rfc2419.txt

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Network Working Group                                         K. Sklower
Request for Comments: 2419            University of California, Berkeley
Obsoletes: 1969                                                 G. Meyer
Category: Standards Track                                          Shiva
                                                          September 1998


         The PPP DES Encryption Protocol, Version 2 (DESE-bis)

Status of this Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [1] provides a standard method for
   transporting multi-protocol datagrams over point-to-point links.

   The PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) [2] provides a method to
   negotiate and utilize encryption protocols over PPP encapsulated
   links.

   This document provides specific details for the use of the DES
   standard [5, 6] for encrypting PPP encapsulated packets.

Acknowledgements

   The authors extend hearty thanks to Fred Baker of Cisco, Philip
   Rakity of Flowpoint, and William Simpson of Daydreamer for helpful
   improvements to the clarity and correctness of the document.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ................................................  2
   1.1. Motivation ................................................  2
   1.2. Conventions ...............................................  2
   2. General Overview ............................................  2
   3. Structure of This Specification .............................  4
   4. DESE Configuration Option for ECP ...........................  4
   5. Packet Format for DESE ......................................  5



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   6. Encryption ..................................................  6
   6.1. Padding Considerations ....................................  7
   6.2. Generation of the Ciphertext ..............................  8
   6.3. Retrieval of the Plaintext ................................  8
   6.4. Recovery after Packet Loss ................................  8
   7. MRU Considerations ..........................................  9
   8. Differences from RFC 1969 ...................................  9
   8.1. When to Pad ...............................................  9
   8.2. Assigned Numbers ..........................................  9
   8.3. Minor Editorial Changes ...................................  9
   9. Security Considerations .....................................  9
   10. References ................................................. 10
   11. Authors' Addresses ......................................... 11
   12. Full Copyright Statement ................................... 12

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Motivation

   The purpose of this memo is two-fold: to show how one specifies the
   necessary details of a "data" or "bearer" protocol given the context
   of the generic PPP Encryption Control Protocol, and also to provide
   at least one commonly-understood means of secure data transmission
   between PPP implementations.

   The DES encryption algorithm is a well studied, understood and widely
   implemented encryption algorithm.  The DES cipher was designed for
   efficient implementation in hardware, and consequently may be
   relatively expensive to implement in software.  However, its
   pervasiveness makes it seem like a reasonable choice for a "model"
   encryption protocol.

   Source code implementing DES in the "Electronic Code Book Mode" can be
   found in [7].  US export laws forbid the inclusion of
   compilation-ready source code in this document.

1.2.  Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [8].

2.  General Overview

   The purpose of encrypting packets exchanged between two PPP
   implementations is to attempt to insure the privacy of communication
   conducted via the two implementations.  The encryption process
   depends on the specification of an encryption algorithm and a shared



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   secret (usually involving at least a key) between the sender and
   receiver.

   Generally, the encryptor will take a PPP packet including the
   protocol field, apply the chosen encryption algorithm, place the
   resulting cipher text (and in this specification, an explicit
   sequence number) in the information field of another PPP packet.  The
   decryptor will apply the inverse algorithm and interpret the
   resulting plain text as if it were a PPP packet which had arrived
   directly on the interface.

   The means by which the secret becomes known to both communicating
   elements is beyond the scope of this document; usually some form of
   manual configuration is involved.  Implementations might make use of
   PPP authentication, or the EndPoint Identifier Option described in
   PPP Multilink [3], as factors in selecting the shared secret.  If the
   secret can be deduced by analysis of the communication between the
   two parties, then no privacy is guaranteed.

   While the US Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm [5, 6] provides
   multiple modes of use, this specification selects the use of only one
   mode in conjunction with the PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP):
   the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode.  In addition to the US
   Government publications cited above, the CBC mode is also discussed
   in [7], although no C source code is provided for it per se.

   The initialization vector for this mode is deduced from an explicit
   64-bit nonce, which is exchanged in the clear during the negotiation
   phase.  The 56-bit key required by all DES modes is established as a
   shared secret between the implementations.

   One reason for choosing the chaining mode is that it is generally
   thought to require more computation resources to deduce a 64 bit key
   used for DES encryption by analysis of the encrypted communication
   stream when chaining mode is used, compared with the situation where
   each block is encrypted separately with no chaining.  Certainly,
   identical sequences of plaintext will produce different ciphers when
   chaining mode is in effect, thus complicating analysis.

