📄 rfc2576.txt
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or SNMPv3 message version, and the original request received by
the proxy was not a GetBulkRequest-PDU, the proxy forwarder SHALL
remove the contents of the variable-bindings field before
forwarding the response.
- If a GetResponse-PDU is received whose error-status field has a
value of 'tooBig,' and the message will be forwarded using the
SNMPv2c or SNMPv3 message version, and the original request
received by the proxy was a GetBulkRequest-PDU, the proxy
forwarder SHALL re-send the forwarded request (which would have
been altered to be a GetNextRequest-PDU) with all but the first
variable-binding removed. The proxy forwarder SHALL only re-send
such a request a single time. If the resulting GetResponse-PDU
also contains an error-status field with a value of 'tooBig,' then
the proxy forwarder SHALL remove the contents of the variable-
bindings field, and change the error-status field to 'noError'
before forwarding the response. Note that if the original request
only contained a single variable-binding, the proxy may skip re-
sending the request and simply remove the variable-bindings and
change the error-status to 'noError.'
- If a Trap-PDU is received, and will be forwarded using the SNMPv2c
or SNMPv3 message version, the proxy SHALL apply the translation
rules described in section 3, and SHALL forward the notification
as an SNMPv2-Trap-PDU.
Note that when an SNMPv1 agent generates a message containing a
Trap-PDU which is subsequently forwarded by one or more proxy
forwarders using SNMP versions other than SNMPv1, the community
string and agent-addr fields from the original message generated
by the SNMPv1 agent will be preserved through the use of the
snmpTrapAddress and snmpTrapCommunity nobjects.
4.2.2. Upstream Version Less Than Downstream Version
- If a GetResponse-PDU is received in response to a GetRequest-PDU
(previously generated by the proxy) which contains variable-
bindings of type Counter64 or which contain an SNMPv2 exception
code, and the message would be forwarded using the SNMPv1 message
version, the proxy MUST generate an alternate response PDU
consisting of the request-id and variable bindings from the
original SNMPv1 request, containing a noSuchName error-status
value, and containing an error-index value indicating the position
of the variable-binding containing the Counter64 type or exception
code.
Frye, et al. Standards Track [Page 22]
RFC 2576 Coexistence between SNMP versions March 2000
- If a GetResponse-PDU is received in response to a GetNextRequest-
PDU (previously generated by the proxy) which contains variable-
bindings that contain an SNMPv2 exception code, and the message
would be forwarded using the SNMPv1 message version, the proxy
MUST generate an alternate response PDU consisting of the
request-id and variable bindings from the original SNMPv1 request,
containing a noSuchName error-status value, and containing an
error-index value indicating the position of the variable-binding
containing the exception code.
- If a GetResponse-PDU is received in response to a GetNextRequest-
PDU (previously generated by the proxy) which contains variable-
bindings of type Counter64, the proxy MUST re-send the entire
GetNextRequest-PDU, with the following modifications. For any
variable bindings in the received GetResponse which contained
Counter64 types, the proxy substitutes the object names of these
variable bindings for the corresponding object names in the
previously-sent GetNextRequest. The proxy MUST repeat this
process until no Counter64 objects are returned. Note that an
implementation may attempt to optimize this process of skipping
Counter64 objects. One approach to such an optimization would be
to replace the last sub-identifier of the object names of varbinds
containing a Counter64 type with 65535 if that sub-identifier is
less than 65535, or with 4294967295 if that sub-identifier is
greater than 65535. This approach should skip multiple instances
of the same Counter64 object, while maintaining compatibility with
some broken agent implementations (which only use 16-bit integers
for sub-identifiers).
Deployment Hint: The process of repeated GetNext requests used by
a proxy when Counter64 types are returned can be expensive. When
deploying a proxy, this can be avoided by configuring the target
agents to which the proxy forwards requests in a manner such that
any objects of type Counter64 are in fact not-in-view for the
principal that the proxy is using when communicating with these
agents.
- If a GetResponse-PDU is received which contains an SNMPv2 error-
status value of wrongValue, wrongEncoding, wrongType, wrongLength,
inconsistentValue, noAccess, notWritable, noCreation,
inconsistentName, resourceUnavailable, commitFailed, undoFailed,
or authorizationError, the error-status value is modified using
the mappings in section 4.3.
- If an SNMPv2-Trap-PDU is received, and will be forwarded using the
SNMPv1 message version, the proxy SHALL apply the translation
rules described in section 3, and SHALL forward the notification
Frye, et al. Standards Track [Page 23]
RFC 2576 Coexistence between SNMP versions March 2000
as a Trap-PDU. Note that if the translation fails due to the
existence of a Counter64 data-type in the received SNMPv2-Trap-
PDU, the trap cannot be forwarded using SNMPv1.
- If an InformRequest-PDU is received, any configuration information
indicating that it would be forwarded using the SNMPv1 message
version SHALL be ignored. An InformRequest-PDU can only be
forwarded using the SNMPv2c or SNMPv3 message version. The
InformRequest-PDU may still be forwarded if there is other
configuration information indicating that it should be forwarded
using SNMPv2c or SNMPv3.
