📄 rfc2057.txt
字号:
RFC 2057 Source Directed Access Control November 1996
For moderated newsgroups, all messages to the newsgroup are forwarded
to an individual who can screen them for relevance to the topics
under discussion. The screening process, however, does not increase
the ability of the original speaker to control who receives a given
message. A newsgroup moderator has as little control as the original
speaker over who receives a message posted to the newsgroup.
Based on the current operations and standards of the Internet, it
would be impossible for someone posting to a USENET newsgroup to
screen recipients to ensure that the recipients were over 17 years of
age. Short of not speaking at all, I know of no actions available to
a speaker today that would be reasonably effective at preventing
minors from having access to USENET newsgroup messages. Requiring
such screening for any messages that might be "indecent" or "patently
offensive" to a minor would have the effect of banning such messages
from USENET newsgroups.
A speaker also has no means by which he or she could require
listeners to provide a credit card, debit account, adult access code,
or adult personal identification number. Each individual USENET
server controls access to the newsgroups on that server, and a
speaker has no ability to force a server operator to take any
particular action. The message is out of the speaker's hands from
the moment the message is posted.
Moreover, even if one hypothesized a system under which a newsgroup
server would withhold access to a message until the speaker received
a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number from the listener, there would be no feasible
way for the speaker to receive such a number. Because a listener may
retrieve a message from a newsgroup days after the speaker posted the
message, such a hypothetical system would require the speaker either
to remain at his or her computer 24 hours a day for as many as ten
days after posting the message, or to finance, develop, and maintain
an automated system to receive and validate access numbers. All of
this effort would be required for the speaker to post even a single
potentially "patently offensive" message to a single newsgroup.
Moreover, even if such a hypothetical system did exist and a speaker
were willing to remain available 24 hours a day (or operate a costly
automated system) in order to receive access numbers, not all
computers that receive USENET newsgroups could reasonably transmit
such access numbers. Some computers that receive newsgroups do so
only by a once-a-day telephone connection to another newsgroup
server. Some of these computers do not have any other type of
Internet connection, and indeed some computers that receive USENET
newsgroups do not even utilize the TCP/IP communications protocol
that is required for direct or real time communications on the
Bradner Informational [Page 11]
RFC 2057 Source Directed Access Control November 1996
Internet. These computers would have no means by which a prospective
listener's access code could be communicated back to a speaker.
It is my opinion that if this hypothetical access system ever were
created, it would be so burdensome as to effectively ban from USENET
newsgroups messages that might be "indecent" or "patently offensive."
Moreover, the communications standards and protocols that would allow
such a hypothetical access system have not as of today been
developed, and no Internet standards setting body of which I am aware
is currently developing such standards and protocols. Specifically,
such a hypothetical access system is not part of the "next
generation" Internet Protocol that I helped to develop.
3.2.3 Internet Relay Chat.
Another method of communication on the Internet is called "Internet
Relay Chat" (or IRC). IRC allows for real time communication between
two or more Internet users. IRC is analogous to a telephone party
line, using a computer and keyboard rather than a telephone. With
IRC, however, at anyone time there are thousands of different party
lines available, in which collectively tens of thousands of users are
engaging in discussions, debates, and conversations on a huge range
of subjects. Moreover, an individual can create a new party line to
discuss a different topic at any time. While many discussions on IRC
are little more than social conversations between the participants,
there are often conversations on important issues and topics.
Although I have not personally operated an IRC server in my career, I
am familiar enough with the operations of IRC servers to be able to
identify the obstacles that a speaker would encounter attempting to
identify other participants and to verify that those participants
were not minors.
There exists a network of dozens of IRC servers across the world. To
speak through IRC, a speaker connects to one of these servers and
selects the topic the speaker wishes to "join." Within a particular
topic (once a speaker joins a topic), all speakers on that topic can
see and read everything that everyone else transmits. As a practical
matter, there is no way for each person who joins a discussion to
interrogate all other participants (sometimes dozens of participants)
as to their identity and age. Because people join or drop out of
discussions on a rolling basis, the discussion line would be
overwhelmed with messages attempting to verify the identity of the
participants.
Also as a practical matter, there is no way that an individual
speaker or an individual IRC server operator could enforce an "adults
only" rule for a selection of the discussion topics. Dozens of IRC
servers are interconnected globally so that people across the world
Bradner Informational [Page 12]
RFC 2057 Source Directed Access Control November 1996
can talk to each other. Thus, a speaker connected to an IRC server
in the United States can speak directly to a listener in Asia or
Europe. There is no practical way that a speaker in the United
States can be reasonably certain that a given IRC discussion is in
fact "adults only."
Nor can a speaker, prior to or at the time of joining an IRC
discussion, ascertain with any confidence the identity of the other
participants in the discussion. Individual participants in an IRC
conversation are able to participate anonymously by using a
pseudonym. A new speaking joining the conversation can see a list of
pseudonyms of other participants, but has no possibly way of
determining the real identify (or even the real e-mail address) of
the individuals behind each pseudonym.
