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📄 draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-sha-04.txt

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INTERNET-DRAFT                                    Donald E. Eastlake 3rdUPDATES RFC 2845                                   Motorola LaboratoriesExpires: December 2005                                         June 2005                  HMAC SHA TSIG Algorithm Identifiers                  ---- --- ---- --------- -----------                  <draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-sha-04.txt>Status of This Document   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.   This draft is intended to be become a Proposed Standard RFC.   Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent   to the DNSEXT working group mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>.   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-   Drafts.   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference   material or to cite them other than a "work in progress."   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.htmlAbstract   Use of the TSIG DNS resource record requires specification of a   cryptographic message authentication code.  Currently identifiers   have been specified only for the HMAC-MD5 and GSS TSIG algorithms.   This document standardizes identifiers and implementation   requirements for additional HMAC SHA TSIG algorithms and standardizes   how to specify and handle the truncation of HMAC values.Copyright Notice   Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2005. All Rights Reserved.D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 1]INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG IdentifiersTable of Contents      Status of This Document....................................1      Abstract...................................................1      Copyright Notice...........................................1      Table of Contents..........................................2      1. Introduction............................................3      2. Algorithms and Identifiers..............................4      3. Specifying Truncation...................................5      3.1 Truncation Specification...............................5      4. TSIG Policy Provisions and Truncation Error.............7      5. IANA Considerations.....................................8      6. Security Considerations.................................8      6. Copyright and Disclaimer................................8      7. Normative References....................................9      8. Informative References..................................9      Author's Address..........................................10      Expiration and File Name..................................10D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 2]INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers1. Introduction   [RFC 2845] specifies a TSIG Resource Record (RR) that can be used to   authenticate DNS queries and responses. This RR contains a domain   name syntax data item which names the authentication algorithm used.   [RFC 2845] defines the HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT name for   authentication codes using the HMAC [RFC 2104] algorithm with the MD5   [RFC 1321] hash algorithm. IANA has also registered "gss-tsig" as an   identifier for TSIG authentication where the cryptographic operations   are delegated to GSS [RFC 3645].   In Section 2, this document specifies additional names for TSIG   authentication algorithms based on US NIST SHA algorithms and HMAC   and specifies the implementation requirements for those algorithms.   In Section 3, this document specifies the meaning of inequality   between the normal output size of the specified hash function and the   length of MAC (message authentication code) data given in the TSIG   RR. In particular, it specifies that a shorter length field value   specifies truncation and a longer length field is an error.   In Section 4, policy restrictions and implications related to   truncation and a new error code to indicate truncation shorter than   permitted by policy are described and specified.   The use herein of MUST, SHOULD, MAY, MUST NOT, and SHOULD NOT is as   defined in [RFC 2119].D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 3]INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers2. Algorithms and Identifiers   TSIG Resource Records (RRs) [RFC 2845] are used to authenticate DNS   queries and responses.  They are intended to be efficient symmetric   authentication codes based on a shared secret. (Asymmetric signatures   can be provided using the SIG RR [RFC 2931]. In particular, SIG(0)   can be used for transaction signatures.) Used with a strong hash   function, HMAC [RFC 2104] provides a way to calculate such symmetric   authentication codes. The only specified HMAC based TSIG algorithm   identifier has been HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT based on MD5 [RFC 1321].   The use of SHA-1 [FIPS 180-2, RFC 3174], which is a 160 bit hash, as   compared with the 128 bits for MD5, and additional hash algorithms in   the SHA family [FIPS 180-2, RFC 3874, SHA2draft] with 224, 256, 384,   and 512 bits, may be preferred in some cases particularly since   increasingly successful cryptanalytic attacks are being made on the   shorter hashes.  Use of TSIG between a DNS resolver and server is by   mutual agreement. That agreement can include the support of   additional algorithms and may specify policies as to which algorithms   and truncations are acceptable subject to the restrication and   guidelines in Section 3 and 4 below.   The current HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT identifier is included in the   table below for convenience.  Implementations which support TSIG MUST   also implement HMAC SHA1 and HMAC SHA256 and MAY implement gss-tsig   and the other algorithms listed below.         Mandatory      HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT         Mandatory      hmac-sha1         Optional       hmac-sha224         Mandatory      hmac-sha256         Optional       hamc-sha384         Optional       hmac-sha512D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 4]INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers3. Specifying Truncation   When space is at a premium and the strength of the full length of an   HMAC is not needed, it is reasonable to truncate the HMAC output and   use the truncated value for authentication. HMAC SHA-1 truncated to   96 bits is an option available in several IETF protocols including   IPSEC and TLS.   The TSIG RR [RFC 2845] includes a "MAC size" field, which gives the   size of the MAC field in octets. But [RFC 2845] does not specify what   to do if this MAC size differs from the length of the output of HMAC   for a particular hash function. Truncation is indicated by a MAC size   less than the HMAC size as specified below.3.1 Truncation Specification   The specification for TSIG handling is changed as follows:   1. If "MAC size" field is greater than HMAC output length:         This case MUST NOT be generated and if received MUST cause the      packet to be dropped and RCODE 1 (FORMERR) to be returned.   2. If "MAC size" field equals HMAC output length:         Operation is as described in [RFC 2845] with the entire output      HMAC output present.   3. "MAC size" field is less than HMAC output length but greater than      that specified in case 4 below:         This is sent when the signer has truncated the HMAC output to      an allowable length, as described in RFC 2104, taking initial      octets and discarding trailing octets. TSIG truncation can only be      to an integral number of octets. On receipt of a packet with      truncation thus indicated, the locally calculated MAC is similarly      truncated and only the truncated values compared for      authentication. The request MAC used when calculating the TSIG MAC      for a reply is the trucated request MAC.   4. "MAC size" field is less than the larger of 10 (octets) and half      the length of the hash function in use:         With the exception of certain TSIG error messages described in      RFC 2845 section 3.2 where it is permitted that the MAC size be      zero, this case MUST NOT be generated and if received MUST cause      the packet to be dropped and RCODE 1 (FORMERR) to be returned. The      size limit for this case can also, for the hash functions      mentioned in this document, be stated as less than half the hash      function length for hash functions other than MD5 and less than 10      octets for MD5.D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 5]

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