draft-ietf-pkix-sim-00.txt

PKIX的RFC英文文档

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                  Oct 2002
   
3. Definition

3.1 identityData 

   This section gives the syntax for identityData including the real 
   name of a subject and a set of attributes. 
   
   The 'othername' component of the subjectAltName extension field will 
   contain this object. 
   
   id-on-identityData   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on ? }
   
     IdentityData ::= SEQUENCE {
        realName        UTF8String,
        userInfo        SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
                           OPTIONAL
     }
   
     - realName field is the real name of the subject and SHOULD be 
       encoded in UTF8String.
     - Additional information for subject identification MAY be stored 
       in userInfo field. If any, the VID SHOULD be included right here.        
        
3.2 Virtual ID 

   This section gives the syntax for Virtual ID. The Virtual ID is 
   composed of two parts, the hash algorithm identifier and hashed 
   value fields.
   
   id-on-identityData-vid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-on-identityData 2}

     VirtualID ::= SEQUENCE {
        hashAlg         HashAlgorithm,
        vid     [0]     OCTET STRING 
     }
                        
     HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
        
     HashContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        identifier      PrintableString,
        randomNum       BIT STRING 
     }
        
     - hashAlg field represents the hash algorithm and its parameter 
       is used for calculating the VID.        
     - vid field contains a computed value in accordance with the 
       method described in section 2.4, and is computed by hashing 
       DER-encoded HashContent value once more.
          
     - identifier field contains the subject's identifier. It SHOULD be 
       expressed as PrintableString.
     - randomNum field contains a 160-bit random string.


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3.3 Encrypted Virtual ID 
   
   This section gives the syntax for Encrypted Virtual ID. The Encrypted
   Virtual ID is divided into five fields.
   
   id-on-identityData-evid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-on-identityData 2}  
   
     EncryptedVID ::= SEQUENCE { 
        version         [0]     INTEGER DEFAULT v1(0), 
        vidHashAlg      [1]     VIDHashAlgorithm OPTIONAL, 
        vidEncAlg       [2]     VIDEncryptionAlgorithm, 
        certID          [3]     IssuerAndSerialNumber, 
        encryptedVID    [4]     OCTET STRING 
     } 

     VIDHashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 

     VIDEncryptionAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 

     IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE { 
        issuer          Name, 
        serialNumber    CertificateSerialNumber 
     } 

     EncryptContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
        vid             VID, 
        randomNum       BIT STRING 
     } 
       
     - version field describes version information of the EVID. If this 
       spec is applied, v1(0) value will be used. 
     - vidHashAlg field is the hash algorithm and parameters are used to 
       generate the VID. 
     - vidEncAlg field is the asymmetric encryption algorithm and 
       parameters are used to compute the VID.  
     - certID field identifies CA's certificate which is used to encrypt 
       the VID. It consists of the issuer and the serial number of CA's 
       certificate. 
     - encryptedVID field is the output of encrypting DER-encoded 
       EncryptContent value with the CA's public key. 














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4. Example Usage of VID

   The VID in a certificate MAY be used to go through different 
   verification procedures depending on the various situations. 
   
   If a relying party doesn't have any information of a user's  
   identifier, the user SHOULD send his/her ID and R simultaneously.
   
   Step
   ----
   
   1. The user sends the ID and R to a relying party securely.
   2. The certificate including the VID transferred in step 1 is sent to 
      the relying party also.
   3. The Relying party extracts the VID from the received certificate.
   4. Both the ID and the R transferred in step 1 are used to compute  
      VID'.
   5. The VID and VID' calculated in step 3 and 4 separately and   
      compared with each other to see if they are identical. 
      
   The order in which data are sent in step 1 and 2 doesn't matter, but
   the ID and R MUST be transferred securely so as not to be leaked to a 
   third party.
   
   In case of the relying party already knows the user ID, then user 
   only have to submit R. Upon receiving the R and the certificate, the 
   relying party can derive the VID' by putting the user's ID already 
   obtained in advance and the R. At last relying party can tell whether 
   two VIDs are equal or not. 
   