4.3. Error Status Mappings
The following tables shows the mappings of SNMPv1 error-status values
into SNMPv2 error-status values, and the mappings of SNMPv2 error-
status values into SNMPv1 error-status values.
SNMPv1 error-status SNMPv2 error-status
=================== ===================
noError noError
tooBig tooBig
noSuchName noSuchName
badValue badValue
genErr genErr
SNMPv2 error-status SNMPv1 error-status
=================== ===================
noError noError
tooBig tooBig
genErr genErr
wrongValue badValue
wrongEncoding badValue
wrongType badValue
wrongLength badValue
inconsistentValue badValue
noAccess noSuchName
notWritable noSuchName
noCreation noSuchName
inconsistentName noSuchName
resourceUnavailable genErr
commitFailed genErr
undoFailed genErr
authorizationError noSuchName
Frye, et al. Standards Track [Page 24]
RFC 2576 Coexistence between SNMP versions March 2000
Whenever the SNMPv2 error-status value of authorizationError is
translated to an SNMPv1 error-status value of noSuchName, the value
of snmpInBadCommunityUses MUST be incremented.
5. Message Processing Models and Security Models
In order to adapt SNMPv1 (and SNMPv2c) into the SNMP architecture,
the following models are defined in this document:
- The SNMPv1 Message Processing Model
- The SNMPv1 Community-Based Security Model
The following models are also described in this document:
- The SNMPv2c Message Processing Model
- The SNMPv2c Community-Based Security Model
In most respects, the SNMPv1 Message Processing Model and the
SNMPv2c Message Processing Model are identical, and so these
are not discussed independently in this document. Differences
between the two models are described as required.
Similarly, the SNMPv1 Community-Based Security Model and the
SNMPv2c Community-Based Security Model are nearly identical,
and so are not discussed independently. Differences between
these two models are also described as required.
5.1. Mappings
The SNMPv1 (and SNMPv2c) Message Processing Model and Security Model
require mappings between parameters used in SNMPv1 (and SNMPv2c)
messages, and the version independent parameters used in the SNMP
architecture [16]. The parameters which MUST be mapped consist of
the SNMPv1 (and SNMPv2c) community name, and the SNMP securityName
and contextEngineID/contextName pair. A MIB module (the SNMP-
COMMUNITY-MIB) is provided in this document in order to perform these
mappings. This MIB provides mappings in both directions, that is, a
community name may be mapped to a securityName, contextEngineID, and
contextName, or the combination of securityName, contextEngineID, and
contextName may be mapped to a community name.
Frye, et al. Standards Track [Page 25]
RFC 2576 Coexistence between SNMP versions March 2000
5.2. The SNMPv1 MP Model and SNMPv1 Community-based Security Model
The SNMPv1 Message Processing Model handles processing of SNMPv1
messages. The processing of messages is handled generally in the
same manner as described in RFC1157 [2], with differences and
clarifications as described in the following sections. The
SnmpMessageProcessingModel value for SNMPv1 is 0 (the value for
SNMPv2c is 1).
5.2.1. Processing An Incoming Request
In RFC1157 [2], section 4.1, item (3) for an entity which receives a
message, states that various parameters are passed to the 'desired
authentication scheme.' The desired authentication scheme in this
case is the SNMPv1 Community-Based Security Model, which will be
called using the processIncomingMsg ASI. The parameters passed to
this ASI are:
- The messageProcessingModel, which will be 0 (or 1 for SNMPv2c).
- The maxMessageSize, which should be the maximum size of a
message that the receiving entity can generate (since there is
no such value in the received message).
- The securityParameters, which consist of the community string
and the message's source and destination transport domains and
addresses.
- The securityModel, which will be 1 (or 2 for SNMPv2c).
- The securityLevel, which will be noAuthNoPriv.
- The wholeMsg and wholeMsgLength.
The Community-Based Security Model will attempt to select a row in
the snmpCommunityTable. This is done by performing a search through
the snmpCommunityTable in lexicographic order. The first entry for
which the following matching criteria are satisfied will be selected:
- The community string is equal to the snmpCommunityName value.
- If the snmpCommunityTransportTag is an empty string, it is
ignored for the purpose of matching. If the
snmpCommunityTransportTag is not an empty string, the
transportDomain and transportAddress from which the message was
received must match one of the entries in the
snmpTargetAddrTable selected by the snmpCommunityTransportTag
Frye, et al. Standards Track [Page 26]
RFC 2576 Coexistence between SNMP versions March 2000
value. The snmpTargetAddrTMask object is used as described in
section 5.3 when checking whether the transportDomain and
transportAddress matches a entry in the snmpTargetAddrTable.
If no such entry can be found, an authentication failure occurs as
described in RFC1157 [2], and the snmpInBadCommunityNames counter is
incremented.
The parameters returned from the Community-Based Security Model are:
- The securityEngineID, which will always be the local value of
snmpEngineID.0.
- The securityName.
- The scopedPDU. Note that this param
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