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📄 rfc2478.txt

📁 著名的RFC文档,其中有一些文档是已经翻译成中文的的.
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Network Working Group                                         E. BaizeRequest for Comments: 2478                                   D. PinkasCategory: Standards Track                                         Bull                                                         December 1998         The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation MechanismStatus of this Memo   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Copyright Notice   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.1.  ABSTRACT   This document specifies a Security Negotiation Mechanism for the   Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)   which is described in [1].   The GSS-API provides a generic interface which can be layered atop   different security mechanisms such that if communicating peers   acquire GSS-API credentials for the same security mechanism, then a   security context may be established between them (subject to policy).   However, GSS-API doesn't prescribe the method by which GSS-API peers   can establish whether they have a common security mechanism.   The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism defined here   is a pseudo-security mechanism, represented by the object identifier   iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanism.snego (1.3.6.1.5.5.2) which   enables GSS-API peers to determine in-band whether their credentials   share common GSS-API security mechanism(s), and if so, to invoke   normal security context establishment for a selected common security   mechanism. This is most useful for applications that are based on   GSS-API implementations which support multiple security mechanisms.   This allows to negotiate different security mechanisms, different   options within a given security mechanism or different options from   several security mechanisms.Baize & Pinkas              Standards Track                     [Page 1]RFC 2478             GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism         December 1998   Once the common security mechanism is identified, the security   mechanism may also negotiate mechanism-specific options during its   context establishment. This will be inside the mechanism tokens, and   invisible to the SPNEGO protocol.   The simple and protected GSS-API mechanism negotiation is based on   the following negotiation model : the initiator proposes one security   mechanism or an ordered list of security mechanisms, the target   either accepts the proposed security mechanism, or chooses one from   an offered set, or rejects the proposed value(s). The target then   informs the initiator of its choice.   In its basic form this protocol requires an extra-round trip. Network   connection setup is a critical performance characteristic of any   network infrastructure and extra round trips over WAN links, packet   radio networks, etc. really make a difference. In order to avoid such   an extra round trip the initial security token of the preferred   mechanism for the initiator may be embedded in the initial token. If   the target preferred mechanism matches the initiator's preferred   mechanism, no additional round trips are incurred by using the   negotiation protocol.   The simple and protected GSS-API mechanism negotiation provides a   technique to protect the negotiation that must be used when the   underlying mechanism selected by the target is capable of integrity   protection.   When all the mechanisms proposed by the initiator support integrity   protection or when the selected mechanism supports integrity   protection, then the negotiation mechanism becomes protected since   this guarantees that the appropriate mechanism supported by both   peers has been selected.   The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism uses the   concepts developed in the GSS-API specification [1]. The negotiation   data is encapsulated in context-level tokens. Therefore, callers of   the GSS-API do not need to be aware of the existence of the   negotiation tokens but only of the new pseudo-security mechanism. A   failure in the negotiation phase causes a major status code to be   returned: GSS_S_BAD_MECH.Baize & Pinkas              Standards Track                     [Page 2]RFC 2478             GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism         December 19982.  NEGOTIATION MODEL2.1.  Negotiation description   The model for security mechanism negotiation reuses a subset of the   concepts specified in [2].   Each OID represents one GSS-API mechanism or one variant of it.    -  When one security mechanism is proposed by the initiator, it       represents the only security mechanism supported or selected       (when the additional APIs defined in the Annex A are used) by the       initiator.    -  When several security mechanisms are proposed by the initiator,       they represent a set of security mechanisms supported or selected       (when the additional APIs defined in the Annex A are used) by the       initiator.   The first negotiation token sent by the initiator contains an ordered   list of mechanisms, a set of options (e.g. deleg, replay, conf flags)   that should be supported by the selected mechanism and optionally the   initial security token for the desired mechanism of the initiator   (i.e. the first of the list).   The first negotiation token sent by the target contains the result of   the negotiation (accept_completed, accept_incomplete or reject) and,   in case of accept, the agreed security mechanism. It may also include   the response to the initial security token from the initiator, when   the first proposed mechanism of the initiator has been selected. When   the first mechanism is acceptable to the target,it should respond to   the initial security token for the desired mechanism of the initiator   when it is present. However, if this is not possible, the target can   simply ignore it and omit the responseToken from the first reply.   Implementations that can piggyback the initial token will be rewarded   by faster connection setup.   In case of a successful negotiation, the security mechanism   represents the value suitable for the target, and picked up from the   list offered by the initiator.  The policy by which the target   chooses a mechanism is an implementation-specific local matter.  In   the absence of other policy, the target should chose the first   mechanism in the list for which valid credentials are available.   Once a mechanism has been selected, the tokens specific to the   selected mechanism are carried within the negotiation tokens (in the   mechToken for the initiator and in the responseToken for the target).Baize & Pinkas              Standards Track                     [Page 3]RFC 2478             GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism         December 19982.2.  