rfc1687.txt

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Network Working Group                                      E. Fleischman
Request for Comments: 1687                      Boeing Computer Services
Category: Informational                                      August 1994


                 A Large Corporate User's View of IPng

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  This memo
   does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of
   this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   This document was submitted to the IETF IPng area in response to RFC
   1550.  Publication of this document does not imply acceptance by the
   IPng area of any ideas expressed within.  Comments should be
   submitted to the [e-mail] mailing list.

Disclaimer and Acknowledgments

   Much of this draft has been adapted from the article "A User's View
   of IPng" by Eric Fleischman which was published in the September 1993
   edition of ConneXions Magazine (Volume 7, Number 9, pages 36 - 40).
   The original ConneXions article represented an official position of
   The Boeing Company on IPng issues.  This memo is an expansion of that
   original treatment.  This version also represents a Boeing corporate
   opinion which we hope will be helpful to the on-going IPng
   discussions.  An assumption of this paper is that other Fortune 100
   companies which have non-computing-related products and services will
   tend to have a viewpoint about IPng which is similar to the one
   presented by this paper.

Executive Summary

   Key points:

   1)  Large corporate users generally view IPng with disfavor.

   2)  Industry and the IETF community have very different values
       and viewpoints which lead to orthogonal assessments concerning
       the desirability of deploying IPng.

   3)  This paper provides insight into the mindset of a large
       corporate user concerning the relevant issues surrounding an
       IPng deployment.  The bottom line is that a new deployment of
       IPng runs counter to several business drivers.  A key point to



Fleischman                                                      [Page 1]

RFC 1687         A Large Corporate User's View of IPng       August 1994


       highlight is that end users actually buy applications -- not
       networking technologies.

   4)  There are really only two compelling reasons for a large end
       user to deploy IPng:

       A) The existence of must-have products which are tightly coupled
           with IPng.
       B) Receipt of a command to deploy IPng from senior management.
          The former would probably be a function of significant
          technological advances.  The latter probably would be a
          function of a convergence of IPng with International
          Standards (OSI).

   5)  Five end user requirements for IPng are presented:

       A) The IPng approach must permit piecemeal transitions.
       B) The IPng approach must not hinder technological advances.
       C) The IPng approach is expected to foster synergy with
          International Standards (OSI).
       D) The IPng approach should have "Plug and Play" networking
          capabilities.
       E) The IPng approach must have network security characteristics
          which are better than existing IPv4 protocols.

Introduction

   The goal of this paper is to examine the implications of IPng from
   the point of view of Fortune 100 corporations which have heavily
   invested in TCP/IP technology in order to achieve their (non-computer
   related) business goals.

   It is our perspective that End Users currently view IPng with
   disfavor.  This note seeks to explain some of the reasons why an end
   user's viewpoint may differ significantly from a "traditional IETF"
   perspective.  It addresses some of the reasons which cause IPng to be
   viewed by end users as a "threat" rather than as an "opportunity".
   It enumerates some existing End User dissatisfactions with IPv4
   (i.e., current TCP/IP network layer).  These dissatisfactions may
   perhaps be eventually exploited to "sell" IPng to users.  Finally, it
   identifies the most compelling reasons for end users to deploy IPng.
   In any case, the IETF community should be warned that their own
   enthusiasm for IPng is generally not shared by end users and that
   convincing end users to deploy IPng technologies may be very
   difficult -- assuming it can be done at all.






Fleischman                                                      [Page 2]

RFC 1687         A Large Corporate User's View of IPng       August 1994


The Internet and TCP/IP Protocols are not Identical

   The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) community closely
   associates TCP/IP protocols with the Internet.  In many cases it is
   difficult to discern from the IETF perspective where the world-wide
   Internet infrastructure ends and the services of the TCP/IP Protocol
   Suite begin -- they are not always distinguishable from each other.
   Historically they both stem from the same roots:  DARPA was the
   creator of TCP/IP and of the seminal "Internet".  The services
   provided by the Internet have been generally realized by the "TCP/IP
   protocol family".  The Internet has, in turn, become a primary
   vehicle for the definition, development, and transmission of the
   various TCP/IP protocols in their various stages of maturity.  Thus,
   the IETF community has a mindset which assumes that there is a strong
   symbiotic relationship between the two.

