rfc1192.txt

来自「RFC 的详细文档！」· 文本 代码 · 共 731 行 · 第 1/3 页

   Offering the NSFNET backbone at no cost to authorized networks both
   encourages undisciplined use of the backbone and inhibits private
   investment in backbone networks.  It constrains the development of a
   market for commercial TCP/IP services by diverting an established and
   rapidly growing user base to a subsidized resource.  Charging NSFNET
   regionals and other mid-level networks for the use of the NSFNET
   backbone would resolve this problem, but this would impose a
   substantial cost burden on the mid-level networks, which would in
   turn have to raise membership and connection fees dramatically.  To
   compensate, the NSF subsidy that now underwrites the backbone could
   be moved down the distribution chain to the users of the backbone --
   i.e., to the regional networks, to the campuses, or even to
   researchers themselves.

   Each option poses unique opportunities and problems.  In theory, the
   further down the chain the subsidy is pushed, the more accountable
   providers will be to end-user needs.  Funding in hands of researchers
   would make universities more responsive to researchers' networking
   needs.  Funding in the hands of universities would in turn make
   regional networks more responsive and competitive.  And funds for
   regional networks would spur a general market for backbone services.
   But the mechanisms for expressing user demand upward through these
   tiers are imperfect.  And, from an administrative standpoint, it is
   easier for NSF to simply provide one free backbone to all comers --
   rather than deal with 25 mid-level networks, or 500 universities, or
   perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands of individual researchers.

Option: Funding Researchers

   It would be possible to earmark funds for network services in agency
   research grants as a matter of course, so that no new administrative
   process would be required.  But since network costs are presently not
   usage based, such funding will not readily translate into



Kahin                                                           [Page 5]

RFC 1192           Commercialization of the Internet       November 1990


   identifiable services and may simply end up in local overhead
   accounts since few institutions allocate out costs of access to the
   Internet.  The use of vouchers rather than cash add-ons might help
   ensure that federal resources are in fact applied to qualifying wide
   area network services -- and possibly avoid the imposition of
   standard institutional overhead on direct funding.  However, if
   vouchers can be sold to other institutions, as economists would
   advocate in the interests of market efficiency, these advantages may
   be compromised.  Even non-transferable vouchers may create a unique
   set of accounting problems for both funding agencies and
   institutional recipients.

   A federal subsidy channeled automatically to research grants could
   substantially limit or segregate the user community.  It would tend
   to divide the academic community by exacerbating obvious divisions
   between the resource-rich and resource-poor -- between federally
   funded researchers and other researchers, between scientists and
   faculty in other disciplines, and between research and education.
   Within the academic community, there is considerable sentiment for
   providing basic network services out of institutional overhead to
   faculty and researchers in all disciplines, at least as long as basic
   services remain unmetered and relatively low at the institutional
   level.  Of course, special costing and funding may well make sense
   for high-bandwidth usage-sensitive network services (such as remote
   imaging) as they become available in the future.

Option: Funding Institutions

   Alternatively, funding for external network services, whether in the
   form of cash or vouchers, could be provided directly to institutions
   without linking it directly to federal research funding.  As it is,
   institutions may apply for one-time grants to connect to regional
   networks, and these are awarded based on peer assessment of a number
   of different factors, not just the quality of the institution's
   research.  But redirecting the subsidy of the backbone could provide
   regular support at the institutional level in ways that need not
   involve peer review.  For example, annual funding might be tied to
   the number of PhD candidates within specific disciplines -- or to all
   degrees awarded in science.  Geographic location could be factored in
   -- as could financial need.  This, of course, would amount to an
   entitlement program, a rarity for NSF.  Nonetheless, it would allow
   institutions to make decisions based on their own needs -- without
   putting NSF in the position of judging among competing networks,
   nonprofit and for-profit.

   There are, however, questions about what sort of services the
   earmarked funding or vouchers could be used for.  Could they be used
   to pay the institution's BITNET fee?  Or a SprintNet bill?  Or to



Kahin                                                           [Page 6]

RFC 1192           Commercialization of the Internet       November 1990


   acquire modems?  For information services?  And, if so, what sort?
   Such questions force the funding agency to assume a kind of
   regulatory in an environment where competing equities, demonstrated
   need, technological foresight, and politics must be constantly
   weighed and juggled.

Option: Funding Regional Networks

   Shifting the subsidy to the regional networks is appealing in that it
   appears to be the least radical alternative and would only require
   allocating funds among some two dozen contenders.  Since most of the
   regional networks are already receiving federal funding, it would be
   relatively simple to tack on funds for the purchase of backbone
   services.  However, providing additional funding at this level
   highlights the problem of competition among mid-level networks.

   Although most regional networks are to some degree creatures of NSF,
   funded to ensure the national reach of NSFNET, they do not hold
   exclusive geographic franchises, and in some areas, there is
   competition between regionals for members/customers.  NSF grants to
   regional networks, by their very size, have an effect of unleveling
   the playing field among regionals and distorting competitive
   strengths and weaknesses.

