rfc1824.txt
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Network Working Group H. Danisch
Request for Comments: 1824 E.I.S.S./IAKS
Category: Informational August 1995
The Exponential Security System TESS:
An Identity-Based Cryptographic Protocol
for Authenticated Key-Exchange
(E.I.S.S.-Report 1995/4)
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This informational RFC describes the basic mechanisms and functions
of an identity based system for the secure authenticated exchange of
cryptographic keys, the generation of signatures, and the authentic
distribution of public keys.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and preliminary remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Definition of terms/Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Required mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. SKIA Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. User Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Zero Knowledge Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Unilateral Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. Message Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Non-Escrowed Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Hardware Protected Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Key Regeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. r ^ r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Implicit Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.6. Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.7. Usage of other Algebraic Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7.1 DSA subgroup SKIA Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7.2 Escrowed DSA subgroup User Setup . . . . . . . . 14
4.7.3 Non-Escrowed DSA subgroup User Setup . . . . . . 15
4.7.4 DSA subgroup Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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RFC 1824 TESS August 1995
5. Multiple SKIAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Unstructured SKIAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Hierarchical SKIAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3. Example: A DNS-based public key structure . . . . . . . 18
Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction and preliminary remarks
This RFC describes The Exponential Security System TESS [1]. TESS is
a toolbox set system of different but cooperating cryptographic
mechanisms and functions based on the primitive of discrete
exponentiation. TESS is based on asymmetric cryptographical protocols
and a structure of self-certified public keys.
The most important mechanisms TESS is based on are the ElGamal
signature [2, 3] and the KATHY protocols (KeY exchange with embedded
AuTHentication), which were simultaneously discovered by Guenther [4]
and Bauspiess and Knobloch [5, 6, 7].
This RFC explains how to create and use the secret and public keys of
TESS and shows a method for the secure distribution of the public
keys.
It is expected that the reader is familiar with the basics of
cryptography, the Discrete Logarithm Problem, and the ElGamal
signature mechanism.
Due to the ASCII representation of this RFC the following style is
choosen for mathematical purposes:
- a ^ b means the exponentiation of a to the power of b, which is
always used within a modulo context.
- a[b] means a with an index or subscription of b.
- a = b means equality or congruency within a modulo context.
1.1. Definition of terms/Terminology
Key pair
A key pair is a set of a public and a secret key which belong
together. There are two distinct kinds of key pairs, the SKIA key
pair and the User key pair. (As will be shown in the section about
hierarchical SKIAs, the two kinds of keys are not really distinct.
They are the same thing seen from a different point of view.)
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RFC 1824 TESS August 1995
User
Any principal (human or machine) who owns, holds and uses a User
key pair and can be uniquely identified by any description (see
the Identity Descriptor below).
In this RFC example users are referred to as A, B, C or Alice and
Bob.
SKIA
SKIA is an acronym for "Secure Key Issuing Authority". The SKIA is
a trusted local authority which generates the public and secret
part of a User key pair. It is the SKIA's duty to verify whether
the identity encoded in the key pair (see below) belongs to the
key holder. It has to check passports, identity cards, driving
licenses etc. to investigate the real world identity of the key
owner. Since every key has an implicite signature of the SKIA it
came from, the SKIA is responsible for the correctness of the
encoded identity.
Since the SKIA has to check the real identity of users, it is
usually able to work within a small physical range only (like a
campus or a city). Therefore, not all users of a wide area or
world wide area network can get their keys from the same SKIA with
reasonable expense. There is the need for multiple SKIAs which
can work locally. This implies the need of a web of trust levels
and trust forwards. Communication partners with keys from the
same SKIA know the public data of their SKIA because it is part of
their own key. Partners with keys from different SKIAs have to
make use of the web to learn about the origin, the trust level,
and the public key of the SKIA which issued the other key.
Id[A] Identity Descriptor
The Identity Descriptor is a part of the public User key. It is a
somehow structured bitstring describing the key owner in a certain
way. This description of the key owner should be precise enough to
fully identify the owner of a User key. The description depends on
the nature of the owner. For a human this could be the name, the
address, the phone number, date of birth, size of the feet, color
of the eyes, or anything else. For a machine this could be the
hostname, the hostid, the internet address etc., for a fax machine
or a modem it could be the international phone number.
Furthermore, the description bitstring could contain key
management data as the name of the SKIA (see below) which issued
the key, the SKIA-specific serial number, the expiry date of the
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RFC 1824 TESS August 1995
key, whether the secret part of the key is a software key or
hidden in a hardware device (see section Enhancements), etc.
Note that the numerical interpretation (the hash value) of the
Identity Descriptor is an essential part of the mathematical
mechanism of the TESS protocol. It can not be changed in any way
without destroying the key structure. Therefore, knowing the
public part of a user key pair always means knowing the Identity
Descriptor as composed by the SKIA which issued this key. This is
an important security feature of this mechanism.
The contents of the Identity Descriptor have to be verified by the
issuing SKIA at key generation time. The trust level of the User
Key depends on the trust level of the SKIA. A certain Identity
Descriptor must not be used more than once for creating a User
Key. There must not exist distinct keys with the same Identity
Descriptor. Nevertheless, a user may have several keys with
distinct expiration times, key lengths, serial numbers, or
security levels, which affect the contents of the Identity
Descriptor.
However, it is emphasized that there are no assumptions about the
structure of the Identity Descriptor. The SKIA may choose any
construction method depending on its purposes.