   In case of the user wants to protect his ID from the relying party, 
   the user sends only the output of a hashed value of the ID and the R 
   along with his certificate to the relying party. With h(ID,R) and 
   the certificate, the relying party can draw the VID' by applying one 
   more hash function. Like the other cases, the replying party is able 
   to verify if a user's identity is correct.
      
5. References

   [X.509]      ITU-T Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Public-Key
                and Attribute Certificate Frameworks. 2000.

   [RFC2510]    Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                Infrastructure, Certificate Management Protocols", RFC
                2510, March 1999.
               
   [RFC2511]    Myers, M., Adams, C., Solo, D. and D. Kemp, "Internet 
                X.509 Certificate Request Message Format", RFC 2511, 
                March 1999. 





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   [RFC3280]    Housley, R., Polk, T, Ford, W. and Solo, D., "Internet 
                X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 
                Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 
                April 2002.   
   
   [PKCS#5]     RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
                Standard Version 2.0", March, 1999. 
   
   [PKCS#8]     RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #8: Private Key Information 
                Syntax Standard Version 1.2", November 1993. 
   
   [PKCS#10]    RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #10: Certification 
                Request Syntax Version 1.7", November 2001. 
                
   [PKCS#11]    RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token 
                Interface Standard Version 2.10", November, 1999.  
                
6. Security Considerations

   The security of a VID delivery is entirely upon the security level of 
   procedures for communicating with CAs. Therefore, EVID, the output 
   of encryption of a VID, SHOULD be included in [PKCS#10] or [RFC2511].
                  
7. Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.




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8. Authors' Addresses

   Jong-Wook, Park
   Korea Information Security Agency
   78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803
   REPUBLIC OF KOREA
   EMail: [e-mail]

   Jae-Ho, Yoon
   Korea Information Security Agency
   78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803
   REPUBLIC OF KOREA
   EMail: [e-mail]
   
   Seungjoo, Kim
   Korea Information Security Agency
   78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803
   REPUBLIC OF KOREA
   EMail: [e-mail]

   Sangjoon, Park
   BCQRE
   467-12, Dogok-Dong, Kangnam-Gu, Seoul, 135-270
   REPUBLIC OF KOREA
   EMail: [e-mail]

   Jae-Il, Lee
   Korea Information Security Agency
   78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803
   REPUBLIC OF KOREA
   EMail: [e-mail]
   
   Hong-Sub, Lee
   Internet Security Technology Forum
   78, Garak-Dong, Songpa-Gu, Seoul, 138-803
   REPUBLIC OF KOREA
   EMail: [e-mail]
   
Appendix A. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs

   IMPORTS 
     
        AlgorithmIdentifier, Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Attribute, 
        AttributeTypeAndValue 
                FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) 
                  dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 
                  id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}; 

-- Arc for other name forms
   id-on   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 }
           



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-- Arcs for randomNum, VID and EVID. 
   id-on-identityData   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on ? }  
   id-on-identityData-randomNum OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 
                                { id-on-identityData 1 }         
   id-on-identityData-vid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on-identityData 2 }           
   id-on-identityData-evid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 
                                { id-on-identityData 3 }         

            
-- IdentityData             
     IdentityData ::= SEQUENCE { 
       realName         UTF8String, 
       userInfo         SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue 
                          OPTIONAL 
     } 

-- Virtual ID 
     virtualID ::= SEQUENCE { 
        hashAlg                 HashAlgorithm, 
        virtualID       [0]     OCTET STRING 
     } 

     HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 

     HashContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
        identifier      PrintableString, 
        randomNum       BIT STRING 
     }
      
-- Encrypted VID 
     EncryptedVID ::= SEQUENCE { 
        version         [0]     INTEGER DEFAULT 0, 
        vidHashAlg      [1]     VIDHashAlgorithm OPTIONAL, 
        vidEncAlg       [2]     VIDEncryptionAlgorithm, 
        certID          [3]     IssuerAndSerialNumber, 
        encryptedVID    [4]     OCTET STRING 
     } 

     VIDHashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 

     VIDEncryptionAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 

     IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE { 
        issuer          Name, 
        serialNumber    CertificateSerialNumber 
     } 

     EncryptContent ::= SEQUENCE { 
        vid             VID, 
        randomNum       BIT STRING 
     } 
 
END 

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