   End users do not share this assumption -- despite the fact that many
   end users have widely deployed TCP/IP protocols and extensively use
   the Internet.  It is important for the IETF community to realize,
   however, that TCP/IP protocols and the Internet are generally viewed
   to be two quite dissimilar things by the large end user.  That is,
   while the Internet may be a partial selling point for some TCP/IP
   purchases, it is rarely even a primary motivation for the majority of
   purchases.  Many end users, in fact, have sizable TCP/IP deployments
   with no Internet connectivity at all.  Thus, many end users view the
   relationship between the Internet and TCP/IP protocols to be tenuous
   at best.

   More importantly, many corporations have made substantial investments
   in (non-Internet) external communications infrastructures.  A variety
   of reasons account for this including the fact that until recently
   the Internet was excluded from the bilateral agreements and
   international tariffs necessary for international commerce.  In any
   case, end users today are not (in the general case) dependent upon
   the Internet to support their business processes.  [Note: the
   previous sentence does not deny that many Fortune 100 employees (such
   as the author) are directly dependent upon the Internet to fulfill
   their job responsibilities: The Internet has become an invaluable
   tool for many corporations' "research and education" activities.
   However, it is rarely used today for activities which directly affect
   the corporations' financial "bottom line":  commerce.]  By contrast,
   large End Users with extensive internal TCP/IP deployments may
   perhaps view TCP/IP technology to be critically important to their
   corporation's core business processes.







Fleischman                                                      [Page 3]

RFC 1687         A Large Corporate User's View of IPng       August 1994


Security Islands

   Another core philosophical difference between large end users and the
   IETF is concerning the importance of Security Islands (i.e.,
   firewalls).  The prevalent IETF perspective is that Security Islands
   are "A Bad Thing".  The basic IETF assumption is that the
   applications they are designing are universally needed and that
   Security Islands provide undesirable filters for that usage.  That
   is, the IETF generally has a world view which presupposes that data
   access should be unrestricted and widely available.

   By contrast, corporations generally regard data as being a
   "sensitive" corporate asset:  If compromised the very viability of
   the corporation itself may in some cases be at risk.  Corporations
   therefore presuppose that data exchange should be restricted.

   Large end users also tend to believe that their employees have
   differing data access needs:  Factory workers have different
   computing needs than accountants who have different needs than
   aeronautical engineers who have different needs than research
   scientists.  A corporation's networking department(s) seeks to ensure
   that each class of employee actually receives the type of services
   they require.  A security island is one of the mechanisms by which
   the appropriate service levels may be provided to the appropriate
   class of employee, particularly in regards to external access
   capabilities.

   More importantly, there are differing classes of computer resources
   within a corporation.  A certain percentage of these resources are
   absolutely critical to the continuing viability of that corporation.
   These systems should never (ever) be accessible from outside of the
   company.  These "corporate jewels" must be protected by viable
   security mechanisms.  Security islands are one very important
   component within a much larger total security solution.

   For these reasons we concur with the observation made by Yakov
   Rekhter (of IBM) and Bob Moskowitz (of Chrysler) in their joint
   electronic mail message of January 28, 1994.  They wrote:

   "Hosts within sites that use IP can be partitioned into three
   categories:

    -    hosts that do not require Internet access.
    -    hosts that need access to a limited set of Internet
         services (e.g., Email, FTP, netnews, remote login) which can
         be handled by application layer relays.
    -    hosts that need unlimited access (provided via IP
         connectivity) to the Internet."



Fleischman                                                      [Page 4]

RFC 1687         A Large Corporate User's View of IPng       August 1994


   The exact mechanism by which a corporation will satisfy the differing
   needs of these three classes of devices must be independently
   determined by that corporation based upon a number of internal
   factors.  Each independent solution will determine how that
   corporation defines their own version of "security island".

   Thus, if end users use the Internet at all, they will generally do so
   through a "security island" of their own devising.  The existence of
   the security island is yet another element to (physically and
   emotionally) decouple the End User from the Internet.  That is, while
   the end user may use the Internet, their networks (in the general
   case) are neither directly attached to it nor are their core business
   processes today critically dependent upon it.