Based on the current operations and standards of the Internet, it
would be impossible for someone participating in a IRC discussion to
screen recipients with a level of certainty needed to ensure the
recipients were over 17 years of age. Short of not speaking at all,
I know of no actions available to a speaker today that would be
reasonably effective at preventing minors from having access to
speech in an IRC discussion. Requiring such screening of recipients
by the speakers for any IRC discussions that might be "indecent" or
"patently offensive" to a minor would have the effect of banning such
discussions.
4.0 Information Retrival Systems
With FTP (or File Transfer Protocol), gopher, and the World Wide Web,
the Internet is a vast resource for information made available to
users around the world. All three methods (FTP, gopher, and the Web)
are specifically geared toward allowing thousands or millions of
users worldwide to access content on the Internet, and none are
specifically designed to limit access based on criteria such as the
age of the Internet user. Currently much of this information is
offered for free access.
4.1 Anonymous FTP
"Anonymous FTP" is a basic method by which a content provider can
make content available to users on the Internet. FTP is a protocol
that allows the efficient and error free transfer of files from one
computer to another. To make content available via FTP, a content
provider establishes an "Anonymous FTP server" capable of receiving
FTP requests from remote users. This approach is called "anonymous"
because when a remote user connects to an FTP server, the remote user
enters the word "anonymous" in response to the server's request for a
user name. By convention, the remote user is requested to enter his
Bradner Informational [Page 13]
RFC 2057 Source Directed Access Control November 1996
or her e-mail address when prompted for a "password." The user is
then given access to a restricted portion of the server disk and to
the files in that area. Even though the user may have entered their
e-mail address in response to the password prompt, there is no
effective validation or screening is possible using the FTP server
software that is currently available. Using currently available FTP
software, a content provider has no way to screen access by
"anonymous" users that may be minors. Even if a content provider
could determine the age of a particular remote user, the currently
available FTP software cannot be set to limit the user's access to
non-"adult" file areas.
FTP server software can allow non-"anonymous" users to access the FTP
server, and in that mode can require the users to have individual
passwords that are verified against a pre-existing list of passwords.
There are two major problems, however, that prevent this type of
non-"anonymous" FTP access from being used to allow broad access to
information over the Internet (as anonymous FTP can allow). First,
with current server software each non-"anonymous" FTP user must be
given an account on the server computer, creating a significant
administrative burden and resource drain. If more than a limited
number of users want access to the FTP system, the requirement of
separate accounts would quickly overwhelm the capacity of the server
to manage the accounts--the FTP server software was not designed to
manage thousands or millions of different user/password combinations.
Second, under existing FTP server software, each of these named users
would have complete access to the server file system, not a
restricted area like the anonymous FTP function supports. This would
create a significant security problem. For these two reasons, as a
practical matter FTP cannot be used to give broad access to content
except via the anonymous FTP option (which, as noted above, does not
allow for screening or blocking of minors).
As discussed below with regard to the World Wide Web, even if someone
re-designed the currently available FTP server software to allow the
screening of minors, the administrative burden of such screening
would in many cases overwhelm the resources of the content provider.
Bradner Informational [Page 14]
RFC 2057 Source Directed Access Control November 1996
Based on the current operations and standards of the Internet, it is
not possible or practically feasible for someone operating an
anonymous FTP file server to screen recipients with a level of
certainty needed to ensure the recipients were over 17 years of age.
Short of not operating an anonymous FTP server at all, I know of no
actions available to a content provider today that would be
reasonably effective at preventing minors from having access to
"adult" files on the FTP server. Requiring such screening by
anonymous FTP server operators to prevent minors from accessing FTP
files that might be "indecent" or "patently offensive" to a minor
would have the effect of banning such anonymous FTP access.
4.2 Gopher.
The gopher program is similar to FTP in that it allows for basic
transfer of files from one computer to another, but it is also a
precursor to the World Wide Web in that it allows a user to
seamlessly jump from one gopher file server to another in order to
locate the desired information. The development of gopher and the
linking of gopher servers around the worlds dramatically improved the
ability of Internet users to locate information across the Internet.
Although in many ways an improvement over FTP, gopher is simpler than
FTP in that users need not enter any username or password to gain
access to files stored on the gopher server. Under currently
available gopher server software, a content provider has no built-in
ability to screen users. Thus a content provider could not prevent
minors from retrieving "adult" files.
As discussed below with regard to the World Wide Web, even if the
gopher server software allowed the screening of minors, the
administrative burden of such screening would in many cases overwhelm
the resources of the content provider.
Based on the current operations and standards of the Internet, it is
not possible for someone operating a gopher file server to screen
recipients with a level of certainty needed to ensure the recipients
were over 17 years of age. Short of not operating a gopher server at
all, I know of no actions available to a content provider today that
would be reasonably effective at preventing minors from having access
to "adult" files on a gopher server. Requiring such screening of
users by gopher server operators to prevent minors from accessing
files that might be "indecent" or "patently offensive" to a minor
would have the effect of banning gopher servers wherever there is any
such material.
Bradner Informational [Page 15]
⌨️ 快捷键说明
复制代码
Ctrl + C
搜索代码
Ctrl + F
全屏模式
F11
切换主题
Ctrl + Shift + D
显示快捷键
?
增大字号
Ctrl + =
减小字号
Ctrl + -