Negotiation procedure   The negotiation procedure is summarised as follows:   (a) the GSS-API initiator invokes GSS_Init_sec_context as normal, but       requests (either explicitly, with the negotiation mechanism, or       through accepting a default, when the default is the negotiation       mechanism) that the Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation       Mechanism be used;   (b) the initiator GSS-API implementation emits a negotiation token       containing a list of supported security mechanisms for the       credentials used for this context establishment, and optionally       an initial security token for the first mechanism from that list       (i.e. the preferred mechanism), and indicates       GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status;   (c) The GSS-API initiator sends the token to the target application;   (d) The GSS-API target deposits the token through invoking       GSS_Accept_sec_context. The target GSS-API implementation emits a       negotiation token containing which if any of the proposed       mechanisms it supports (or has selected).   If the mechanism selected by the target matches the preferred   mechanism identified by the initiator and the initiator provides a   mechToken, the negotiation token response may contain also an initial   security token from that mechanism.   If the preferred mechanism is accepted, GSS_Accept_sec_context()   indicates GSS_S_COMPLETE when unilateral or mutual authentication has   been performed and involves a single token in either direction.   If a proposed mechanism is accepted, and it was not the preferred   mechanism, or if the first negotiation token sent by the initiator   did not included a mechToken, then the negotiation token response   sent by the target may contain also a response token from that   mechanism which transmits mechanism-specific information (e.g. to   transmit a certificate). The initiator may ignore such an initial   token if it is not prepared to process it.   If a proposed mechanism other than the preferred mechanism is   accepted, or the preferred mechanism is accepted but involves   multiple exchanges (e.g. challenge-response authentication), then   GSS_Accept_sec_context() indicates GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status.Baize & Pinkas              Standards Track                     [Page 4]RFC 2478             GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism         December 1998   If the proposed mechanism(s) are rejected, GSS_Accept_sec_context()   indicates GSS_S_BAD_MECH status. The security context initialisation   has failed.   (e) The GSS-API target returns the token to the initiator       application;   (f) The GSS-API initiator deposits the token through invoking       GSS_Init_sec_context.   GSS_Init_sec_context() may then indicate GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED,   GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_BAD_MECH status.      The GSS_S_BAD_MECH status is returned when the negotiation token      carries a reject result or when the negotiation token carries an      accept result and the mechanism selected by the target is not      included in the initial list sent by the initiator.      The GSS_S_BAD_MIC status is returned when the selected mechanism      supports a MIC token but the MIC computed over the list of      mechanisms sent by the initiator is missing or incorrect.      If the negotiation token carries a reject result, the context      establishment is impossible. For example, a rejection will occur      if the target doesn't support the initiator's proposed mechanism      type(s). Upon failure of the mechanism negotiation procedure, the      mech_type output parameter value is the negotiation mechanism      type.      The GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status is returned when the negotiation      token carries an accept result and further tokens must be      transferred in order to complete context establishment for the      selected mechanism. In that case GSS_Init_sec_context() returns an      initial context token as output_token (with the selected      mechanism's context token encapsulated within that output_token).      The initiator then sends the output_token to the target. The      security context initialisation is then continued according to the      standard GSS-API conventions for the selected mechanism, where the      tokens of the selected mechanism are encapsulated until the      GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned for both the initiator and the target.      When GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED is returned, the mech_type output      parameter is not yet valid.      When GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned, the mech_type output parameter      indicates the selected mechanism. When the final negotiation token      does not contain a MIC, the initiator GSS-API implementation must      check the returned/selected mechanism is on the originallyBaize & Pinkas              Standards Track                     [Page 5]RFC 2478             GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism         December 1998      submitted list of mechanisms and also verify that the selected      mechanism is not able to support a MIC. When the final negotiation      token contains a MIC over the initial mechanisms list sent by the      initiator, the MIC must be verified.   Note that the *_req_flag input parameters for context establishment   are relative to the selected mechanism, as are the *_state output   parameters. i.e., these parameters are not applicable to the   negotiation process per se.   The initiator GSS-API calling application may need to know when the   negotiation exchanges were protected or not. For this, when   GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned, it can simply test the integ_avail flag.   When this flag is set it indicates that the negotiation was   protected.   On receipt of a negotiation token on the target side, a GSS-API   implementation that does not support negotiation would indicate the   GSS_S_BAD_MECH status as if a particular basic security mechanism had   been requested but was not supported.   When GSS_Acquire_cred is invoked with the negotiation mechanism as   desired_mechs, an implementation-specific default credential is used   to carry on the negotiation. A set of mechanisms as specified locally   by the system administrator is then available for negotiation. If   there is a desire for the caller to make its own choice, then an   additional API has to be used (see Appendix A).3.  DATA ELEMENTS3.1.  Mechanism Type   MechType::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER   mechType        Each security mechanism is as defined in [1].3.2.  Negotiation Tokens   The syntax of the negotiation tokens follows the InitialContextToken   syntax defined in [1]. The security mechanism of the initial   negotiation token is identified by the Object Identifier   iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanism.snego (1.3.6.1.5.5.2).Baize & Pinkas              Standards Track                     [Page 6]

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