📄 rfc2679.txt
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Since a pseudo-random number sequence is employed, the sequence of
times, and hence the value of the sample, is not fully specified.
Pseudo-random number generators of good quality will be needed to
achieve the desired qualities.
The sample is defined in terms of a Poisson process both to avoid the
effects of self-synchronization and also capture a sample that is
statistically as unbiased as possible. {Comment: there is, of
course, no claim that real Internet traffic arrives according to a
Poisson arrival process.} The Poisson process is used to schedule
the delay measurements. The test packets will generally not arrive
at Dst according to a Poisson distribution, since they are influenced
by the network.
All the singleton Type-P-One-way-Delay metrics in the sequence will
have the same values of Src, Dst, and Type-P.
Note also that, given one sample that runs from T0 to Tf, and given
new time values T0' and Tf' such that T0 <= T0' <= Tf' <= Tf, the
subsequence of the given sample whose time values fall between T0'
and Tf' are also a valid Type-P-One-way-Delay-Poisson-Stream sample.
4.6. Methodologies:
The methodologies follow directly from:
+ the selection of specific times, using the specified Poisson
arrival process, and
+ the methodologies discussion already given for the singleton
Type-P-One-way-Delay metric.
Almes, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]
RFC 2679 A One-way Delay Metric for IPPM September 1999
Care must, of course, be given to correctly handle out-of-order
arrival of test packets; it is possible that the Src could send one
test packet at TS[i], then send a second one (later) at TS[i+1],
while the Dst could receive the second test packet at TR[i+1], and
then receive the first one (later) at TR[i].
4.7. Errors and Uncertainties:
In addition to sources of errors and uncertainties associated with
methods employed to measure the singleton values that make up the
sample, care must be given to analyze the accuracy of the Poisson
process with respect to the wire-times of the sending of the test
packets. Problems with this process could be caused by several
things, including problems with the pseudo-random number techniques
used to generate the Poisson arrival process, or with jitter in the
value of Hsource (mentioned above as uncertainty in the singleton
delay metric). The Framework document shows how to use the
Anderson-Darling test to verify the accuracy of a Poisson process
over small time frames. {Comment: The goal is to ensure that test
packets are sent "close enough" to a Poisson schedule, and avoid
periodic behavior.}
4.8. Reporting the metric:
You MUST report the calibration and context for the underlying
singletons along with the stream. (See "Reporting the metric" for
Type-P-One-way-Delay.)
5. Some Statistics Definitions for One-way Delay
Given the sample metric Type-P-One-way-Delay-Poisson-Stream, we now
offer several statistics of that sample. These statistics are
offered mostly to be illustrative of what could be done.
5.1. Type-P-One-way-Delay-Percentile
Given a Type-P-One-way-Delay-Poisson-Stream and a percent X between
0% and 100%, the Xth percentile of all the dT values in the Stream.
In computing this percentile, undefined values are treated as
infinitely large. Note that this means that the percentile could
thus be undefined (informally, infinite). In addition, the Type-P-
One-way-Delay-Percentile is undefined if the sample is empty.
Almes, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]
RFC 2679 A One-way Delay Metric for IPPM September 1999
Example: suppose we take a sample and the results are:
Stream1 = <
<T1, 100 msec>
<T2, 110 msec>
<T3, undefined>
<T4, 90 msec>
<T5, 500 msec>
>
Then the 50th percentile would be 110 msec, since 90 msec and 100
msec are smaller and 110 msec and 'undefined' are larger.
Note that if the possibility that a packet with finite delay is
reported as lost is significant, then a high percentile (90th or
95th) might be reported as infinite instead of finite.
5.2. Type-P-One-way-Delay-Median
Given a Type-P-One-way-Delay-Poisson-Stream, the median of all the dT
values in the Stream. In computing the median, undefined values are
treated as infinitely large. As with Type-P-One-way-Delay-
Percentile, Type-P-One-way-Delay-Median is undefined if the sample is
empty.
As noted in the Framework document, the median differs from the 50th
percentile only when the sample contains an even number of values, in
which case the mean of the two central values is used.
Example: suppose we take a sample and the results are:
Stream2 = <
<T1, 100 msec>
<T2, 110 msec>
<T3, undefined>
<T4, 90 msec>
>
Then the median would be 105 msec, the mean of 100 msec and 110 msec,
the two central values.
