📄 draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-04.txt
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Network Working Group S. JosefssonInternet-Draft August 30, 2005Expires: March 3, 2006 Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS) draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-04Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 3, 2006.Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).Abstract Cryptographic public keys are frequently published and their authenticity demonstrated by certificates. A CERT resource record (RR) is defined so that such certificates and related certificate revocation lists can be stored in the Domain Name System (DNS). This document obsoletes RFC 2538.Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 1]Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. The CERT Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Certificate Type Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Text Representation of CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. X.509 OIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Content-based X.509 CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Purpose-based X.509 CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Content-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. Purpose-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.5. Owner names for IPKIX, ISPKI, and IPGP . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9. Changes since RFC 2538 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Appendix A. Copying conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 2]Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 20051. Introduction Public keys are frequently published in the form of a certificate and their authenticity is commonly demonstrated by certificates and related certificate revocation lists (CRLs). A certificate is a binding, through a cryptographic digital signature, of a public key, a validity interval and/or conditions, and identity, authorization, or other information. A certificate revocation list is a list of certificates that are revoked, and incidental information, all signed by the signer (issuer) of the revoked certificates. Examples are X.509 certificates/CRLs in the X.500 directory system or OpenPGP certificates/revocations used by OpenPGP software. Section 2 below specifies a CERT resource record (RR) for the storage of certificates in the Domain Name System [1] [2]. Section 3 discusses appropriate owner names for CERT RRs. Sections 4, 5, and 6 below cover performance, IANA, and security considerations, respectively. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [3].2. The CERT Resource Record The CERT resource record (RR) has the structure given below. Its RR type code is 37. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | type | key tag | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | algorithm | / +---------------+ certificate or CRL / / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-| The type field is the certificate type as defined in section 2.1 below. The key tag field is the 16 bit value computed for the key embedded in the certificate, using the RRSIG Key Tag algorithm described in Appendix B of [10]. This field is used as an efficiency measure to pick which CERT RRs may be applicable to a particular key. The keyJosefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 3]Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 tag can be calculated for the key in question and then only CERT RRs with the same key tag need be examined. However, the key must always be transformed to the format it would have as the public key portion of a DNSKEY RR before the key tag is computed. This is only possible if the key is applicable to an algorithm (and limits such as key size limits) defined for DNS security. If it is not, the algorithm field MUST BE zero and the tag field is meaningless and SHOULD BE zero. The algorithm field has the same meaning as the algorithm field in DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs [10], except that a zero algorithm field indicates the algorithm is unknown to a secure DNS, which may simply be the result of the algorithm not having been standardized for DNSSEC.2.1. Certificate Type Values The following values are defined or reserved: Value Mnemonic Certificate Type ----- -------- ---------------- 0 reserved 1 PKIX X.509 as per PKIX 2 SPKI SPKI certificate 3 PGP OpenPGP packet 4 IPKIX The URL of an X.509 data object 5 ISPKI The URL of an SPKI certificate 6 IPGP The URL of an OpenPGP packet 7-252 available for IANA assignment 253 URI URI private 254 OID OID private 255-65534 available for IANA assignment 65535 reserved The PKIX type is reserved to indicate an X.509 certificate conforming to the profile being defined by the IETF PKIX working group. The certificate section will start with a one-byte unsigned OID length and then an X.500 OID indicating the nature of the remainder of the certificate section (see 2.3 below). (NOTE: X.509 certificates do not include their X.500 directory type designating OID as a prefix.) The SPKI type is reserved to indicate the SPKI certificate format [13], for use when the SPKI documents are moved from experimental status. The PGP type indicates an OpenPGP packet as described in [6] and its extensions and successors. Two uses are to transfer public key material and revocation signatures. The data is binary, and MUST NOT be encoded into an ASCII armor. An implementation SHOULD processJosefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 4]Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005 transferable public keys as described in section 10.1 of [6], but it MAY handle additional OpenPGP packets. The IPKIX, ISPKI and IPGP types indicate a URL which will serve the content that would have been in the "certificate, CRL or URL" field of the corresponding (PKIX, SPKI or PGP) packet types. These types are known as "indirect". These packet types MUST be used when the content is too large to fit in the CERT RR, and MAY be used at the implementer's discretion. They SHOULD NOT be used where the entire UDP packet would have fit in 512 bytes. The URI private type indicates a certificate format defined by an absolute URI. The certificate portion of the CERT RR MUST begin with a null terminated URI [5] and the data after the null is the private format certificate itself. The URI SHOULD be such that a retrieval from it will lead to documentation on the format of the certificate. Recognition of private certificate types need not be based on URI equality but can use various forms of pattern matching so that, for example, subtype or version information can also be encoded into the URI. The OID private type indicates a private format certificate specified by an ISO OID prefix. The certificate section will start with a one- byte unsigned OID length and then a BER encoded OID indicating the nature of the remainder of the certificate section. This can be an X.509 certificate format or some other format. X.509 certificates that conform to the IETF PKIX profile SHOULD be indicated by the PKIX type, not the OID private type. Recognition of private certificate types need not be based on OID equality but can use various forms of pattern matching such as OID prefix.2.2. Text Representation of CERT RRs The RDATA portion of a CERT RR has the type field as an unsigned decimal integer or as a mnemonic symbol as listed in section 2.1 above. The key tag field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer. The algorithm field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer or a mnemonic symbol as listed in [10]. The certificate / CRL portion is represented in base 64 [14] and may be divided up into any number of white space separated substrings, down to single base 64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full signature. These substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis.Josefsson Expires March 3, 2006 [Page 5]Internet-Draft Storing Certificates in the DNS August 2005
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