   However, if chaining is to extend beyond packet boundaries, both the
   sender and receiver must agree on the order the packets were
   encrypted.  Thus, this specification provides for an explicit 16 bit
   sequence number to sequence decryption of the packets.  This mode of
   operation even allows recovery from occasional packet loss; details
   are also given below.






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3.  Structure of This Specification

   The PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP), provides a framework for
   negotiating parameters associated with encryption, such as choosing
   the algorithm.  It specifies the assigned numbers to be used as PPP
   protocol numbers for the "data packets" to be carried as the
   associated "data protocol", and describes the state machine.

   Thus, a specification for use in that matrix need only describe any
   additional configuration options required to specify a particular
   algorithm, and the process by which one encrypts/decrypts the
   information once the Opened state has been achieved.

4.  DESE Configuration Option for ECP

   Description

        The ECP DESE Configuration Option indicates that the issuing
        implementation is offering to employ this specification for
        decrypting communications on the link, and may be thought of as
        a request for its peer to encrypt packets in this manner.

        The ECP DESE Configuration Option has the following fields,
        which are transmitted from left to right:

                    Figure 1:  ECP DESE Configuration Option

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
        +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
        |   Type = 3    |    Length     |         Initial Nonce ...
        +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

        Type

             Type = 3, to indicate the DESE-bis protocol.  The former
             value 1 indicating the previous DESE specification is
             deprecated, i.e.  systems implementing this specification
             MUST NOT offer the former value 1 in a configure-request
             and MUST configure-reject the former value on receipt of a
             configure-request containing it.

        Length

             10






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        Initial Nonce

             This field is an 8 byte quantity which is used by the peer
             implementation to encrypt the first packet transmitted
             after the sender reaches the opened state.

             To guard against replay attacks, the implementation SHOULD
             offer a different value during each ECP negotiation.  An
             example might be to use the number of seconds since Jan
             1st, 1970 (GMT/UT) in the upper 32 bits, and the current
             number of nanoseconds relative to the last second mark in
             the lower 32 bits.

             Its formulaic role is described in the Encryption section
             below.

5.  Packet Format for DESE

   Description

        The DESE packets themselves have the following fields:

                  Figure 2:  DES Encryption Protocol Packet Format

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |    Address    |    Control    |     0000      |  Protocol ID  |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Seq. No. High | Seq. No. Low  |        Ciphertext ...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

        Address and Control

             These fields MUST be present unless the PPP Address and
             Control Field Compression option (ACFC) has been
             negotiated.

        Protocol ID

             The value of this field is 0x53 or 0x55; the latter
             indicates that ciphertext includes headers for the
             Multilink Protocol, and REQUIRES that the Individual Link
             Encryption Control Protocol has reached the opened state.
             The leading zero MAY be absent if the PPP Protocol Field
             Compression option (PFC) has been negotiated.





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        Sequence Number

             These 16-bit numbers are assigned by the encryptor
             sequentially starting with 0 (for the first packet
             transmitted once ECP has reached the opened state.

        Ciphertext

             The generation of this data is described in the next
             section.

6.  Encryption

   Once the ECP has reached the Opened state, the sender MUST NOT apply
   the encryption procedure to LCP packets nor ECP packets.

   If the async control character map option has been negotiated on the
   link, the sender applies mapping after the encryption algorithm has
   been run.

   The encryption algorithm is generally to pad the Protocol and
   Information fields of a PPP packet to some multiple of 8 bytes, and
   apply DES in Chaining Block Cipher mode with a 56-bit key K.

   There are a lot of details concerning what constitutes the Protocol
   and Information fields, in the presence or non-presence of Multilink,
   and whether the ACFC and PFC options have been negotiated, and the
   sort of padding chosen.

   Regardless of whether ACFC has been negotiated on the link, the
   sender applies the encryption procedure to only that portion of the
   packet excluding the address and control field.

   If the Multilink Protocol has been negotiated and encryption is to be
   construed as being applied to each link separately, then the
   encryption procedure is to be applied to the (possibly extended)
   protocol and information fields of the packet in the Multilink
   Protocol.

   If the Multilink Protocol has been negotiated and encryption is to be
   construed as being applied to the bundle, then the multilink
   procedure is to be applied to the resulting DESE packets.









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