RSV    RESERVED
          o  ATYP   address type of following address
             o  IP V4 address: X'01'
             o  DOMAINNAME: X'03'
             o  IP V6 address: X'04'
          o  DST.ADDR       desired destination address
          o  DST.PORT desired destination port in network octet
             order

   The SOCKS server will typically evaluate the request based on source
   and destination addresses, and return one or more reply messages, as
   appropriate for the request type.





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5.  Addressing

   In an address field (DST.ADDR, BND.ADDR), the ATYP field specifies
   the type of address contained within the field:

          o  X'01'

   the address is a version-4 IP address, with a length of 4 octets

          o  X'03'

   the address field contains a fully-qualified domain name.  The first
   octet of the address field contains the number of octets of name that
   follow, there is no terminating NUL octet.

          o  X'04'

   the address is a version-6 IP address, with a length of 16 octets.

6.  Replies

   The SOCKS request information is sent by the client as soon as it has
   established a connection to the SOCKS server, and completed the
   authentication negotiations.  The server evaluates the request, and