rfc1810.txt

著名的RFC文档,其中有一些文档是已经翻译成中文的的.

        Serial software rate in Mbps = MIPS rate

   Predictions using SpecInt92 numbers as MIPS estimators can be
   compared with measured rates [2]:

     Spec-    Predicted      MD5
     Int92   Upper-Bound   Measured      Machine
   ------------------------------------------------------------
     122       122-195     87 Mbps    DEC Alpha (190 Mhz)
      48        48- 77     33 Mbps    HP 9000/720
      88        88-141     48 Mbps    IBM RS/6000 7006 (PPC 601 @80 Mhz)
      32        32- 51     31 Mbps    Intel i486/33 NetBSD
      90        90-144     44 Mbps    Intel Pentium/90 NeXTStep
      90        90-144     52 Mbps    SGI/IP-20 IRIX 5.2
      65        65-104     37 Mbps    Sun SPARC-10/51 SunOS 4.1.3
     126       126-202     57 Mbps    Sun SPARC-20/71 SunOS 4.1.3

   The hardware rate takes 3 time units per step, i.e.  3 * 4 = 12 time
   units per word of input.  Hardware capable of doing an operation
   (e.g., 32-bit addition) in N nanoseconds can support a data bandwidth
   of 32/12/N bps, i.e., 2/3N bps.

        Hardware rate in Mbps = 8/3N * 1,000



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   For CMOS, an operation (32-bit addition, including register retrieval
   and storage) costs about 5.2 ns (2.6 ns per add, 2 ns for latching)
   [6].  There are 6 clocks through the most highly-parallelized
   implementation, resulting in 31.2 ns per 32-bit word, or 256 Mbps
   [6].  This will not keep pace with existing hardware, which is
   capable of link speeds in excess of 622 Mbps (ATM).

   By comparison, IPv4 uses the Internet Checksum [5].  This checksum
   can be performed in 32-bit-wide units in excess of 1 Gbps in an
   existing, low-cost PLD.  The checksum can also be parallelized by
   computing partial sums and reducing the result.

One Proposed Solution

   There are several ways to increase the performance of the IPv6
   authentication mechanism.  One is to increase the hardware
   performance of MD5 by slightly modifying the algorithm, the other is
   to propose a replacement algorithm.  This RFC discusses briefly the
   modification of MD5 for high-speed hardware implementation.
   Alternate algorithms, capable of 3.5x the speed of MD5, have been
   discussed elsewhere [6].

   MD5 uses block chaining to ensure sensitivity to block order.  Block
   chaining also prevents arbitrary parallelism, which can be as much a
   benefit to the spoofer as to the user.  MD5 can be slightly altered
   to accommodate a higher bandwidth data rate.  There should be a
   predetermined finite number of blocks processed from independent
   seeds, such that the I-th block is part of the "I mod K"-th chain.
   The resulting K digests themselves form a message, which can be MD5-
   encoded using a single-block algorithm. This idea was proposed
   independently by the author and by Burt Kaliski of RSA.

   The goal is to support finite parallelism to provide adequate
   bandwidth at current processing rates, without providing arbitrary
   power for spoofing.  It would require further analysis to ensure that
   it provides an adequate level of security.

   For current technology and network bandwidth, a minimum of 4-way
   parallel chaining would suffice, and 16-way chaining would be
   preferable.  This would support network bandwidth of 1 Gbps with 4-
   way chaining, in CMOS hardware.  The chaining parallelism should be a
   multiple of 4-way, to generate a complete block of digests (4 words
   per digest, 16 words per block).  This modification is believed to
   achieve the goals of MD5, without the penalties of implementation of
   the current MD5 algorithm.






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Security Considerations

   This entire document addresses a mechanism for providing security in
   IPv6.  MD5 is the proposed default optional authentication mechanism
   for IPv6 traffic.  This RFC specifically addresses the concern that
   security mechanisms such as MD5 that cannot support high bandwidth
   with available hardware will compromise their deployment, and
   ultimately, the security of the systems they are intended to
   maintain.

   The IPv6 requirements document emphasizes that IPv6 implementations
   should not compromise performance, compared to IPv4.  This is
   presumably despite IPv6's increased functionality.  "Required
   optional" components of IPv6 should be held to this same standard.
   MD5 compromises performance, and so its use as a required default
   option in IPv6 should be reconsidered.

   The use of MD5 as the default to the required authentication option
   may compromise security in high-bandwidth systems, because enabling
   the option causes performance degradation, defeating its inclusion as
   an IPv6 option.  As a result, the authentication option may be
   disabled entirely.

   It is important to the use of authentication in high-performance
   systems that an alternative mechanism be available in IPv6 from the
   outset.  This may require the specification of multiple "required"
   authentication algorithms - one that's slower but believed strong,
   and one that's faster but may inspire somewhat less confidence.

Conclusions

   MD5 cannot be implemented in existing technology at rates in excess
   of 256 Mbps in hardware, or 86 Mbps in software.  MD5 is a proposed
   authentication option in IPv6, a protocol that should support
   existing networking technology, which is capable of 130 Mbps UDP.

   As a result, MD5 cannot be used to support IP authentication in
   existing networks at existing rates.  Although MD5 will support
   higher bandwidth in the future due to technological advances, these
   will be offset by similar advances in networking.  If MD5 cannot
   support existing network bandwidth using existing technology, it will
   not be able to scale as network speeds increase in the future.  This
   RFC proposes that MD5 be modified to support a 16-way block chaining,
   in order to allow existing technology (CMOS hardware) to support
   existing networking rates (1 Gbps).  It further proposes that
   alternatives to MD5 be considered for use in high-speed networks.





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Acknowledgements

   The author would like to thank Steve Kent at BBN, Burt Kaliski,
   Victor Chang, and Steve Burnett at RSA, Ran Atkinson at the NRL, and
   the HPCC Division at ISI for reviewing the contents of this document.
   Burt independently suggested the block-parallel modification proposed
   here.

References

   [1] Atkinson, R., "IPv6 Authentication Header", Work in Progress,
       Naval Research Lab, February 1995.

   [2] DiMarco, J., "Spec Benchmark table, V.  4.12",
       <ftp://ftp.cfd.toronto.edu/pub/spectable>.

   [3] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC1321, MIT LCS
       & RSA Data Security, Inc., April 1992.

   [4] Partridge, C., and F. Kastenholz, "Technical Criteria for
       Choosing IP The Next Generation (IPng)", RFC 1726, BBN Systems
       and Technologies, FTP Software, December 1994.

   [5] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol - DARPA Internet Program Protocol
       Specification," STD 5, RFC 791, USC/Information Sciences
       Institute, September 1981.

   [6] Touch, J., "Performance Analysis fo MD5," to appear in ACM
       Sigcomm '95, Boston.

   [7] Touch, J., Optimized MD5 software, <ftp://ftp.isi.edu/pub/hpcc-
       papers/touch/md5-opt.tar>.

Author's Address

   Joe Touch
   Information Sciences Institute
   University of Southern California
   4676 Admiralty Way
   Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695
   USA

   Phone: [phone] x151
   Fax:   [phone]
   URL:   ftp://ftp.isi.edu/pub/hpcc-papers/touch
   EMail: [e-mail]





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