   Alternet and PSI further complicate the picture, since there is no
   clear basis for NSF or other agencies to discriminate against them.
   The presence of these privately funded providers (and the possibility
   of others) raises difficult questions about what network services the
   government should be funding: What needs is the market now capable of
   meeting?  And where will it continue to fail?

   Experience with regulation of the voice network shows that it is
   inefficient to subsidize local residential service for everybody.  If
   one is concerned about people dropping off the voice network -- or
   institutions not getting on the Internet -- the answer is to identify
   and subsidize those who really need help.  The market-driven
   suppliers of TCP/IP-based Internet connectivity are naturally going
   after those markets which can be wired at a low cost per institution,
   i.e., large metropolitan areas, especially those with a high
   concentration of R&D facilities, such as Boston, San Francisco, and
   Washington, DC.  In the voice environment, this kind of targeted
   marketing by unregulated companies is widely recognized as cream-
   skimming.

   Like fully regulated voice common carriers (i.e., the local exchange
   carriers), the non-profit NSF-funded regional networks are expected
   to serve all institutions within a large geographic area.  In areas
   with few R&D facilities, this will normally result in a



Kahin                                                           [Page 7]

RFC 1192           Commercialization of the Internet       November 1990


   disproportionately large investment in leased lines.  Either remote
   institutions must pay for the leased line to the nearest network
   point of presence -- or the network must include the leased line as
   part of common costs.  If the regional network assumes such costs, it
   will not be price-competitive with other more compact networks.

   Accordingly, a subsidy redirected to the regional networks could be
   keyed to the density of the network.  This might be calculated by
   number of circuit miles per member institution or some form of
   aggregate institutional size, figured for either the network as a
   whole or for a defined subregion.  This subsidy could be available to
   both for-profit and non-profit networks, but only certain non-profit
   networks would meet the density requirement, presumably those most in
   need of help.

Increasing the Value of the Connection

   The principal advantage in underwriting the backbone is that it
   provides a evenhanded, universal benefit that does not involve NSF in
   choosing among competing networks.  By increasing the value of
   belonging to a regional network, the backbone offers all attached
   networks a continuing annual subsidy commensurate with their size.

   Increased value can also derived from access to complementary
   resources -- supercomputer cycles, databases, electronic newsletters,
   special instruments, etc. -- over the network.  Like direct funding
   of backbone, funding these resources would induce more institutions
   to join regional networks and to upgrade their connections.  For
   example, where a database already exists, mounting it on the network
   can be a very cost-effective investment, increasing the value of the
   network as well as directly benefiting the users of the database.

   Commercial information services (e.g., Dialog, Orbit, Lexis) may
   serve this function well since they represents resources already
   available without any public investment.  Marketing commercial
   services to universities over the Internet is permissible in that it
   supports academic research and education (although the guidelines
   state that such commercial uses "should be reviewed on a case-by-case
   basis" by NSF).

   But to date there has been remarkably little use of the regional
   networks, let alone the NSFNET backbone, to deliver commercial
   information services.  In part, this is because the commercial
   services are unaware of the opportunities or unsure how to market in
   this environment and are concerned about losing control of their
   product.  It is also due to uneasiness within the regional networks
   about usage policies and reluctance to compete directly with public
   packet-switched networks.  However, for weak regional networks, it



Kahin                                                           [Page 8]

RFC 1192           Commercialization of the Internet       November 1990


   may be necessary to involve commercial services in order to attract
   and hold sufficient membership -- at least if NSF subsidies are
   withdrawn.  Without a critical mass of users, commercialization may
   need to precede privatization.

Impact of Removing NSF Subsidy from the Backbone

   Any shift to a less direct form of subsidy may cause some disocation
   and distress at the regional network level -- until the benefits
   begin to be felt.  No regional network has yet folded, and no
   institution has permanently dropped its connection to a regional
   network as a consequence of higher prices, but concerns about the
   viability of some regionals would suggest that any withdrawal of
   subsidy proceed in phases.

   Moreover, as the NSF subsidy vanishes, the operation of the backbone
   becomes a private concern of Merit, the Michigan Strategic Fund, IBM,
   and MCI.  While Merit and the Michigan Strategic Fund are more or
   less public enterprises within the state, they are essentially
   private entrepreneurs in the national operation of a backbone
   network.  Without NSF's imprimatur and the leveraging federal funds,
   the remaining parties are much less likely to treat the backbone as a
   charity offering and may well look to recovering costs and using
   revenues to expand service.

   The backbone operation could conceivably become either a nonprofit or
   for-profit utility.  While nonprofit status might be more appealing
   to the academic networking community now served by the backbone, it
   is not readily apparent how a broadly representative nonprofit
   corporation, or even a cooperative, could be constituted in a form
   its many heterogeneous users would embrace.  A non-profit
   organization may also have difficulty financing rapid expansion of
   services.  At the same time, the fact that it will compete with
   private suppliers may preclude recognition as a tax-exempt