5.3. Type-P-One-way-Delay-Minimum
Given a Type-P-One-way-Delay-Poisson-Stream, the minimum of all the
dT values in the Stream. In computing this, undefined values are
treated as infinitely large. Note that this means that the minimum
could thus be undefined (informally, infinite) if all the dT values
are undefined. In addition, the Type-P-One-way-Delay-Minimum is
Almes, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]
RFC 2679 A One-way Delay Metric for IPPM September 1999
undefined if the sample is empty.
In the above example, the minimum would be 90 msec.
5.4. Type-P-One-way-Delay-Inverse-Percentile
Given a Type-P-One-way-Delay-Poisson-Stream and a time duration
threshold, the fraction of all the dT values in the Stream less than
or equal to the threshold. The result could be as low as 0% (if all
the dT values exceed threshold) or as high as 100%. Type-P-One-way-
Delay-Inverse-Percentile is undefined if the sample is empty.
In the above example, the Inverse-Percentile of 103 msec would be
50%.
6. Security Considerations
Conducting Internet measurements raises both security and privacy
concerns. This memo does not specify an implementation of the
metrics, so it does not directly affect the security of the Internet
nor of applications which run on the Internet. However,
implementations of these metrics must be mindful of security and
privacy concerns.
There are two types of security concerns: potential harm caused by
the measurements, and potential harm to the measurements. The
measurements could cause harm because they are active, and inject
packets into the network. The measurement parameters MUST be
carefully selected so that the measurements inject trivial amounts of
additional traffic into the networks they measure. If they inject
"too much" traffic, they can skew the results of the measurement, and
in extreme cases cause congestion and denial of service.
The measurements themselves could be harmed by routers giving
measurement traffic a different priority than "normal" traffic, or by
an attacker injecting artificial measurement traffic. If routers can
recognize measurement traffic and treat it separately, the
measurements will not reflect actual user traffic. If an attacker
injects artificial traffic that is accepted as legitimate, the loss
rate will be artificially lowered. Therefore, the measurement
methodologies SHOULD include appropriate techniques to reduce the
probability measurement traffic can be distinguished from "normal"
traffic. Authentication techniques, such as digital signatures, may
be used where appropriate to guard against injected traffic attacks.
The privacy concerns of network measurement are limited by the active
measurements described in this memo. Unlike passive measurements,
there can be no release of existing user data.
Almes, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]
RFC 2679 A One-way Delay Metric for IPPM September 1999
7. Acknowledgements
Special thanks are due to Vern Paxson of Lawrence Berkeley Labs for
his helpful comments on issues of clock uncertainty and statistics.
Thanks also to Garry Couch, Will Leland, Andy Scherrer, Sean Shapira,
and Roland Wittig for several useful suggestions.
8. References
[1] Paxson, V., Almes, G., Mahdavi, J. and M. Mathis, "Framework for
IP Performance Metrics", RFC 2330, May 1998.
[2] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S. and M. Zekauskas, "A One-way Packet
Loss Metric for IPPM", RFC 2680, September 1999.
[3] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (v3)", RFC 1305, April 1992.
[4] Mahdavi J. and V. Paxson, "IPPM Metrics for Measuring
Connectivity", RFC 2678, September 1999.
[5] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September 1981.
[6] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[7] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
Almes, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]
RFC 2679 A One-way Delay Metric for IPPM September 1999
9. Authors' Addresses
Guy Almes
Advanced Network & Services, Inc.
200 Business Park Drive
Armonk, NY 10504
USA
Phone: +1 914 765 1120
EMail: almes@advanced.org
Sunil Kalidindi
Advanced Network & Services, Inc.
200 Business Park Drive
Armonk, NY 10504
USA
Phone: +1 914 765 1128
EMail: kalidindi@advanced.org
Matthew J. Zekauskas
Advanced Network & Services, Inc.
200 Business Park Drive
Armonk, NY 10504
USA
Phone: +1 914 765 1112
EMail: matt@advanced.org
Almes, et al. Standards Track [Page 19]
RFC 2679 A One-way Delay Metric for IPPM September 1999
10. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Almes, et al. Standards Track [Page 20]
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