The Identity Descriptor of a certain user A is referred to as
Id[A]. Whereever the Identity Descriptor Id[A] is used in a
mathematical context, its cryptographical hash sum H(Id[A]) is
used.
Encrypt(Key,Message)
Decrypt(Key,Message)
Encryption and Decryption of the Message with any common cipher.
1.2. Required mechanisms
The protocols described in this RFC require the following
submechanisms:
- A random number generator of cryptographic quality
- A prime number generator of cryptographic quality
- A hash mechanism H() of cryptographic quality
- An encryption mechanism (e.g. a common block cipher)
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RFC 1824 TESS August 1995
- An arithmetical library for long unsigned integers
- A method for checking network identities against real-world
identities (e.g. an authority which checks human identity cards
etc.)
2. Setup
This section describes the base method for the creation of the SKIA
and the User key pairs. Enhancements and modifications are described
in subsequent sections.
The main idea of the protocols described below is to generate an
ElGamal signature (r,s) for an Identity Descriptor Id[A] of a user A.
Id[A] and r form the user's public key and s is the users secret key.
The connection between the secret and the public key is the
verification equation for the ElGamal signature (r,s). Instead of
checking the signature (r,s), the equation is used in 'reverse mode'
to calculate r^s from public data without knowledge of the secret s.
The authority generating those signatures is the SKIA introduced
above.
2.1. SKIA Setup
By the following steps the SKIA key pair is created:
- p: choose a large prime p of at least 512 bit length.
- g: choose a primitive root g in GF(p)
- x: choose a random number x in the range 1 < x < p-1
- y:= ( g ^ x ) mod p
The public part of the SKIA is the triple (p,g,y), the secret part is
x.
Since the public triple (p,g,y) is needed within the verification
equation for the signatures created by the SKIA, this triple is also
an essential part of all user keys generated by this SKIA.
2.2. User Setup
The User Setup is the generation of an ElGamal signature on the
user's Identity Descriptor by the SKIA. This can be done more than
once for a specific User, but it is done only once for a specific
Identity Descriptor.
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To create a User key pair for a User A, the SKIA has to perform the
following steps:
- Id[A]: Describe the key owner A in any way (name, address, etc.),
convert this description into a bit- or byte-oriented
representation, and concatenate them to form the Identity
Descriptor Id[A].
- k[A]: choose a random number k[A] with gcd(k[A],p-1) = 1. k[A]
must not be revealed by the SKIA.
- r[A] := ( g ^ k[A] ) mod p
- s[A] := ( H(Id[A]) - x * r[A] ) * ( k[A] ^ -1 ) mod (p-1)
The calculated set of numbers fulfills the equation:
x * r[A] + s[A] * k[A] = H(Id[A]) mod (p-1).
The public part of the generated key of A consists of Id[A] and r[A],
referenced to as (Id[A],r[A]) in the context of the triple (p,g,y).
(Id[A],r[A]) always implicitely refers to the triple (p,g,y) of its
parent SKIA.
The secret part of the key is s[A].
k[A] must be destroyed by the SKIA immediately after key generation,
because User A could solve the equation and find out the SKIAs secret
x if he knew both the s[A] and k[A]. The random number k must not be
used twice. s[A] must not be equal to 0.
Since (r[A],s[A]) are the ElGamal signature on Id[A], the connection
between the SKIA public key und the User key pair is the ElGamal
verification equation:
r[A] ^ s[A] = ( g ^ H(Id[A]) ) * ( y ^ (-r[A]) ) mod p.
This equation allows to calculate r[A] ^ s[A] from public data
without knowledge of the secret s[A]. Since this equation is used
very often, and for reasons of readability, the abbreviation Y[A] is
used for this equation.
Y[A] means to calculate the value of r[A] ^ s[A] which is
( g ^ H(Id[A]) ) * ( y ^ (-r[A]) ) mod p.
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Note that a given value of Y[A] is not reliable. It must have been
reliably calculated from (p,g,y) and (Id[A],r[A]). Y[A] is to be
understood as a macro definition, not as a value.
Obviously both the SKIA and the User know the secret part of the
User's key and can reveal it, either accidently or in malice
prepense. The enhancements section below shows methods to avoid
this.
3. Authentication
This section describes the basic methods of applying the User keys.
They refer to online and offline communication between two users
A(lice) and B(ob).
The unilateral and the mutual authentications use the KATHY protocol
to generate reliable session keys for further use as session
encryption keys etc.
3.1. Zero Knowledge Authentication
The "Zero Knowledge Authentication" is used if Alice wants to
authenticate herself to Bob without need for a session key.
Assuming that Bob already reliably learned the (p,g,y) of the SKIA
Alice got her key from, the steps are:
1. Alice generates a large random number t, 1<t<p-1, where t should
have approximately the same length as p-1.
2. a := r[A] ^ t mod p
3. Alice sends her public key (Id[A],r[A]) and the number a to Bob.
4. Bob generates a large random number c, c<p-1, where c should have
approximately the same length as p-1, and sends c to Alice.
5. Alice calculates
c' := (c * s[A] + t) mod (p-1)
and sends c' to Bob.
6. Bob verifies whether
r[A] ^ c' = (Y[A] ^ c) * a mod p.
This is the Beth-Zero-Knowledge protocol [8] which is based on self-
certified public keys and an improvement of the DLP-Zero-Knowledge
identification protocol from Chaum, Evertse, and van de Graaf [9].
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