📄 draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-sha-04.txt
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INTERNET-DRAFT HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers SHA-1 truncated to 96 bits (12 octets) SHOULD be implemented.D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 6]INTERNET-DRAFT HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers4. TSIG Policy Provisions and Truncation Error Use of TSIG is by mutual agreement between a resolver and server. Implicit in such "agreement" are policies as to acceptable keys and algorithms and, with the extensions in this doucment, truncations. In particular note the following: Such policies MAY require the rejection of TSIGs even though they use an algorithm for which implementation is mandatory. When a policy calls for the acceptance of a TSIG with a particular algorithm and a particular non-zero amount of trunction it SHOULD also permit the use of that algorithm with lesser truncation (a longer MAC) up to the full HMAC output. Regardless of a lower acceptable truncated MAC length specified by policy, a reply SHOULD be sent with a MAC at least as long as that in the corresponding request unless the request specified a MAC length longer than the HMAC output. Implementations permitting policies with multiple acceptable algorithms and/or truncations SHOULD permit this list to be ordered by presumed strength and SHOULD allow different truncations for the same algorithm to be treatred as spearate entities in this list. When so implemented, policies SHOULD accept a presumed stronger algorithm and truncation than the minimum strength required by the policy. If a TSIG is received with truncation which is permitted under Section 3 above but the MAC is too short for the policy in force, an RCODE of TBA [22 suggested](BADTRUNC) MUST be returned.D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 7]INTERNET-DRAFT HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers5. IANA Considerations This document, on approval for publication as a standards track RFC, (1) registers the new TSIG algorithm identifiers listed in Section 2 with IANA and (2) Section 4 allocates the BADTRUNC RCODE TBA [22 suggested].6. Security Considerations For all of the message authentication code algorithms listed herein, those producing longer values are believed to be stronger; however, while there have been some arguments that mild truncation can strengthen a MAC by reducing the information available to an attacker, excessive truncation clearly weakens authentication by reducing the number of bits an attacker has to try to brute force [RFC 2104]. Significant progress has been made recently in cryptanalysis of hash function of the type used herein, all of which ultimately derive from the design of MD4. While the results so far should not effect HMAC, the stronger SHA-1 and SHA-256 algorithms are being made mandatory due to caution. See the Security Considerations section of [RFC 2845]. See also the Security Considerations section of [RFC 2104] from which the limits on truncation in this RFC were taken.6. Copyright and Disclaimer Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 8]INTERNET-DRAFT HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers7. Normative References [FIPS 180-2] - "Secure Hash Standard", (SHA-1/224/256/384/512) US Federal Information Processing Standard, with Change Notice 1, February 2004. [RFC 1321] - Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm ", RFC 1321, April 1992. [RFC 2104] - Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997. [RFC 2119] - Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC 2845] - Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B. Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.8. Informative References. [RFC 2931] - Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, September 2000. [RFC 3174] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001. [RFC 3645] - Kwan, S., Garg, P., Gilroy, J., Esibov, L., Westhead, J., and R. Hall, "Generic Security Service Algorithm for Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (GSS-TSIG)", RFC 3645, October 2003. [RFC 3874] - R. Housely, "A 224-bit One-way Hash Function: SHA-224", September 2004, [SHA2draft] - Eastlake, D., T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA)", work in progress.D. Eastlake 3rd [Page 9]INTERNET-DRAFT HMAC-SHA TSIG IdentifiersAuthor's Address Donald E. Eastlake 3rd Motorola Laboratories 155 Beaver Street Milford, MA 01757 USA Telephone: +1-508-786-7554 (w) EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.comExpiration and File Name This draft expires in December 2005. Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-sha-04.txtD. Eastlake 3rd [Page 10]
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